

World War II

**German SS Fourth Reich Plans
British Intelligence Files**

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World War II: German SS Fourth Reich Plans British Intelligence Files

168 pages of British intelligence files covering plans by the German intelligence agency, Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers-SS, also known as the SD, to install a "stay-behind" organization in Europe for use after the end of combat, to work behind Allied controls to build a Fourth Reich.

The Sicherheitsdienst, which translates into English as Security Service, was the intelligence wing of the SS and the Nazi Party during World War II. The SD was considered a sister organization of the Gestapo.

DOCUMENTS IN THIS SET

MI5 FILE SF52-4-16

This 78 page file, not released by the British Government until September 2011, was titled, "MISCELLANEOUS INDICATIONS OF G.I.S. POST-WAR PLANS FOR CONTINUED ACTIVITY."

This set of reports dating from November 1944 to November 1949 contains various indications that the German Intelligence Service (G.I.S) had plans for continued activity despite defeat, after the end of World War II.

The file includes reports and assessments of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) attempts to install a "stay-behind" organization in Europe for use behind Allied lines, after the cessation of hostilities, to build a Fourth Reich. The material includes a report on the interrogation of German intelligence official Heinrich von Berseviczy, which suggests that the survivors of the German Intelligence Service were attempting to regroup and reorganize, including the recruitment of new agents.

Plans included a postwar Abwehr. The Abwehr was the German military intelligence agency abolished by Adolf Hitler in 1944. The new Abwehr was to be based in a powdered milk factory in Switzerland, which had the "ostensible purpose of feeding undernourished German children after the war".

A MI5 memo based on the interrogation of German intelligence officer Bruno Nikoll states that, "They were planning the rebirth of Germany and were already beginning to work 'usefully'". The main purpose was to "make the allies post-war task as hard as possible," and to "ferment distrust between Americans and Russians". Various institutions would serve as a cover for agents including local tourist offices and libraries.

Highlights from this collection of documents include information concerning:

A captured German directive on guerrilla warfare dated April 1945, urging agents to work behind enemy lines in reconnaissance, espionage and sabotage.

An extract from a report of the interrogation of Julius Hagemann, mentioning the "Friedensorganisation" post war plan of the Abwehr.

A June 1945 report that various sources indicated that the SD was preparing to continue its work through the Reichspost, the German postal system. The report says that postal employees willing to do SD work were being trained.

MI5 FILE PF 602431

This 86 page file, not released by the British Government until April 2011, was titled, "MORDRELLE.OLIVIER MARIE JOSEPH." This set of documents, dating from November 20, 1944 to May 2, 1946, covers Olivier Marie Joseph Mordrelle, also known as Olier Mordrel, the Breton language version of Olivier Mordrelle. Mordrelle was a Breton separatist who founded the Breton National Party. The Bretons are an ethnic group of Celtic descendants located in the region of Brittany in France. During World War II some Bretons seeking independence from France became pro-German.

An MI5 report describes him as a, "petty political agitator whose efforts to create an independent BRITTANY were treated too indulgently by the French before the outbreak of war."

On December 14, 1938, Mordrelle was convicted in France for an "attack on the nation's unity", and given a one year suspended sentence. In 1939 Mordelle was recruited by the German military intelligence organization Abwer. In May 1940, Mordrelle was condemned to death in absentia by a French military tribunal for his activities in the Breton Separatist movement. After the establishment of a German occupation government, Mordrelle returned to France as a collaborator, but later returned to Germany.

The Sicherheitsdienst (SD) trained him as a saboteur. In April 1945, the mission given to him by the SD was to promote unrest, with the goal of starting a civil war in France, from which a Fourth Reich would emerge.

Mordrelle was captured by Allied forces in Bolzano, Italy in May 1945. During interrogation, he related details about Nazi post-war plans to create "world disorder" that would result in the rise of a Fourth Reich.

Mordrelle told his handlers that he had attended a conference in Deisenhofen near Munich in April 1945. He said that the meeting was presided over by an Obergruppenfuehrer in full SS uniform, comprising 15 representatives from countries west of Germany. Mordrelle said that plans to promote post-war unrest were discussed. At the meeting it was said that ample funds had been planted in South America (mainly Argentina) and trustworthy bankers had been sent to live in Spain and Switzerland. The agents were instructed to keep a low profile after the war before organizing "national movements" to stir up unrest and make the Allies' post-war task as difficult as possible, so that the Nazi party could reappear in a suitable disguise and build up a Fourth Reich.

Much of the file contains details given by Mordelle of connections between Breton separatists and Irish Nationalists and connections between Germany and Irish Nationalists. The file contains information given by Mordrelle on German intelligence activities in Ireland.

On March 11, 1946 Mordelle escaped from allied detention in Rome.

CIA HISTORY OF THE OSS AND PROJECT SAFEHAVEN

In addition to the 168 Pages described above, is a 16 page article from the Summer 2000 issue of the CIA journal, "Studies in Intelligence" titled, "The OSS and Project SAFEHAVEN, Tracking Nazi Gold."

This article was written by Donald P. Steury, who at the time was a CIA Officer in Residence at the University of Southern California. The article recounts the OSS role (SI–Secret Intelligence and X-2–Counterintelligence) in support of US policy to track, locate, and prevent Nazi postwar control of Germany's gold and other valuable assets in neutral countries as an Allied victory approached. The overriding goal of SAFEHAVEN was to make it impossible for Germany to start another war.

Steury wrote, "The fear was that the German political and economic leadership, sensing, defeat, would act to transfer secretly blocs of industrial and fiscal capital to neutral countries, thereby escaping confiscation and the reparations bill. If this happened, German economic and industrial power would be largely intact and would act as a power base from which an unrepentant German leadership could build a resurgent Fourth Reich in 20 years. The military defeat of Germany thus would again be meaningless."

SF52-4-16/V1

MISCELLANEOUS INDICATIONS OF G.I.S. POST-WAR PLANS FOR CONTINUED ACTIVITY

SF52-4-16/V1

SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date
	PA		KV3		418			

SF52-4-16/V1

*Connection with G.I.S.

Source:

To be read in conjunction with exhibits in the file

June 45.

A captured member of FAT 123, Sonderfuehrer Z Heinrich von BERSEVICZY, interrogated at 15 US Army Interrogation Centre, has revealed details on alleged preparations made by the Abwehr for a post war intelligence network covering several European countries. The PW stated that he believed that the proposed headquarters for the post-war Abwehr was to be established in a powdered milk factory in Switzerland, with the ostensible purpose of feeding undernourished German children after the war.

12 AG weekly
Int. Summary.
No. 46.
SF.52/Switz/9,1a

1945.

Bruno NIKOLL has revealed plans for an underground organisation consisting of former members of FAKS and FATS with some SD personnel which was to maintain liaison with the Ukrainian Underground (UBA) and the Polish Brigade. This organisation was intended to engage in espionage and small scale sabotage, and to foment distrust between Americans and Russians. There has been no confirmation from other sources of such an undertaking.

USF Report Ref:
461(GBI/CIR/Ops)
SF.52/10/51 10a.

1.
MINUTE SHEET.

Reference SF. 52/4/16.

Nov. 1944.	Note on Margarete GAERTNER from post war organisation angle by Major Geyer.	1w
7.12.44.	Note on Otto Brandel-Stoeckling-Pemic- Boris/Pedro by Major Geyer.	1x
6.1.45.	Note by Major Geyer on Long German stay-behind Org. in Western Europe.	1y
8.2.45.	Note by Major Geyer further to 1y.	1z
22.3.45.	Extract from S.C.I. 12th A.G. Interrogation Report on Julius HAGEMANN, mentioning the "Friedensorganisation", Post-War plan of the Abwehr.	1a.
12.12.44.	X Report on S.D. in Belgium.	1xy.

2.

2.6.45.	From S.C.I. Unit A. forwarding information supplied by SCHULZ on stay-behind units in the Salzburg Area.	2a.
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3.

9.6.45.	Extract from Camp 020 Interrogation Report on KUEBART, mentioning the Post-War Intelligence Organisations.	3a.
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4.

27.6.45.	From 12th Army Group with reference to the Sicherheitsdienst.	4a.
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5.

27.6.45.	Extract from a report forwarded by 7th Army on the interrogation of BRANDL.	5a.
28.6.45.	Copy of a captured document on the training of the G18 for continued resistance.	5b.

6.

6.7.45.	Copy of a report forwarded by 21 Army Group on the Sipo and SD.	6a.
6.7.45.	Extract from AFHQ Report on MORDRELLE re Post-War plans of Amt III B.	6b.

(1609) 23796/1381
2050.000 8/40 JCASLW
Cp644/229
(REGIMINT)
CODE 5-340

[OVER

12.7.45 D.S.DOC. Bulletin d'Information de C.E. No. 48

7a

8.

12.7.45. Interrogation Report re SCHELLENBERG.

8a

9.

16.7.45. Extract from U.S.F.E.T. Intermediate Report on SANDBERGER,

9a

16.8.45. [Note on German Post War Plans.] 6F.52/Spain/7

9b

10.

6F.52/Switzerland/9

3.9.45. [Minute from W.R.C.4.B. enclosing translation of extract of DS/DOC Bulletin d'Information No.92, re GIS activities.]

10a

3.9.45. [Extract from Interrogation Report re Joseph DESBET, forwarded by V.D.7.]

10b.

11.

12.9.45. Extract from DS.DOC. Bulletin d'Information No. 101: Hopes & Plans of the G.I.S.

11a.

12.

24.9.45. Extract from Interrogation Report on STOCKMANN @ MICHEL, d/d 21.9.45, giving Enemy post-war plans for W/T agents. 12a.

12a.

13.

12.10.45. Extract from SCI Unit A Report on WIESER re POST-HOSTILITY PLANS.

13a.

Register No.

Minute Sheet No.

14.

17.1.46. Extract from UNCT P.I. 3. on STEINLE re Friedensnetz (Peacetime Intelligence Net) of Amt VI dated 12.12.45.

14a.

15.

8.3.46. Extract from Report given by KLEYENSTUEBER re Post War Organisation. . 15a.

16.

17

10.11.49. Note to D.D.G. with Minute from M.I.1.'E) re German Intelligence Org.

17a

18.

16.11.49. Note re German Intelligence Org.

18a.

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958. Nov 2010

COPY.

M.I.1(E)/1982 Loose Minute.

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18a-
380

M.I.5.

A study is being made by the War Office on the possibility of a clandestine Intelligence Service being re-opened overseas by the Germans.

In the attached file are the relevant documents so far collected.

Will you please comment on them and let us have anything else you may have on the subject which you think may be of use.

Sgd. G.W.Crocker, Major
for Lt.Col.G.S.

M.I.1.(E)

Ext. 167

1 Nov. 49.

M.I.1(E).

We have no special comments on the information summarised by M.I.4(a) in their note of 19.10.49, but M.I.6 and Intelligence Division, Germany, may be able to add certain particulars.

/There are

11/12/49

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.I.I.I.

There are certainly elements of the old German Intelligence Service in the countries mentioned, and they may be expected to get together on a central organization has been formed in Germany. If something in embryo has not already been formed - and we have no evidence that such a German Intelligence organization is bound to emerge from the present proposals to permit the Germans to establish Security Bureaux at Land level and a Federal Security Bureau. The Federal Bureau would form an excellent cover for a national organization, which will probably develop on the same lines as the Überseedienst did after the last war. As soon as the Germans are travelling extensively on trade matters, contacts will be made with groups in foreign countries.

(S).I.I.I.
Adi. J.S.S.
Qd. vol. I

(Lad) C.M. Fiddell

M.I.5.
16 Nov. 49.

ENCL

TO 17 NOV 1949
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Register No.

Minute Sheet No.

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D.D.G.

I should be grateful for your comments on the attached minute from M.I.1(E). It seems to me strange that the War Office should be embarking upon a step of this sort for which they cannot possibly be properly equipped, and that this should be done either by M.I.6., Int.Div. or ourselves. In point of fact I think that it should be done by M.I.6. or Int.Div., and that at this stage our interest is relatively slight.

B.2.
10.11.49.

J.H. Marriott
J.H. Marriott.

W.H.
3/12/49
[P.T. Over]

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LEVER DEALING WITH GERMANS ABROAD.

SUMMARY.

1. SPAIN.

Evidence indicates that in Spain there is a sizeable German colony which includes many Nazis and former members of the G.I.S. An important section of the colony is strongly nationalist and eager to help in the rebirth of Germany. The leader of this group is said to be Clarita STAUFFER, a prominent woman Falangist. Contacts exist between Germany and Germans in Spain.

It is very probable that an intelligence net would be organised between Germany and Spain should a new German Government be at all right-wing.

2. ARGENTINE.

The numerous Germans who travel illegally in the Argentine do so from private motives only, aided in many cases by the Argentine Government, which is anxious to obtain technicians. Clarita STAUFFER may also have some hand in arranging emigration to the Argentine.

The efficient wartime German intelligence organisation has faded, but has not been obliterated, and could be revived. There is NO evidence, however, of any attempt being made to recreate the intelligence network.

3. BRAZIL.

Germans in the southern states of Brazil are once more beginning to take an active part in State politics. Public opinion, however, appears to be against them. There are links between Germany and Brazil. As yet there is no evidence that the Brazilian Government is recruiting scientists and technicians for work in Brazil.

4. CHILE.

Several German pro-Nazi "groups" are still active, and appear to be gaining confidence. Nazi Germans use propaganda to disparage British and American activities. German intelligence activities are potential.

5. DENMARK.

The Danish Chief of Police published a report in January 1948, which revealed the existence of a widespread organisation engaged in smuggling German scientists and technicians to the Argentine via Denmark.

6. AFRICA.

From small beginnings the Nazi party in South-West Africa had become influential by 1931, and after the rise of the Nazi Party to power in Germany it became dominant and aggressive, with an organisation that reached out to every corner of the territory. In November, 1946, a Commission set up by the Union Government recommended that 254 Germans (of whom 197 were from South-West Africa) should be deported, and a further 107 placed on a Suspended List. The publication of the Commission's report was greeted by a vehement outcry from a

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section of the South African public, prominent among which were the Dutch Reformed Church and a certain so-called "Deutsch-Afrikanischen Hilfsanschluss". The Nationalist Party also supported this outcry, which makes it almost impossible to believe that the agitation against deportation was not largely politically inspired. However, in June 1947, the issue of deportation orders was being proceeded with. It is not known if the deportations were carried out.

7. SYRIA.

The Syrian Government has employed a small number (approximately 60) of German military and technical advisers, allegedly under General Graf von STRACHWITZ. Some of these are mentioned as Nazis. A well-placed Source reports that examination of the papers of the late Syrian President, Marshal Husin ZAİM (Formerly Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Army) reveals that he was in contact with General GUDERIAN, probably with a view to obtaining a further instalment of ex-Wehrmacht officers. We have, however, no evidence of the Germans in the Syrian Army employed in pro-Nazi activities. There are indications that the new regime in Syria is less pro-German, and it seems likely that the number of Germans employed will be reduced rather than increased.

8. AUSTRIA.

There are about 433,000 "less-implicated" Nazis in Austria. In the elections on 9th October, 1949, the new "Fourth Party", the League of Independents (V.d.U.), which openly appealed to ex-Nazi elements (who were recently granted amnesty) surprisingly gained 12 per cent of the popular vote, and 16 of the 165 seats. The party is extreme Right-Wing, and has been attacked by all sections of the Austrian press for being strongly influenced by its Nazi element. There have been reports of a pan-German attitude within the party and of links with Right-Wing parties in Germany. There have also been indications that leaders of the party have been in touch with the Russians.

9. MOROCCO.

In a highly-coloured statement, a certain Karl Heinz KERNER has stated that he had an interview with BORMANN in July, 1949, at his Headquarters at ASILA, Morocco. BORMANN stated he was working for the come-back of National Socialism throughout the world, and that his organisation was world-wide.

M.I.4(a).
19th October, 1949.

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THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
RETAINED IN DEPARTMENT
UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF
THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958. Nov 2010

EXTRACT.

15A.

Extract for File No. 1... SF. 52/4/16 - general. Name:
 Original in File No. 1... 17. 601.503. KLEYERSTUEBER, Serial: 270. Receipt Date:
 Original from: SSU WARREN. Under Ref.: Dated: 2.8.46.
 Extracted on: 20.8.46. by: TAT. Section: R.5.

Extract from unlated "homework" assignment completed by
 Ernst Arno Paul KLEYERSTUEBER, head of Abw.I Luft Berlin
 and later, of Ast Madrid.

.....
KO Spain: R-network, capitulation and liquidation.

The conception of an R-network (Retreat network) had been generally introduced by the Abwehr Dept. since 1943. The R-network was to be established as a precautionary measure in occupied territory in case of a possible retreat. It was only to be made ready for operation before, in order to be put into action after the evacuation. It was then to provide the military intelligence with information from this territory. This information comprised 2 groups.

- 1) Information already received in this territory before the evacuation from outside. This had to be passed on in the "R" case.
- 2) Procurement of information on the enemy in the evacuated territory itself.

For this purpose the Abwehr offices in the occupied territories

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 9.9.46

established, as a precautionary measure, emergency quarters farther back, mostly in the Reich. From here the R-network was to be directed during and after the retreat.

In the case of a neutral country like Spain the "R" case in an altered form meant the breaking off of diplomatic relations between Spain and Germany and/or an Allied entry into Spain. Orders had been given to make preparations for such eventualities. By such preparations it was to be guaranteed that the offices for the reconnaissance of enemy's position of the 3 Wehrmacht branches (Feindlagebearbeitungen) would continue to be provided with information from Spain.

During my time as KO chief "R" preparations only applied to the I-service. The II-service (sabotage) in Spain had been closed since the summer of 1944. The "R" preparations were rejected by the III-service in Spain. That was logical, as after an Allied occupation a German counter-espionage in Spain would have been senseless.

The preparations of "I" had to be extended to the procurement of funds. In accordance with standing orders from the Abwehr Dept. the requirements of a period of 3 months were regarded as a directive. In spite of the falling out of the KO it was to be guaranteed that the information hitherto gained by the KO in Spain from the agents continued to reach the interested quarters in Germany.

The idea was to instruct the agents to transmit their information by wireless to Sigmaringen. From there they would then continue to receive their orders by wireless. Stuttgart and Sigmaringen respectively were planned as emergency quarters for the KO. If expelled from Spain, the military intelligence service to and on Spain was to be continued from here. Apart from its forward location in the southwest, one of the main reasons for the choice of Stuttgart was that the Abwehr Dept. had a large wireless plant in Sigmaringen.

See next page.

EXTRACT.

Extract for File No. Name:

Original in File No. Serial: Receipt Date:

Original from: Under Ref.: Dated:

Extracted on: by: Section:

-3-

It must be made clear that the "R" case presupposed the loss of certain territory, but also that the German Wehrmacht would continue to fight. Plans dealing with the possibility of a German collapse would have been regarded as defeatism and would have led to the most severe punishment of those involved.

"R" preparations in Spain were deemed necessary in the autumn of 1944, as a breaking-off of relations between Spain and Germany seemed possible.

However, from the beginning of 1945 on it became evident that Germany's collapse was imminent. It could be assumed that the KO would be able to operate till then. Preparations for the "R" case were therefore superfluous and were cancelled. Funds detached for this purpose were collected again.

From that time on only those measures were termed "R" preparations which I had planned in the event of the Reich's collapse, viz. remuneration of the members of the KO and of the agents left after reduction of the service. It was necessary to denote these measures as "R" preparations, because non-camouflaged preparations for the event of a collapse could

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have led to dangerous consequences for those involved. (In the inner ring of the KO I called the collapse the "Z" case.) The formerly planned actual "R" preparations were therefore cancelled according to the situation.

The Abwehr Dept. in Berlin handled the plan to prepare Sigaringen as emergency quarters, but I hardly think that more than the initial stage was reached. At the time it was intended to detail the KO members expelled from Spain to Sigaringen. In this way men acquainted with Spanish conditions were gradually to rally there and thus establish the necessary platform for upholding the Spanish agents' connections, in case the KO should no longer exist.

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EXTRACT FOR S.F. 52/4/16.

ORIGINAL IN P.F. 601,816/STEIMLE. 20b.

From USFET with CG, Seventh Army Final Interrogation Report on Eugen STEIMLE.
S E C R E T
Rec'd 17.1.46.
Dated 12.12.45.

16 30/1.
APPENDIX No. 13 to Final Interrogation Report of STEIMLE, Eugen, SS Standartenfuhrer, Chief of Gruppe VI B and Abt. Mil. E, RSHA, Berlin, 12 Dec 45.

The Issue of a "FRIEDENSNETZ" (peacetime intelligence net) of AMT VI

Until the end of the war in May 1945, AMT VI had neither built up on intelligence net nor employed individual V-men or agents in the West-sector. The decision had been made that AMT III and AMT IV were responsible for these functions. This does not concern the Amt Mil., which automatically kept up a military news service within German territory ever since military operations took place on German soil.

The only thing known to STEIMLE about the interior intelligence nets is a remark he once overheard, that AMT VI F/H was supposed to give AMT III technical support. However, he does not know whether or not that actually happened.

STEIMLE's Group of the Berlin area had to move to Thuringia, later to Bavaria, and finally to Austria, when the collapse of Germany became apparent during the last three months of the war. This necessitated a cutting down of the machine to make it possible to move around altogether. For that reason STEIMLE ordered his REFERENTEN to dismiss the majority of their co-workers, or to place them at the disposal of combat units. Thus, only about a third of STEIMLE's group was transferred from Thuringia to Bavaria. When he moved from Bavaria to Austria, he only took his two Referenten BERNHARD and FENDLER, and about 5 other co-workers along.

STEIMLE left the decision for the future use of the individual co-workers to his REFERENTEN, and therefore he can't make any statements as to their later whereabouts. However, it is certain that a great number of them was put at the disposal of combat units. Others gave their Referenten their future address thus enabling AMT VI Hqs - should they be able to operate in Austria under German dominance in case of prolongation of the war - to contact them and assure their future use in new tasks. Everybody recognized the fact that - for all practical purposes STEIMLE's group was dissolved in Rottach-Egern. STEIMLE received no instructions for a formation of a peacetime net during this or the preceding phase; nor did he exercise or plan any intelligence activities after armistice had been declared.

In this connection, STEIMLE mentions the activity of an SS STUBAF, whose name he has forgotten. (PEREY?) He worked on French and Belgian Nationalist-movements in Sector West of AMT III, as far as they were of interest for AMT III. During the last days of April, this STUBAF got in contact with STEIMLE in Rottach-Egern, and asked for his assistance in the financial support and the evacuation to a foreign country of his former co-workers. After mentioning this in his interrogation, STEIMLE remembered the name of DIELS in connection with these happenings. Others were LESSUEUR, the successor to DORIOT, and another Frenchman. STEIMLE referred the STUBAF in question to OSTUBAF BERNHARD for settlement of his financial requests. STEIMLE saw this STUBAF last in the vicinity of Innsbruck, where he introduced him to the last-named Frenchman.

STEIMLE can say with relative certainty that this case was merely the effort of this STUBAF to help his former co-workers save their skin in the approaching catastrophe. Besides the fact that he never spoke to STEIMLE of a peacetime-net, it may be assured that any such plans on his part would be headed for failure because of financial and technical difficulties.

/s/ George G. Charig,
/t/ GEORGE G. CHARIG
Special Agent, CIC

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EXTRACT.

13a

Extract for File No. 1. G.F. 52/4/16. Name: MISC: INDICATIONS OF GIS POST
WAR PLANS FOR CONTINUED ACTIVITY
Original in File No. 1. P.F. 602.711 WIESER. Serial: 130. Dated: 12.10.45.
Original from: SIS (SOI Unit A. Under Ref. ISX-38. 13.8.45.
SALZBURG)
Extracted on: 10.12.45. by: O'B. Section: H/4.

POST-HOSTILITY PLANS.

WIESER affects to know absolutely nothing of offensive post-hostility plans directed against the Allies, such as WERE-WOLF, stay-behind agents or sabotage units, such as those of the "BUNDSCUH", in which KM VIENNA or one of its members was supposed to play a role. Accordingly, he did not receive or give any instructions to this effect and believes that none of his subordinate officers issued ~~at~~ any such instructions. "Only in the event that the former antagonists of Germany should decide to form an anti-bolshevist front", as subject put it, were the members of the KM VIENNA resolved to resume their activities under the aegis of the Allies and against Soviet-Russia. WIESER added that after an interview which he had had on April 29 in SALZBURG with General TURKUL, he was led to believe that "negotiations with the Allies", for such plans were already in progress, and that in the case of General "TURKUL", "preparations for his active collaboration with the Allies were in fact already being made".

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C.R. No.....

MINUTE SHEET No..... *11a*

To: W.R.H.

Please find herewith translation
of extract from "Ds.Doc. Bulletin
d'Information No.101" which can be filed
in S.F. "G.I.S. and plans for the future".

Capt. Josse.

WRC.4.d.
12.9.45

12 SEP 1945

I. - GERMAN I.S. ACTIVITIES.

a) In the past.

Herewith a brief on the various "covers" used by the G.I.S. in SWEDEN.

b) In the present and in the future. - Hopes and plans of the G.I.S.

- 1.- Survivors of the G.I.S. are regrouping, reorganising their service and recruiting new agents. They have great hopes in the rebirth of GERMANY and are already beginning to work "usefully".
- 2.- They are counting on differences of opinion between the Allies and foresee an automatic reaction of the peoples of EUROPE to the "intense bolchevic propaganda", and the successes that this might eventually have. By intelligently exploiting the upheavals in this sphere of adversity, they are reckoning on GERMANY becoming powerful once again, regardless of the ways and means of achieving this.

The new G.I.S. is especially relying on the reaction of the big industrial firms to the "communist menace", and on the support from abroad (SPAIN, the Hearst Press in the U.S.A.) to help with the reconstruction of GERMANY.

- 3.- The new G.I.S. is endeavouring in particular to procure political and economic informations; the military question, apart from the war industries, does not interest them.

II. - ARRESTS.

The following persons have been arrested in GERMANY

a) In the French Zone of occupation.

- KIECH Robert, Captain, SS U'SCHLAF (censor in BERLIN) A.R.P.
- TSCHECHNI Adolf de WALDBHUF, in training at the School of Sabotage called TSIFENTHAL
- LOTH Léopold de TIENGEN, ditto
- FREY Léopold de TIENGEN, ditto
- STANETSKI Anneliese, Colonel WAGNER's ex-secretary. (WAGNER, alias Dr. DELIUS, K.O. BULGARIA)

- VARIOUS G.I.S. "COVERS" IN STOCKHOLM.

Like all neutral countries, various institutions serve as a "cover" for G.I.S. agents. Following is a list of a number of the institutions made out by the Communist newspaper "NY Dagen" of December 1944.

- The German Scientific Institute, center for SD agents.
- The German School, situated at KARLAVAGEN 25, and the Deutsche Akademie with its different branches in the provinces directed by Prof. SIX, Head of AIT VII.
- The Tourists Office
- Nazi Newspaper.
- Telegraph agency office.
- Two German centers.

- The shipping office.
- The Film society
- Seven commercial enterprises
- Libraries
- Swedish Nazi Newspapers.

These are the numerous centers of German espionage in STOCKHOLM. A map of the town, published in this newspaper, marks them by a swastika. The network is very compact, and as the Communists remarked, all these "covers" are situated near some Swedish center of importance.

S. Form 81/R.P./5000/1.45

EXTRACT.

Extract for File No. 1. SF. 52/4/16. Name: Misc: Indications of GIS Post-War Plans for continued Activity.
 Original in File No. 1. PF. 600,492 STOCKMANN. Serial: 16a. Receipt Date: 24.9.45.
 Original from: 089. (V/48 S). Under Ref.: None. Dated: 21.9.45.
 Extracted on: 15.10.45. by: O'B. Section: WR/HI.

Extract taken from Interrogation Report of STOCKMANN @ MICHEL, Sdr. of Gruppe I M, PARIS, who was arrested on 13.8.45 at SIMBACH.

F. ENEMY POST-WAR PLANS FOR W/T AGENTS

38. Subject states categorically that no agent of Leitstelle I-West had received any instructions on post-war activity. Some hope of continuing contact with W/T agents might have existed if the Reduit had been established; but when that disappeared, all idea of contacting the agents was lost. HERRLITZ himself had not given any directions for continuing post-war work, at least up to the end of April, when subject last saw him.

39. It may be noted here that, if the statements in para. 38 appear to show remarkable shortsightedness, the same quality is indicated in the instructions received from Berlin prior to the invasion; to concentrate on setting up an agent network along the coasts. Apparently little thought had been given to establishing firm stay-behind agents in the interior, according to STOCKMANN; and it was only after the invasion that such a need was fully realized.

EXTRACT.

106

Extract for File No.: SF. 52/4/16.

Original in File No.: PF. 600,408. DeSMEDT.

Original from: V.D.7.

Under Ref.:

Serial: 16a.

Dated: 3.9.45.

CX.12713.

31.8.45.

Extracted on: 24.10.45.

by: BEW

Section: H44.

Extract from Interrogation Report dated 12 Jul 45, on Joseph De SMEDT, W/T stay-behind agent of KdM Hamburg and member of Flanders SS, captured on 6 Jun 45.

APPRECIATION OF THE WORK OF THE ABWEHR AFTER THE WAR

ROSNER, whilst giving espionage courses to DE SMEDT spoke to him of agents activities after the war.

Each agent was given instructions to contact the main Abwehr office if he knew it, otherwise through normal postal channels which continued to function to contact other agents by means of discreet letters, or by other means available.

Even in the case of defeat of Germany, the Abwehr would continue activities. Each agent would receive special instructions on this subject before being sent out on a mission.

All information had to be sent in, even if the agent thought it was unimportant. LAST wanted to know everything, particularly the political situation in the regions, and the attitude of the population with the occupying authorities, labour and food situation, etc.

Dis.
2/10/45

EXTRACT.

9a

Extract for File No.: S.F. 52/4/16 Name:
 Original in File No.: P.F. 602.130 SANDBERGER Serial: 22a. Receipt Date: 16.7.45.
 Original from: USFET Intermediate Report on Under Ref.: Dated: 8.7.45.
 SANDBERGER.
 Extracted on 2.8.45. by: I.P. Section: W.R.H.

SANDBERGER, former director of Amt VI A and Mil Amt of the R.S.H.A. and now under interrogation, has given the following information:-

b. Plans for a German Secret Intelligence Service in Occupied Germany.

Early in 1945 HITLER asked HIMMLER whether an occurrence in US occupied German territory, which had been reported by the Allied radio, actually happened. HIMMLER in turn asked OHLENDORF, the head of Amt III, who did not know. As a result of such failure a conference was held by SANDBERGER, Staf. SPENGLER, Chief of III-C and O/Stubaf. KIELPINSKY, Referent in III-C, to discuss plans for a secret intelligence service which would operate in territory occupied by the Allied troops.

Amt III was to establish the intelligence service, using former SD employees and persons without previous GIS connection. Amt VI was to supply the W/T sets. The plan fell through when it was discovered that Amt VI could not spare the sets and that Amt III had no trained W/T operators. The only result of the meetings was an agreement between Amt III and Amt VI to divide their spheres of work in Allied-occupied territory. Amt III was to work in Germany proper and Amt VI in foreign countries occupied by the Allies. Alsace-Lorraine was made an exception; both Aemter were to work there. In Alsace-Lorraine Amt VI continued its activities through Leitstelle SIEGFRIED, under Staf. BICKLER.

SANDBERGER states that no plans were formulated by Amt VI to organise an intelligence service within German territory and that the plans made by Amt III were never carried out.

File No. S.F. 52/4/16

SERIAL 9b

has been removed from this file.

SEE S.F. 52/Spain/7.

Removed by CSW/HA

Date 23.9.45.

File No. S.F. 52/4/16

SERIAL 10a

has been removed from this file.

SEE S.F. 52/Switzerland/9

Removed by CSW/HA

Date 23.9.45.

"TOP SECRET"

89.

Original in. PP 500,561. SCHELLENBERG. v.2. 89a. 12.7.45.

SECRET

Report on Interrogation of

Walter SCHELLENBERG

27th. June - 12th July
1945

I. Introduction

1. Walter SCHELLENBERG, head of "SD Ausland" or chief Amt VI, is facing his present plight as a prisoner in Allied hands in a spirit of complete realism. This does not mean that he is dejected at the thought of the fate that may befall the former SS Brigadeführer. The fact that SCHELLENBERG seems to be possessed by a certain amount of faith in Allied goodwill is due to his conviction that he has, ever since becoming conscious in 1940 that Germany had lost the war, been striving for a settlement with the Western powers and for an improvement of the lot of Allied nationals, soldiers and civilians in German hands. Numerous instances are proffered as evidence for such conduct. The general impression left by SCHELLENBERG is that of a man who, aided by remarkable intelligence and zest for work and abetted by a seemingly insatiable ambition, saw his chance for meteoric career on the wings of the SS in the domain that monopolised his interests - "the Intelligence Service"; and then, disillusioned by the enmity he incurred amongst some of his socially and intellectually inferior colleagues, and the change in Germany's war fortunes, paid in instalments for his passage home.

2. The "Geheime Meldedienst", the new name chosen by SCHELLENBERG for the old designation "Abwehr" which he thought had fallen into disrepute owing to its inefficiency and the low intellectual and moral standard of most of its members, was the task entrusted to "Amt VI", which was joined by the "Mil. Amt" when the incorporation of the Abwehr into the RSHA took place. The "Geheime Meldedienst" in its present shape and composition represents by no means SCHELLENBERG's ideal of a future German Secret Service. If SCHELLENBERG had had his way and if defeat had not put an end to his grandiose, not to say megalomaniac, plans, which provided the participation of more or less the whole educated part of the nation in secret service work, he would have branched out in time into all social, cultural, economic, scientific and even artistic manifestations of German life at home and abroad in order to permeate them with "collaborators" (honorary and paid) and "runners" (Zuträger) of the "Geheime Meldedienst".

II. Post defeat plans

3. The sudden deterioration of the military situation of Germany in the last months before defeat did, however, according to SCHELLENBERG, not allow the German leadership to develop any post defeat plans. SCHELLENBERG maintains that the wholly working method of the National Socialist system prevented any such premeditated schemes taking shape. Every intelligent man saw the end coming. Nobody was allowed, however, to allude to it, as the policy of despair ("Katastrophen Politik") pursued by the leaders, that is "if we must die, then let the whole people die", punished every precautionary or protective measure in an exemplary way as desertion.

4. For this reason SCHELLENBERG could broach this subject only very late in the day and only in the shape of private discussions with chiefs of departments and sections. As late as February 1945 he brought this subject up at a meeting of all department chiefs and gave them the task to submit to him in two weeks time purely personal ideas regarding this question and merely in the shape of suggestions. He had defined the subject very carefully and had taken great care in the formulation of his statement. Notwithstanding this fact the result was a discussion which proved anything but agreeable to SCHELLENBERG. The gist of this discussion was: "So this in the position which is responsible for the Amt VI chief nursing such ideas". SCHELLENBERG is convinced that WANNIECK and SKORZENY reported in this sense to KALTENBRUNNER who tackled him a few days later in harsh words about his statement. SCHELLENBERG replied evasively by pointing to technical preparatory work. SKORZENY brought the subject up again by telling SCHELLENBERG in a rather condescending manner that the SS "Jagdverbände" (north, east, south and west) were all being concentrated in the Alps and were fighting there as Maquis. All who could join would have to place themselves under his orders, everything else was rubbish. He and KALTENBRUNNER were absolutely agreed on that.

5. SKORZENI obviously meant what he said and acted accordingly. SCHELLENBERG took no notice of him in future and gave him up as hopeless. The continuous measures concerning the evacuation, the technical possibilities, etc., did not allow SCHELLENBERG sufficient time to treat the problem mentioned with the department chiefs. He discussed it on various occasions with Dr. SAIDENBERGER and Lt. Col. OHLEITZ. The progressive break up of the Reich showed that a disappearance into civilian clothes and corresponding civilian professions, if necessary even in an extreme way (clergymen, monks, etc), was the only thing one could advise others to do. It amounted to an endeavour to save "human substance". The question how a working Intelligence Service could be built up on such a basis, remained completely open and unexplained. Not a word was said any more about a possibility of contact with foreign countries, the real centre of gravity of secret service work. SCHELLENBERG is of the firm conviction that apart from the measures for the evacuation which had by then degenerated into flight, nothing systematically planned was done for post war work.

6. Of great importance in this connection were SCHELLENBERG's discussions with Major General von GEHLEN. GEHLEN was until February 1945 "Chef Fremde Heere Ost". He was an excellent general staff officer who enjoyed all round esteem. He possibly possessed the greatest understanding amongst the members of the "Wehrmachtsfuhrungstab" for the "Gehelms Meldedienst". He was SCHELLENBERG's strongest supporter within the army. This was shown by the acceptance of SCHELLENBERG's suggestion that all military attaches and I.C.s. of the Wehrmacht were to pass through the school of the "Gehelms Meldedienst". The preparations for this were complete when GEHLEN was deprived of his post because he failed to form a correct estimate of the attack by the XI Ukrainian army from the direction of Posen. GEHLEN's I.C. situation report was, however, absolutely irrefragable, admitting as it did the possibility of an attack in the direction of Berlin as well as Pomerania. Hitler had one of his usual attacks of rage and KALTEFLUHER was delighted when he was able, addressing himself to SCHELLENBERG, to declare in the course of a lunch party: "This little sausage of von GEHLEN now had got to go west too - he probably relied too much on your poor intelligence service. Don't forget I don't dream of courting one day reproaches by the Fuehrer owing to your reports. In that case you would be most speedily dismissed." SCHELLENBERG describes this particular performance as one of the many attacks of KALTEFLUHER against him.

7. Major General von GEHLEN in March 1945 asked SCHELLENBERG for a quiet talk in private. One evening he spent three hours with SCHELLENBERG. In the course of this talk GEHLEN estimated that military resistance would last another two months. Then the end had to be counted with. GEHLEN said that preparations had to be made for this case. The only man with the necessary imagination and energy to undertake this task was HIMMLER. HIMMLER should as Commander of the home Army, authorize SCHELLENBERG to build up, together with GEHLEN and the best general staff officers, a resistance movement and army on the lines of the Polish resistance. GEHLEN said that the army had the fullest confidence in SCHELLENBERG as an organizer and he, GEHLEN, and his best general staff officers, as well as many whom SCHELLENBERG did not yet know, would put themselves voluntarily under SCHELLENBERG's command. GEHLEN added that he would now pretend that he was taking a four weeks holiday, but in reality he was going to "Frankenstrupp" (a cover name standing for a prepared evacuation quarter of the OKW) in order to prepare his plan quietly. He had already asked for a comprehensive survey regarding the Polish resistance army. GEHLEN requested SCHELLENBERG to prepare the same on his side. The evening ended with SCHELLENBERG's assurance that he would think it all over thoroughly and then secure the decision of HIMMLER.

8. SCHELLENBERG promised GEHLEN strictest secrecy. GEHLEN attached above all great importance to KALTEFLUHER not being put into the picture. SCHELLENBERG discussed the matter with Dr. RAPP, II B, and asked for a report on the whole issue. Not more than ten days after SCHELLENBERG's talk with GEHLEN. He brought with him an excellent survey of the whole structure of the Polish resistance army, together with GEHLEN's request to transmit as soon as possible, preferably by the same courier, the written consent of HIMMLER.

The courier explained orally that as GUDERIAN was no more chief of the OGH and as WERNER was his successor, it would be a good thing if HESSLER initiated WERNER into the plan.

9. SCHEELEBERG explained the whole plan to HESSLER who declined it abruptly. He said verbatim to SCHEELEBERG: "This is complete nonsense, if I should discuss this plan with WERNER I am the first defeatist of the Third Reich. This fact would be served boiling hot to the Fuehrer. You need not tell this to your GEMLEN. You need only explain to him that I strictly refuse to accept the plan. Besides - it is typical of the high class general staff officer to sit in Frankenstrupp nursing post war plans instead of fighting." SCHEELEBERG quickly changed the subject otherwise he thought HESSLER would not have stopped talking and no-one could have predicted what orders HESSLER might have given inspired by a momentary mood. SCHEELEBERG informed GEMLEN and Dr. RAPP of the negative attitude of HESSLER. As far as SCHEELEBERG knows no further development occurred.

10. As a further illustration of how difficult it was to raise the subject of post defeat plans, SCHEELEBERG furnished the following examples; A circular order of the general staff of the Army dated February 1945 and marked "Only for general staff officers" again drew attention to the severe penalties for defeatism. Three general staff officers were quoted by name who had been shot for this crime. In one of the cases the victim had pointed out that the material superiority of the Western powers was so great that a bad end was in sight.

III. Post defeat Plans for Neutral Countries.

11. SCHEELEBERG states categorically that there exist no concrete post war plans for PORTUGAL, SPAIN, SWEDEN & SWITZERLAND. There exist in PORTUGAL, SPAIN & SWEDEN so-called I-networks (I-netze), that is "Hekdekoepe" provided with money and technical equipment which were only meant to enter into action if relations with the country in question were severed or if an "invasion" took place. The primary condition was, however in every respect (personnel, material and technical) that the central offices in the Reich should function.

IV. The role of VI Wi and VI Kult in Post defeat plans.

12. SCHLEIBER points out that what he said about post defeat plans in general applies also to the role which might have been assigned to economic and cultural questions in schemes of this nature. He admits the possibility that there took place within Section VI Wi and VI Kult very detailed talks on these subjects and that plans were discussed with the chiefs of these sections. These plans concerned, however, the "Homeland" and as far SCHLEIBER knows, nothing concrete resulted from these talks.

V. Amt VI Wi and German Industry.

13. There can be no doubt that the advantages to the "Geheime Meldedienst" resulting from close collaboration between Amt VI Wi and German economic life at home and abroad, were not lost on SCHLEIBER. He well knew that the Abwehr had always made use of the agencies abroad of powerful German industrial enterprises as cover for its own activities. Whilst this arrangement was mostly done locally, that is as the result of private relationship between representatives of German business undertakings and Abwehr officers, SCHLEIBER's plans envisaged the systematic penetration of German "Wirtschaft" with both the spirit and the flesh of his "Geheime Meldedienst".

W.R.H.

I have already sent you the "Bulletin D'Information de C.E. No. 48" with instructions for carding. — Filed in SFS 2/16/ (Annexe filed in SF 2/11)

I now attach another copy with a memorandum on the Werewolf which could be filed in the S.F. re GIS and plans for the future (exact heading unknown).

W.R.C.4. J.
18.7.45.

File this copy in SFS 4/16.

7a
PRÉSIDENCE
du
GOUVERNEMENT PROVISIONNEL
de la
REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE

R./ex. 24 /65

DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE
des
ÉTUDES & RECHERCHES



transmis au M. Min.

Réf. à rappeler : N° 114/230321/R.Q.

Paris, le 6 juin 1945.

BULLETIN d'INFORMATION de C.E. N° 48

I.- ACTIVITÉ du S.R. ALLEMAND.

1°) Indices.

Certains indices laissent à penser que la mise en sommeil des Services Spéciaux Allemands, quasi-inévitable avec la fin des hostilités, ne sera pas de longue durée. - En effet, l'activité de ces Services dans certains Pays neutres, comme l'Espagne, témoigne d'un effort suivi pour passer du plan de guerre au plan de paix.

En Allemagne, certaines mesures avaient été prévues :

- en ce qui concerne l'Abwehr, une grande liberté de manœuvre a été donnée par les Chefs à leurs subordonnés : certains ont rejoint les troupes combattantes et sont recherchés dans les camps de prisonniers; d'autres, qui avaient cessé toute activité depuis plusieurs mois, ont repris des occupations dans la vie civile.
- les membres du S.D., de leur côté, ont pour la plupart changé d'identité, et se sont camouflés, dans la mesure du possible, soit dans l'armée, les organisations clandestines et à l'étranger.

Des renseignements donnés par des fonctionnaires de la STAPD de STUTTGART, arrêtés en zone française, projettent quelques lumières sur des mesures assez caractéristiques prises par le poste au cours du mois d'Avril 1945. Il semble bien qu'à ce moment-là, sur des ordres venus du R.S.H.A., le personnel de la STAPD et de la KRIPC ait été fondu en un seul Service, et qu'il ait été réparti en de très petits postes locaux, 31 au total, faits de 5 ou 6 individus, disséminés à travers tout le WURTEMBERG.

Cette mesure qui fut expliquée officiellement par la nécessité d'adapter l'appareil de la police aux nouvelles circonstances créées par la situation militaire, répondait probablement à l'intention de disséminer dans la zone d'occupation des îlots de résistance, de S.R. et de C.L.

Parallèlement à cette réorganisation, se poursuivait le recrutement de volontaires en vue de constituer de petits groupes du WEHRWOLF, chargés de renseignements et de sabotages.

Ci-joint, à ce propos, en annexe, une étude succincte sur le WEHRWOLF.

✓
ext.
25-7-45

2°) Manifestations.

a) En Argentine.

Richard SCHRONDER, un des principaux collaborateurs du Docteur LAY, Walter WILKENING, collaborateur d'Heinrich HIMMLER et Wilhem SCHONENBERG, Chef de la Gestapo qui a opéré en France et en Espagne, sont arrivés à BUENOS-AIRES et ont pris contact avec le Comte Karl Von HUBBURG, Chef du Centre d'espionnage allemand en Amérique Centrale.

26 autres hitlériens se seraient réfugiés dans la province de MISSIONES.

b) Au Danemark.

Découverte d'un complot à COPENHAGUE, dont le but était de faire sauter le dépôt britannique. - 17 individus ont été arrêtés.

c) En Suisse.

En Octobre 1944, l'Ambassade d'Allemagne avait reçu d'Allemagne, par wagon plombés, des fours électriques permettant d'insérer 4 mètres cubes de papier en 6 minutes au moyen de résistances placées au sein du papier.

Les archives importantes ont été détruites par ce procédé.

d) En Espagne.

Des dirigeants connus de la Gestapo sont actuellement en Espagne : le Sturmführer SANDERO, le Standartführer BAUMGARTEN et le Gruppenführer MULLER. Beaucoup de nationaux allemands se sont fait naturaliser espagnols et travaillent dans divers organismes gouvernementaux (Bureau de Tourisme, usines, prisons, camps de concentration, etc...)

II.- ACTIVITE du S.R. ESPAGNOL.

Le S.R. Espagnol s'efforce de récupérer les agents que le S.R.A. ne peut plus employer, et continue son travail de renseignements sur la France, sur les bases établies par le S.R.A. - Aucune indication précise ne permet toutefois de conclure que le S.R.E. continue de travailler en collaboration avec le S.R.A.

III.- REPRESAILLES.

a) En Suisse.

Au cours d'une opération dirigée contre les fonctionnaires diplomatiques et consulaires allemands, la Police Suisse a procédé à des perquisitions et saisi des documents.

Le fichier des membres Suisses du Mouvement nazi "Mouvement National Populaire" est entre les mains de la Police.

.....

b) au Portugal.

A la demande des Alliés, les ressortissants allemands avaient été assignés à résidence. Il résulte des renseignements recueillis, que les membres du S.R.A. et de l'Abwehr au Portugal, n'ont pas été touchés par les mesures administratives prévues.

Ces faits ont été portés à la connaissance des Ministres des puissances Alliées à LISBONNE.

c) En Allemagne.

- Dans la zone de la 1^{re} Armée Française, ont été arrêtés :

- le Colonel Otto WAGNER, dernier chef du K.d.M. STUTTGART.
- le Dr. WASSER, Officier de C.E. à STUTTGART.

- Différents agents du S.D. ayant travaillé en France, au nombre desquels il convient de mentionner :

- CEVLY - alias WASEMUND - ancien agent du B.d.S. Paris, puis de celui de Strasbourg.
- GERSTLAUER Karl, SS. H' Stuf, Chef du Poste S.D. d'Altkirch.
- HUTLER André, agent du S.D. dans le Ht-Rhin.
- SCHNEIDER Albert, agent du S.D. de Strasbourg, ancien chef de l'antenne de Wissembourg.

- Un certain nombre de fonctionnaires du Service SIPO - S.D. ont été arrêtés récemment en Allemagne du Sud. Trois en particulier méritent d'être signalés, parce qu'ils avaient travaillé en France, au temps de l'occupation.

- le Sturmbannführer HEROLD, Directeur de police criminelle qui appartenait à la Sûreté aux Armées (S.F.P.) de Bordeaux (Juin-Décembre 1940), et de Dijon (Décembre 1940-Juin 1942), avant d'exercer les fonctions de K.d.S. à Poitiers. - Il appartenait, en dernier lieu, à la STAPO de Stuttgart - (arrêté dans la zone de la 1^{re} Armée Française).
- l'Untersturmführer DORN, membre du poste SIPO-S.D. de Dijon, où il exerçait en particulier des fonctions d'interprète.
- le Sturmbannführer BLECHER, du S.D. de Stuttgart, qui passa quelque temps à Belfort et à Dijon, en 1940, et fut de 1943 à 1944, Chef du S.D. de Mulhouse - (arrêté dans la zone de la 1^{re} Armée Française).

d) En France.

Il convient de noter particulièrement l'arrestation de quelques représentants de l'Abwehr (1) dans les poches de l'Atlantique.

- Lieutenant KOTHE et Lt CLASSEN, appartenant tous deux à la Sécurité Navale de La Rochelle.
- Lieutenant SCHMIDT, bien connu sous les alias de DULOUIN et de LAGRANGE, du poste S.R.A. de Nantes, et qui se trouvait, depuis Septembre 1944, dans la région de St-Nazaire, La Baule.

(1) Cf. Bulletin d'Information N° 47, du 7 Juin 1945.

- 4 -

- Mathilde CARRE - alias VICTOIRE - responsable des arrestations opérées par les Allemands dans :

- l'organisation OV. ROLOU
- l'organisation du Capitaine PHILIPPE
- l'organisation LUCAS,

ainsi que de celles de la plupart des membres de l'organisation interalliée, et internée en Grande-Bretagne, est rentrée en France sous escorte.- La D.S.T. a été saisie de cette importante affaire.

- Enfin, l'arrestation de SAPE Ferdinand, Journaliste, parachuté dans la région de Roanne, ainsi que sept de ses compagnons, a permis de recueillir une documentation importante sur le rôle des Groupements Français en Allemagne, et sur certaines liaisons de la Presse collaboratrice en France pendant l'occupation.

Le Directeur
des Services de Documentation



[Handwritten signature]

A N N E X E

Etude succincte sur le WEHRWOLF.

-1-1-1-1-

L'état actuel de nos informations ne permet pas encore de se faire une idée exacte sur le WEHRWOLF. Il a paru toutefois utile de rassembler les éléments connus pour les présenter sous forme de synthèse et d'en dégager en conclusion quelques hypothèses.

Des affaires sont actuellement en cours et donneront sans doute, après exploitation, un aperçu un peu plus précis de la question.

I.- Renseignements anciens et récents recueillis sur le WEHRWOLF.

a) C'est en Novembre 1944 que le nom apparaît pour la première fois à la connaissance de la D.S.D.O.C. - Le Gaupersonalansleiter SCHUBLO aurait dit, alors qu'il était à moitié ivre, qu'il en était le Chef pour BADS - ALSACE. Le Chef du WEHRWOLF en Allemagne devait être SKORZENY.

Selon un informateur généralement bien placé près d'un tiers, des membres de la Direction Centrale de la Gestapo ont été détachés à l'organisation du WEHRWOLF et travaillaient avec acharnement à l'installation d'agents dans toutes les communes importantes de l'Allemagne depuis Septembre 1944.

L'interrogatoire d'un Chef de la H.J. (Février 1945) révélait que tous les Chefs de Groupe H.J. avaient reçu des instructions pour s'organiser sur le type de "partisans Russes" la façon à porter sur les arrières des Alliés une résistance passive et active. Ce plan devait fonctionner dès le franchissement du "Mur de l'Ouest".

Faut-il voir également comme un aspect du WEHRWOLF la constitution d'unités spéciales ordonnée par le Führer, en Octobre 1944. Le recrutement de ces unités devait porter sur des hommes répondant à deux exigences : ne pas être connus politiquement en dehors de leur pays natal; - réunir des qualités de jugement, d'opiniâtreté, de persévérance, capables d'effectuer des missions périlleuses.

Un rapport Américain faisait ressortir qu'au lendemain de l'offensive Russe en Pologne, des réduits avaient été aménagés pour abriter les résistants.

b) Les premiers jours de l'occupation en Allemagne ont prouvé qu'effectivement le WEHRWOLF avait été préparé et mis sur pied.

L'affaire GERSCHENK soulignait qu'en Mars 1945, deux personnes de STUTTGART connaissaient l'insigne du WEHRWOLF, et que le Chef pour le WURTEMBERG était le SS. Brigade Führer MULLER.

- Dès le mois de Février 1945, les unités de Waffen SS. ont été, selon l'ordre d'HITLER, dispersées dans les régions de l'Allemagne non encore occupées, et ont donné naissance à des Sonderkommandos de 4 à 5 hommes. A la même époque, la Division SS. "GOTZ VON BERLICHINGEN" aurait été dissoute afin de fournir les éléments nécessaires à la constitution de ces formations.

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La mise sur pied de Sonderkommandos dans la police SS. et la Gestapo a fait l'objet de mesures particulières. Le 31 Mars, une note d'HEIMLER ordonnait la création de Sonderkommandos chargés de missions spéciales. Pour la région de BADE et WURTEMBERG, c'est le SS. Obersturmbannführer PUTZ, Chef de la SIFO - S.D. qui devait diriger la mise sur pied de ces kommandos de quelques hommes. Il chargea de cette mission le SS. Obersturmbannführer THIELER, Commandeur de la SIFO de WURTEMBERG.

- Ces petits groupes devaient être complètement autonomes et s'ignorer les uns les autres. Ils dépendaient directement du Chef de la région (SS. Obersturmbannführer KESSEGAY Fritz pour le WURTEMBERG).

Ils avaient reçu pour mission :

- de rejoindre les emplacements prévus dès l'avance Alliée, et recruter les hommes de confiance pour secourir leur action;
- de ne rien entreprendre immédiatement, se laisser dépasser par l'avance;
- d'accomplir des actes de sabotage sur les arrières et surtout sur les voies de communication servant à l'acheminement du matériel et du ravitaillement;
- de favoriser les agitations de la population créées par le manque de ravitaillement.

Ils disposaient comme moyens :

- d'appareils radio pour assurer les liaisons.
- de stocks de munitions et d'armement ainsi que de vivres soigneusement dissimulés;
- ils avaient perçu également six mois de solde par avance, ainsi qu'une indemnité spéciale de 1.000 marks.- Le Chef disposait en outre de fonds spéciaux (10.000 marks).

Un troup de cette catégorie a été capturé.

- La Division BRANDENBURG a aussi servi à la constitution du WEHRWOLF. Les Kommandos de cette Division, plus importante que les Sonderkommandos mentionnés (ils peuvent comprendre de 20 à 30 hommes), se sont retirés dans la montagne avec vivres et munitions pour continuer la lutte clandestinement.

- Il existerait également des kommandos mixtes composés de SS. et de Miliciens Français, ou d'anciens agents des Services Spéciaux allemands peu désireux de retourner en France.- A noter la création de formations de défense sous la direction d'un nommé GAROON Remy, le recrutement étant fait par GAMORY-DUBOURDEAU, commandant la Brigade de la Division SS. CHARLEMAGNE.

- Des groupes de résistance ont été découverts et arrêtés en différents endroits. Leur arrestation a conduit à la capture de dépôts de matériel, de munitions et surtout d'explosifs. Ces groupes étaient organisés et tout portait à supposer qu'ils auraient pu fonctionner.

/.....

- Des écoles d'entraînement pour la lutte clandestine ont existé en Allemagne; un document saisi dans un de ces centres donne le nom de ceux qui avaient pris part au septième stage de l'instruction sur le WEHRWOLF.

II.- CONCLUSIONS.

- a) Le WEHRWOLF existe. Il a été prévu et organisé. Cependant le recrutement s'est avéré, dès le début, très difficile. Mais cette organisation n'était pas encore au point au moment de la débâcle allemande.

Il avait pour but, primitivement, de créer des troubles et l'insécurité sur les arrières, en particulier dans les zones les plus garnies de troupes occupantes, et en même temps de terroriser les régions occupées pour limiter la "collaboration" et l'apport en ressources de toutes sortes que la population pourrait fournir aux Alliés. Il pouvait enfin travailler en accord avec la troupe régulière et lier son action à une action offensive.

- b) C'était aussi l'assaut qui devait entraîner le peuple tout entier dans la résistance.

Il semble se préciser que toutes les organisations de sabotage existantes étaient destinées à faire partie du WEHRWOLF.

Il avait donc un but de guerre.

- c) Par la défaite totale, le WEHRWOLF devient un refuge pour les indésirables, les condamnés certains qui n'ont plus rien à espérer.

Mais aussi, il devient odieux à la plus grande partie de la population avide de paix et de tranquillité. Il ne peut plus compter sur beaucoup d'aide, d'autant plus qu'il n'entre pas dans le tempérament allemand de lutter clandestinement. Par ailleurs, la capitulation l'a, lui aussi, désorganisé, et certains de ses membres déposent les armes "clandestinement" puisque tout est perdu.- SKORZENY lui-même s'est prudemment fait F.G.

- d) Il semble donc que le WEHRWOLF doit être considéré comme un mouvement en période de désorganisation manquant de liaison. Ses manifestations ne peuvent être que désordonnées; néanmoins, il restera un espoir et un refuge, et pourrait servir de regroupement aux mécontents. Ainsi, il peut redevenir une organisation redoutable; elle ne pourrait avoir, comme le "maquis", l'appui de l'Etranger, mais elle peut encore disposer des dépôts d'armes, munitions et explosifs qui ont été constitués.

- e) Enfin, c'est une erreur de mettre sur le compte du WEHRWOLF les manifestations d'hostilités des SS. encore en liberté, qui sont à considérer en général, uniquement comme des fanatiques vendant chèrement leur vie.

- f) On s'est demandé si le WEHRWOLF, en raison de la publicité faite sur lui, n'était pas une organisation de camouflage destinée à donner la change sur une organisation plus secrète de S.R. et de sabotage.

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On a émis aussi l'hypothèse que le WLEHRWOLF ne devait entrer en action qu'après un certain laps de temps, pour laisser aux troupes d'occupation une impression de sécurité, profiter du relâchement des mesures de contrôle et des changements d'opinion de la population à l'égard des Alliés, pour mener une action qui sera plus efficace.

A remarquer qu'en Alsace, où il a été aussi organisé, il ne s'est pas encore manifesté : sommeil ou désagrégation.

En résumé, le WLEHRWOLF ne doit pas être considéré comme une chose négligeable, et il peut devenir dangereux.

La lutte pour la destruction des derniers éléments du WLEHRWOLF doit être entreprise pour éviter qu'il serve de tremplin à la reconstruction d'une véritable organisation.

Extract for S.F.52/4/16 G.I.S. Post-War Activity.

- 6 -

Original in P.F.602,431. 15a. dated 6.7.45

TOP SECRET

CSDIC/SC/15AG/SD 21.

3. THE POST-WAR PLANS OF AMT III B RSHA

When Source attended the conference at DEISENHOFEN, near MUNICH, in mid Apr 45, it was presided over by an Obergruppenfuhrer in full SS uniform and comprised about fifteen representatives from countries lying West of GERMANY, and including ITALY. None of these representatives was known to Source.

It was explained first that a last-minute fusion of Amt III B and Amt VI had taken place, in order to further the great plan of promoting post-war unrest.

The speaker then proceeded to relate how ample funds had already been planted in S AMERICA - mainly in the ARGENTINE - and would become available for financing agents in due course. In order to have "bankers" who could distribute this money, certain trustworthy key men had already been sent to live in SPAIN and SWITZERLAND.

The agents were to lie low for a certain period after the end of the war in EUROPE and at a given time were to start organising "national" movements which would be thoroughly in keeping with the traditions of each country but which would all preach anti-Bolshevism and stir up unrest culminating in civil war. If the cult of anti-Bolshevism were not particularly popular, then any other sore point, such as the burden of supporting an Army of Occupation or of having to cede territory, might be seized on. The main purpose was to make the Allies' post-war task as hard as possible, so that the Nazi Party could, in time, reappear in a suitable disguise and build up a Fourth Reich.

In going to work, no movement was to make any mention of its pro-Nazi sentiments or to indulge in anti-semitic propaganda. This was stressed as a cardinal rule.

Each movement should also strive to create different slogans, methods of approach to the public, initiation ceremonies, ranks, etc., in order to lessen the risk of the affinity between movements being suspected.

Clandestine cooperation between movements in different countries was not envisaged, at least at the beginning.

The Nazis intended to form a "three-layer" organisation to control the various movements. The first layer would concentrate on forming a German "Schutzgemeinschaft" out of EUROPE and so would direct the high policy. The second layer would be that which had to model the policy of the first layer to suit the various countries. Unlike the first two layers, the third layer might (in carrying out its general propaganda work) become known to the various movements.

Source was told that he could contact a French agent in the RITZ Hotel, MADRID, if he could get there. From allusions made, he connects this German agent in SPAIN either with a certain Jean RADENAC, a former friend of his in PARIS who made a fortune by trading with the SD and passing information, or with a lesser light - Andre HERVO - who also made money by trading with the Germans and who also left for SPAIN at an opportune moment.

Source states that this last meeting had a strange air of unreality. He had the feeling that last-minute plans were being made in words and on paper when all the persons present were secretly preoccupied with the idea of how they could best save their skins.

110
31.8.45

Subject:- Sipo & SB

1643

SECRET

SHAEF CI War Room,
LONDON.

21 AGp/INT/2927
17 June 45

Herewith copy of SHAEF Mission (DENMARK) report on
Sipo and SB.

GSI,
Main Hq 21 Army Group,
SLA.

SBS
GGS.

Brigadier,
General Staff.

Translation.
Page I.

Valdemar C.E. LJUNGREEN (19/201, HILLERSØ) director,
residing C.J. FRANKSVEJ 10 ground floor, TILSØBORG 332, director
of ECKECKES factory for metallic industries, GRUNTVIGSVEJ 23, has
applied at the office at this place as he thought that he had some
information which might be used by the Section.

About himself and his private relations he stated, he had
been working for the German WEHRMACHT by delivering machines for their
war industries during the Occupation, and even if he gives the usual
explanation that in the beginning he did not realise what he was
doing, and later he was not allowed to stop the work for the Germans,
he admits straight out that he belongs to the category named as
Economic Collaborators.

He started his factory in 1938 and in the year 1939 he
experimented with various things with the result that the factory
had a large deficit. In 1940 the persons who had invested money in the
factory threatened to withdraw it, and at the beginning of the
occupation he was quite close to bankruptcy.

In September 1940 a German Hans HOLZERMANN offered to get
LJUNGREEN some work to do for the German Rustungs staff. HOLZERMANN
claimed 10 % of the orders which might come. The offer as well as
the conditions were submitted to a director's meeting and passed,
LJUNGREEN then got the work for the Rustungs staff of producing various
special parts.

For about 9 months he paid 10 % of the order to HOLZERMANN
according to contract. This 10 % amounted to 70,000 Kr. Besides this
HOLZERMANN received likewise 10 % of the amounts of the orders for "DANIA",
Aage SPØRENSEN machine factory in VALBY, the Industry Syndicate, Staakes
machine factory in BRØNSHØJ, "MEKANO", "FORNTOOLS" and several others.

In the beginning of 1941 they received a circular letter which
prohibited the payment of return commission. In order to evade this
HOLZERMANN at first arranged by threats that a pro - forma engineer was
employed in these factories, and then he shared the commission with him.

HOLZERMANN has previously to this had a private address:
ENGELSBORGVEJ, LYNGBY, and his wife is a qualified assistant in HOLTE
at the chemist's shop. He is Reichdeutscher, but has been in Denmark
for many years. During the occupation he travelled quite a lot between
Denmark and Sweden. When he turned up as mentioned ~~below~~ above, his
office was in VESTERBROGADE 10. He had office with an engineer called

8 - JUL 1945

[Handwritten signature and initials]

submarine and sailed back to Germany. This he told LJUNGGREEN and added that he had also continued after the last war with German Intelligence Service. When he tried to make LJUNGGREEN go in for this INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, LJUNGGREEN refused to do so, as he would not work against his own country. The "Doctor" drew LJUNGGREEN's attention to the fact that for instance the Russians might occupy Denmark, but immediately afterwards told LJUNGGREEN that he could decide himself in which country he wanted to work. So he could under the present war conditions for instance go to England and work there. The Intelligence Service might be partly military and partly business. LJUNGGREEN need not fear any German organizations, as neither SD, Sipo, Abwehr or similar organizations could do him any harm, as the "Doctor's" Intelligence Service was above all of it.

When LJUNGGREEN still declined, the "Doctor" told him that when he had thought it all over, he would get a telephone No. in Copenhagen which he could call, after this the matter would be settled. It did not matter that the war would soon be finished as they were working far ahead, and the "Doctor" mentioned that an occupation of Germany in a way would cause some disorder, ~~which~~ - but the very first thing which would be organized would be the Secret Intelligence Service.

The Head Quarter of this Intelligence Service was situated in Hamburg, and they had a transmitter in HALLE.

For the use for the work, each member had a card-index which had been micro-photographed and could be contained in a match box. In case of urgent danger there was an instruction to destroy this first of all. In case the members wanted to get into touch with each other this would take place by telegram as there was a special code for this purpose.

LJUNGGREEN believes that he to a certain extent will be able to remember some of the code - especially if he gets some assistance from an expert in codes, and he is willing to give any possible help to this work.

When LJUNGGREEN still refused, the "Doctor" offered to start a smaller factory for metallic articles in Sweden, with a Swedish staff and Swedish money, and to leave the leading position to LJUNGGREEN, so that he was on the spot. At the receipt of this offer LJUNGGREEN got the impression that he should be a collecting centre for information. Besides the "Doctor" said that, naturally he could not decide anything now, but when he had considered the matter, he might then go to Sweden and stay at Hotel REGINA in STOCKHOLM and ask for MARTENS in the reception. The "Doctor" would then automatically receive the message and inform LJUNGGREEN of his duties. As a kind of bait, the "Doctor" told among other things about the good financial terms the agents had and informed that, an agent in England during this war had received an amount of about 1 million Kr, for an information about an aerodrome or a naval base. The conversation lasted about an hour, then LJUNGGREEN left the hotel ~~ENKENS~~ with MARTENS.

Immediately before the Capitulation LJUNGGREEN stayed at the Grand Hotel in Copenhagen, and saw the "Doctor" come in and go to a room where a Journalist WELTI from Switzerland was living. The latter, who was accompanied by his wife, left for Sweden. As it is the reception in the hotel who has given this information it is very important that no direct inquiries are made as thereby the source would be found.

- 4 -

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When LJUNGREEN states this thing, it is because he believes that the Swiss Journalist who has connection with the "Doctor", must undoubtedly be a person who is of great interest.

LJUNGREEN has stated all this information quite voluntarily, but I have therefore promised him any possible protection, as he thinks that the German Intelligence Service which is still existing and also works in Copenhagen wants to get rid of him, as soon as they realise that, he has passed on his information.

CONFIDENTIAL.

58

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE WAR ROOM
LONDON

Ref: IF.602,130/W.R.C.3a

28 Jun 1945.

The attached is a translation of a document
captured by 7th U.S. Army on the subject of Training for
Guerilla Warfare.

DISTRIBUTION.

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Original filed in IF 602,130 SANDBERGER.
Copy in SF 52/4/22(5) Amt VI A of RSHA.

AW
6.7.45

Confidential

Grippeleiter VFW/111
M.I. A & B, No. 6.7/1/45 confidential.

Berlin, 4 April 1945.

Grippeleiter: SS Standartenführer Dr. SANDMEIER
Referatleiter: SS Stabschef Dr. MEYER

Subject: Development and training for Guerilla Warfare.

1) Registry.

2) Remarks:

In compliance with directive, dated 4 January 1945, the following is reported:

1. In addition to the various possible solutions to the present problem (such as decisive new weapons; political solutions, halting the Anglo-Americans on a predetermined line, splitting up of German resistance forces into a series of single strong points) the development and training of a secret service (SSP, or Gehörig Meldeinst) must be considered as equally essential.
2. The present development must be in conformance with the purpose of continuing the battle at all costs and with all conceivable means, since capitulation would, therefore, mean not only the destruction of the Reich but also the foundation of the German people. There is no doubt whatever that a breach between the Anglo-Americans and the Soviets must occur, only the time factor is uncertain. The goal of the fighting, therefore, must be to present a powerful factor when this breach reaches the critical stage, the settlement of which will be conclusive for one side or the other.
3. The work of the secret service is of decisive importance as long as the fight continues, indeed its importance increases with the reduction of the military forces at our disposal. Even in the extreme case that German resistance can only be carried out by an underground movement, the secret service would be indispensable.
3. The work of the secret service is of decisive importance as long as the fight continues, indeed its importance increases with the reduction of the military forces at our disposal. Even in the extreme case that German resistance can only be carried out by an underground movement, the secret service would be indispensable.
4. Our aim must be to convince, or to strengthen the convictions of all officers, soldiers, and employees of the Secret Service that the continuation of the fighting and the Secret Service are essential for the reasons cited herein. With this in mind, reasons must be shown why the Anglo-Americans must realize that the break with their Soviet partner can no longer be averted. By way of example, Soviet Russia at present has been bled white; and even if its capacity for the production of armaments, as far as present type weapons are concerned, is considerable, it is hardly in the position to tool up and produce newer weapons. At this moment the Anglo-Americans are stronger. With each passing year, however, the human and industrial potential of the Soviet Union will increase, whereas time will not be to the advantage of the Anglo-Americans. The Soviet losses will be equalized in the not too distant future by the growth of new generations; the Soviet armament industry will develop entirely new weapons and will be supreme, not in the least due to German inventors and engineers who either volunteer or are compelled to cooperate. This can only be prevented by taking advantage of the present weakness of the Soviet Union, and this is

5B

Further it is inconceivable that the Anglo-Americans would want the hundreds of thousands of German held Soviet prisoners of war to be returned to the Soviet Union, and thus be used to advantage by their opponent when the breach occurs. On the other hand, it will not be politically (sic) possible to prevent the return of the prisoners if the clash does not take place soon. The conflict of interests in China, Iran, the Balkan states, and Greece has already brought the erstwhile partners to the brink of war, and the collisions of spheres of interest in the Adriatic, Austria, Bohemia-Moravia, the Elbe estuary, and the Scandinavian countries will cause the tension to go beyond the breaking point. These and similar ideas cannot be emphasized too often in order to dispel the fatalistic impression that there will be a third World War. (there will be one indeed, but when we no longer exist) and similarly to stamp out the all too optimistic illusion that the Anglo-Americans will voluntarily halt their advances in order to restore a balance of power. It is vitally important to interminably emphasize that the Anglo-Americans will be stopped only by our resistance.

5. The Secret Service must immediately and ruthlessly be transformed to a guerrilla warfare unit. For this purpose the following measures must be undertaken at once.

a) The training of the 1st and 2nd categories are to be combined as much as possible, and only their important aspects are to be emphasized. Every category II officer, assistant and agent must be trained in the category I type of reconnaissance (even though not as thoroughly as the category I personnel). Every category I officer, assistant, and agent must know guerrilla warfare in theory and practice, and be able to carry it out in practical application, since in many of the areas left behind only movements and tasks of the guerrilla warfare type will be possible. The combined training of the I and II categories will be conducted by the staff of instructors of the Kurfurst Regiment. They will conform with directives issued by the Military Office IV with the utmost emphasis.

b) Those officers and soldiers of the Secret Service who are already on duty will formulate appropriate written directives, and establish the necessary sections. Instruction will be given in front reconnaissance II and III, and through the transmission of appropriate directives be organized to give intensive military reconnaissance instruction. Front reconnaissance and the command communications areas must be supported very soon in order to permit the transposition to guerrilla warfare.

c) The Secret Service will be considerably decentralized.

d) All agent and service radios will be assembled in areas wherein they may be used for guerrilla operations.

e) Officers and men of the Secret Service will be fitted with suitable civilian clothing (no tea time clothing).

f) Officers and men of the Secret Service will be provided with appropriate papers at once, and not when they are about to be used, since then it will be too late. For example Army discharge papers of wounded Secret Service employees are to be made out with retro-active dates, for others occupational deferment papers, work papers and similar papers are to be prepared.

g) The personnel of the Secret Service are to be thoroughly examined and those who cannot give assurances that they will stick to the end will be transferred to the Army or assigned to the labour pool. In the future the Secret Service can only use officers and men who are prepared to go past the front lines, if necessary as civilians, and work behind the enemy lines, and reconnoitre. Even those who are physically incapacitated who cannot conduct

personnel reconnaissance, can allow themselves to be captured as well as anyone, or be dropped behind the enemy lines, and thus be the centres and brains of espionage and sabotage groups. As far as the women employees are concerned, only those who are physically able and determined to endure the hardships of guerilla operations, or work as agents should be used; the remaining should be assigned to the Red Cross or be placed in the labour pool.

- b) The choice of personnel from the trainees must be more discerning. It does not pay to recruit men into the Secret Service who characteristically raise doubts. Intelligence is a prerequisite, but in itself does not suffice if the candidate does not believe in the sense of fighting or for other reasons are not qualified. Should those who do not have a keen desire for service be shoved through the courses, they will only be a burden to the Secret Service, and in case of capture or envelopment would be dangerous. In these days quantity is not as important as quality.

3. Chief of the VI Military Office with a request for acknowledgment.

4. To Section VI A/Military Office for additional copies.

SS Standartenfuhrer (name not given)

EXTRACT.

Extract for File No. SF. 52/4/16. Name: Miscellaneous indications of G.I.S. Post-War plans for continued activity.
 Original in File No. PF. 602,502. BRANDL. Serial: 1a. Dated: 27.6.45.
 Original from: 7th Army. Under Ref.: None. 2.6.45.
 Extracted on: 14.7.45. by: RES. Section: H/IA.

Extract from a report of the interrogation of Joseph BRANDL, Officer in charge of the former GESTAPO Aussenstelle Augsburg, and of Abt. IV of Gestapo Stelle Augsburg.

Subject was then located through information given this agent by WALTER BSSLINGER, and gave himself up on 31 May 1945. Questioned as to underground intelligence projects within US occupied territory, subject volunteers the following information: On about 1 April 1945, a directive reached the Augsburg GESTAPO Stelle asking for a report on plans made for an underground continuation of intelligence activities in the province of Schwaben. The whole project was put into the hands of SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Felix RUEHL and Oberssekreter Helmut WALTER. The organization was named SIEGRUNE: the agent prospects were not to be let know the nature of their mission; GESTAPO men were to contact these stay-behinds periodically to obtain collected information. For lack of W/T equipment, carrier pigeons and messengers were to maintain contact between the Alpine redoubt and the underground intelligence system. Subject states that he had only a general knowledge of these projects, as they did not concern the work of his department. He claims ignorance of exactly how many such stay-behinds were appointed, however, he states that the whole organization was in an undeveloped status when events necessitated the evacuation of Augsburg. The sealed "top secret" envelope containing the names and addresses of the underground "v" men was in subject's possession on the way from Leuterschach to Grins where he allegedly left it with Felix RUEHL. The failure to hold the Alpine Redoubt has foiled these projects, as it was from here that such projects should have been directed.

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157/Hua
14-7-45

SECRET

X379

Ha

21 June 1945

TO: WAR ROOM, London
FROM: SPEARHEAD *DR*
SUBJECT: Sicherheits-Dienst

Attached are two (2) copies of a
report, Subject: Sicherheits-Dienst, which
is for your information.

Distribution:

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X 379

Report No. B - 2783

4 June 1945

4a

FROM: BERN
DATE OF INFO: End of May 1945
DATE OF REPORT: 31 May 1945
EVALUATION: C-3
SOURCE: Pestalozzi, via 224
SUBSOURCE: Pestalozzi/I
COUNTRY: GERMANY
SUBJECT: Sicherheits-Dienst
DISTRIBUTION: Washington, Paris, Caserta, Files (3)

It is reported from various sources that the German SD (Sicherheits-Dienst) is still functioning. About nine months ago SD officials prepared to continue the functions of this agency, even after Germany had surrendered and been occupied by the Allies. To perform SD functions, officials relied largely on employees of the German Reichspost. Those who were willing to do SD work were trained in it and left on their jobs. Those who did not want it were relieved of their jobs and trained SD men or women assumed their places. Sources claim that almost all postal employees in Southern Germany are either SD men or work for the SD. It has not been possible to date to find out where the headquarters are located, but certain information has come to hand according to which they are located somewhere on the northern shore of Lake Constance. It is believed that these headquarters are mobile.

JBW

SECRET

EXTRACT.

Extract for File No. SF 52/4/16 Name Abwehr Post-War Plans
 Original in File No. FF 601 833 KUEBART V.2. Serial 26a Receipt Date 9.6.45
 Original from Camp O20 Report Under Ref. None Dated 9.6.45
 Extracted on 11.7.45 by AJC Section H.4.a.

Extract from Camp O20 Interrogation Report re
 Wilhelm KUEBART, Gruppenleiter I.H.

Translation of Statement by KUEBART.

Post-War Intelligence Organisation.

I gathered no information about any preparations or plans for a military Intelligence Organisation after the war. HANSEN never made any allusion to the matter. HIMMLER, however, was said to have stated once that, after Victory, he intended to build up a German Intelligence Service, on the pattern of the British.

I consider it impossible that, after the recent collapse of Germany, there remains the residue of a military Intelligence Service in any form, or that it is likely to recover. My reasons are as follows:

1. Total disintegration of the Abwehr.
2. Lack of leadership.
3. It is no longer a military necessity, for an Intelligence Service is not an end in itself, but only a means to an end.
4. All members of the Abwehr are already known to the Allied Intelligence, or will be in a short time, and thus easily

P.T.O. 12-24

kept under observation. Those members who have been active hitherto will be tired of their work, and will only ask to be left in peace.

5. Complete lack of raw material.
6. For the German of normal opinions there is no political reason for carrying on an Intelligence Service against the Western Allies. The normal German - with the exception of Nazi fanatics - is glad to be rid of the Nazis.
7. Outside Germany itself, it will be practically impossible to find one agent ready to work for the country in its present state of collapse.

I have no knowledge of the extent to which the S.D. has made preparations for the continued existence or recovery of a political service. I should imagine that it will possibly reach out from South America, through isolated enclaves in Europe (Switzerland, Sweden) towards former Reich territory, in the hope of embracing such groups as are still in existence, or re-establishing contact with surviving members of the "old brigade".

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52/4/6

SECRET

Hq., 2677th Regt., OSS (Prov)
Detachment A

SCI Unit A
Salzburg, Austria

FSX-005
2 June 1945

SUBJECT: Stay Behind Units in the Salzburg Area. (As projected in
March, 1945 by the RSHA for sabotage and intelligence
purposes.)

Information submitted by Erwin SCHULZ (see FSX-004), SS Brigade-
führer und Generalmajor der Polizei and Befehlshaber der SKPO und SD in
Edu Salzburg.

1. At the beginning of March, 1945, an order was sent by Graf. MUELLER,
of the RSHA Amt IV, to all Stapo offices and Inspektoren and Befehl-
shaber der Sipo, requesting that in case of further advances by the enemy
forces, small compact and completely reliable units were to be set up,
which were to stay behind in occupied areas, (sich vom Feinde ueberrollen
lassen). It was pointed out that it was of the greatest importance to
the RSHA to learn with reliability of conditions in the occupied areas,
especially as regards the behaviour of enemy troops and of the local
population. No further details or instructions were contained in this
directive, which altogether only covered about half of a typewritten
page.

2. Approximately one week later, a more detailed and specific directive
was issued over the signature of KALTENBRUNNER. This directive set
forth that small, compact S-(Sabotage) and N-(Nachrichten) troops were
to be formed. Their task was to be the continued providing of intelli-
gence on the enemy and the disruption and damaging of the enemy, mainly
of his communication system, his oil depots, his supply lines, and the
sabotaging of his airfields and of his planes. Even this rather brief
order did not go into any specific operational details and only emphasized
that the greatest care was to be exercised in the selection of these
stay behind units. The units were to be as small and compact as possible
and were to be briefed in such a way, that one troop (Trupp) did not
know the identity of the other troops and also ignored the locations
where any other troops were to operate. The troops were to be supplied
with sufficient amounts of food supplies, funds and ammunition; explos-
ives and sabotage equipment were to be stored in good time in adequately
camouflaged caches, while the Nachrichten troops were, if possible, to
be equipped with W/T sets.

3. SCHULZ further stated that: "In my own sphere of competence, neither
an S nor an N Troop was organized and brought into action, for neither
the prerequisites as regards personnel, nor those regarding supplies
existed in this area, since no funds, special food supplies or special
ammunition supplies had ever been provided for these plans, which in this
area never passed the planning stage." (Thus, in the Salzburg district,
explosives were so short that in February, 1945, an order was issued to
carefully preserve and save all duds after air raids, to assemble them
with the Air Force, so that their explosive charge might be used again.)

4. SCHULZ also pointed out that these directives were solely concerned
with and adapted to the period of actual warfare and that he had no know-
ledge of an actual order (to the Sipo or SD services) regarding post-
hostilities projects.

G-2, CJ, 7th Army (8)
G-2, CI, 15th Army Corps (2)
CIC, 15th Army Corps (3)
G-2, CI, AFHQ (4)
SCI, 7th Army (1)
Lt. Col. Crowley (2)

(Signed)
E.P. BARRY
Major, MI
CO, SCI/A

SF 52/Belgium/3 - fidei styg
Formerly in SF 52/Belgium/3 - fidei styg

Dated December 1944

TOP SECRET

R.B. Miss Welf Smith

THE S.D. IN BELGIUM.

The limited aim of this note is to estimate the character and degree of danger to security presented by the past and present plans of Amt. VI, VI-S and Milant D of the R.S.M.A. for operations in Belgium. Two questions reasonably distinct are involved. (1) Have we the measure of the stay-behind organization laid down in Belgium before the German withdrawal? (2) Have we made the appropriate security dispositions to counter S.D. plans made since the withdrawal?

THE STAY-BEHIND ORGANIZATION.

1. EFFICIENCY OF AMT. VI, BRUSSELS.

Some preliminary observations on the efficiency of the Amt. VI Dienststelle in Brussels may help to assess the seriousness of the threat constituted by the stay-behind plans of the organization. Generally speaking, our evidence, which is copious and of good quality (consisting as it does of the testimony of seven of the principal agents intended to remain behind and two S.D. officers who enjoyed free access to the Dienststelle) reveals a degree of incompetence and stupidity which should go some way to destroy the belief that the S.D. is necessarily superior to the Abwehr as an espionage organization.

In Belgium the principal officers of the Dienststelle not only exhibited little professional skill or even commonsense, but were plainly unsuited by temperament and character for the careful and detailed work which the laying-down of an effective stay-behind organization would have required. Thus, Hauptsturmführer LAWRENZ, head of the Dienststelle since October 1943, (i.e. a few months after Berlin had issued the order to Brussels to lay down an effective stay-behind organization), is described by DE MULDER and ROY as lazy and too fond of female company, while SWEERTS describes him contemptuously as a passe film star given to reddening his nails. His assistant, Untersturmführer KRAATZ, whose special province was the organization of the stay-behind network, is described by both ROY and DE MULDER as fussy, inconsistent and hurried - characteristics which were well illustrated in

12 DEC 1944

21-12-44

his negotiations with DE MULDER, whom he took on as an agent in the mistaken belief that the nature of his occupation had already been explained to him by another member of the Dienststelle. DE MULDER was in consequence engaged before he knew that he was concerned with an espionage organization at all. Our sources agree, however, that the wireless expert concerned with the stay-behind organization, Funkleiter HERMANN, was an exception to the general incompetence; yet there was continuous friction between him and KRAATZ and on one occasion, according to HULSMAN, HERMANN to spite his superior made false reports on the efficiency of the agents' wireless practice.

The incompetence of the officers of the Dienststelle was exhibited principally in the types of agent whom they selected and the motives to which they appealed. Originally, according to GARITTE, it was intended to employ as agents in the stay-behind organization, characters who were not known as pro-Germans or collaborators, but this wise policy must soon have been abandoned as a mere counsel of perfection, since most of the agents were either known as Rexists, V.N.V., etc. or had been members of the Waffen S.S. or of one of the Foreign Legions. Still more extraordinary seems the policy of employing as highly confidential agents former members of the resistance movements who had been induced to work for the S.D. under the threat of the death sentence or physical torture as in the cases of HULSMAN and possibly BUTCKI. This policy was according to SCHWETZ (himself an interpreter at Abt. IV Linge) commonly adopted by Abt. IV where the conversion of "terrorists" into informers through physical torture seems to have been regarded as normal, and was perhaps not altogether ludicrous since they would work under the eye of their new masters, and not, as in the case of Abt. VI stay-behind agents, out of their masters' reach. This is but one respect in which Abt. VI was rendered incompetent as an espionage organization through its infection with "Gestapo" methods.

With inefficiency at the Abt. VI Dienststelle went insecurity, and the cases of SWEETES, COLLAT and possibly GARITTE show how exposed its secrets were to penetration. In matters of minor detail the admission of DELHAYE

to first a more outside agent engaged in following suspects, to a seat (and a desk) in the Dienststelle within 3 months of recruitment. Illustrates the general low level of caution.

Finally, it is worth noting how strongly the efficiency of Abt. IV under FRIEDRICH contrasted with the state of affairs in Abt. VI. ~~SECRET~~ describes this officer as the most able and dangerous character in the S.D. in Brussels.

2. THE START OF ABT. VI STAY-BEHIND PLANS.

The order to Abt. VI Brussels to construct a stay-behind organization of W/T agents came through from Berlin in the summer of 1943. Till then it had been engaged in a wide range of apparently profitless tasks, and principally in the attempt to pick up information about foreign countries, from Belgian circles thought still to have contact with the Allies. Before GARITTE entered the Dienststelle in 1943 few if any agents had been sent abroad by it and the sole sources of information seem to have been the gossip of journalists or the various business and financial circles in Belgium, and what could be gleaned through the resistance groups that had been penetrated. GARITTE's scheme for obtaining information through the entire Belgian communities in Spain and Portugal must have taken up a considerable amount of the time and energies of the Dienststelle. In consequence it seems safe to assume that no consideration had been given to the more important task of laying down a stay-behind organization until the middle of 1943.

3. THE I.NETZ OF W/T AGENTS.

The principal, though apparently not the only, stay-behind scheme of which we know is the I.NETZ (INVASIONS NETZ) of W/T agents, seven of whom are in our hands. It is difficult to believe that any remnants of the I.NETZ can have survived as effective agents, but some of the characters known to have been involved have made good their escape, or remain safely in hiding. It is, however, worth while reviewing the I.NETZ scheme in

the light of the evidence now available to see how far this conclusion is justified:-

(a) Geographical Distribution.

We have eight separate accounts of the points at which I.NETZ agents were to be planted with their S/T sets, and if we err on the side of caution and accept all the places specified in the various accounts the following is a complete list:

Brussels, Antwerp, Charleroi, Ghent, Ostende,
Liege, Calais, Boulogne, Lille, St. Omer,
Rhode St. Genese, St. Hubert.

It is known, however, that some of these places never received the agents destined for them, e.g. Boulogne in the case of PIT, St. Hubert in the case of LEONARD & PAN, and the only reliable estimate of the extent to which the I.NETZ has been broken is the list of the agents who are still missing. These are according to HUISMAN's list, VERSTRAETEN and HUYCKX for Antwerp; according to DELHAYE, STEIN and Jules VERBIST for Antwerp; according to DE KULDER JEF for Ghent; according to COLLET, HEINE for Antwerp; according to ROY, LEON and POL for Brussels and LEONARD & PAN for St. Hubert. Of these, it seems extremely probable that VERSTRAETEN and LEONARD at least may have gone to Germany and it is possible that HUYCKX and HEIN may be identical with characters of these names whom we know to be in Germany. Some of these may of course return.

(b) It is obvious that the seven agents in our hands form a large proportion of the whole of the I.NETZ, even if the lists given us are not exhaustive. It is of some importance, therefore, to notice that of these seven only three, ROY, DELHAYE and HUYCKX, failed to give themselves up to the Allies and of these three ROY was arrested by the Brigade Blanche as a known Rexist, DELHAYE was denounced by another agent and HUYCKX was arrested as the result of the discovery of a card in the Belgian Police files describing him as an S.D. Angehöriger. These facts suggest that only a very small proportion of the whole I.NETZ is likely to have escaped our attention.

(c) The failure of Abt. VI to give the members of the I.NETZ effective cover strengthens the conclusion reached above. Thus HULSMAN is the only member of the I.NETZ known to us who had not had a collaborationist or pro-German past. In COLLET's case an attempt was made late in March 1944 to provide him with cover in the form of the editorship of an amusement guide at the Bruxelles Spectacle, half the purchase price of which was provided for him by the S.D. HULSMAN's cover in Calais, i.e. of employment first in the Docks and later on the fortifications, was of his own finding.

(d) Abt. VI had made some rudimentary plans for the maintenance of the I.NETZ agents after its own departure. This took the form of a distribution to each agent of 30,000 francs at the end of August. This was the equivalent of six months' pay and it can therefore be assumed that lack of funds will not seriously inconvenience any still undetected members of the network. Further, nearly all the agents seem to have been promised by KRAATZ that further monthly sums, sometimes as much as 10,000 francs would reach them regularly after the German withdrawal. Perhaps the most serious interference with the S.D.'s plans in the identification of Yvan ROT's wireless shop in Brussels as an important element in the I.NETZ since it was intended not only to make this a rendezvous when required for the stay-behind agents, but to service their W/T sets from there.

(e) Skill. One respect in which Abt. VI seems to have been reasonably efficient was in the matter of the W/T instruction of their agents. Nearly all the agents known to us attended a proper course at one or other of the S.D. W/T schools, and in some cases, e.g. HULSMAN, the course was prolonged and thorough. In others, e.g. DE MULDER, they were subject to examinations and

refresher courses, and in most cases there was adequate practice traffic. ROY, as something of a technical expert and the owner of a shop, but for his collaborationist past would have been a formidable agent and would have had no difficulty in establishing communication with the control in Germany. It seems, therefore, that we cannot assume that agents belonging to the I.NETZ would not have had proper qualifications and opportunities for practice to enable them to conduct serious traffic. Reasonably efficient instruction in codes seems to have been given in most cases, but the speed with which Belgium was overrun may have generally interfered with lastminute instructions both in code and W/T as it did in DELHAYE's case. Most of the W/T agents were in position, with their W/T sets, by May, 1944, though DE MUYER and DELHAYE did not receive theirs till July and August respectively.

(f) An examination of the specific questionnaires given to members of the I.NETZ makes it impossible for us to assume that their mission has been rendered out of date by events. It is true that most of them were directed to obtain some technical information and perhaps most of the operational instructions have little relevance to the present position. All of the agents, however, as would be expected, were told to report on political matters, especially on any signs of discontent and dissatisfaction, and an important item, in e.g. COLLET's case, was the fate of Germanophiles especially those who had openly sided with the New Order. The inference is, therefore, that the I.NETZ was intended as much to assist the S.D. plans of disruption as for any operational purpose, and in this respect at least if there are any functioning members of the I.NETZ they constitute a danger.

4. OTHER STAY-BEHIND AGENTS.

In addition to the I.NETZ, which on the evidence would seem almost certainly to have been destroyed or rendered impotent, there is some rather slender evidence hinting at other S.D. stay-behind espionage plans. This evidence, which may repay further investigation in the field, is as follows:-

(a) Adolf FITTERY. GARITTE speaks of this man in quite categorical terms as the head agent in charge of a stay-behind network at Ghent, and gives his address as 73, Verstraet Tronchiennes and also 44, rue d'Assaut, Ghent. It is remarkable that though most of the members of the I.NETZ whom we have interrogated refer to a stay-behind agent of Ghent, usually as JEF, nothing suggests that this agent is identical with FITTERY. It may well be, therefore, that FITTERY is the centre of a stay-behind network distinct from the I.NETZ since there seems no reason to doubt GARITTE's evidence on the point. It seems clear, moreover, that FITTERY was not himself to be a mere W/T operator, but was to be in charge of a group, and certainly from GARITTE's description he would have the experience and training suitable for this. If the Adolf FITTERY mentioned in 21st Army Group Fortnightly Report Number 11, together with a number of associates, is identical with the character of this name mentioned by GARITTE, it seems probable that an important S.D. network has been discovered and certainly enquiries about this group should be prosecuted vigorously.

(b) GARITTE speaks of a Dutchman named HOMBURG, who had acted as an informant for Abt. VI, as having agreed with the Germans to support their agents after the German withdrawal. He was not, however, to have a W/T net and his role seems to have been limited to supplying funds to other stay-behind agents. He should be easily identifiable since GARITTE speaks of him as owning a racing stable at Brussels and his father's business (manufacturers of cement bowls) at Place de Brouckere, Brussels. In view of the generally credible character of GARITTE's evidence, a serious attempt should be made to find HOMBURG.

(c) Perhaps less serious is the evidence of HUISMAN, DE MULDER and BUCKEY with regard to HERMANN, the Funkleider of Abt. VI, which may

possibly be no more than the result of the latter's threats or empty boasts. It is, however, the fact that these three sources all agree that HERMANN stated his intention to remain behind though except in DE MULDER's account he might merely have meant that he would come back after the German withdrawal. According to BUYCKI, HERMANN and six other agents were either to stay-behind or to return and might need the facilities which BUYCKI's house could provide.

5. STAY-BEHIND SABOTAGE.

Until the arrest on 4.11.44 of Hugo LAHAYE, only two S.D. sabotage dumps had been discovered. These were both made by the agent SNEL alias DE BEER and were both discovered as a result of HULSMAN's evidence. There was, however, enough evidence available to suggest that the S.D. preparations for stay-behind sabotage were extensive. The main evidence lay in the testimony of most of the captured agents of the I.NETZ that a principal agent, Jos VERSTRAETEN, was responsible for the organization of sabotage, and GARITTE's evidence, who though not knowing VERSTRAETEN's functions as an organizer of sabotage, spoke of him as in charge of the I.NETZ. This suggested that VERSTRAETEN had considerable commitments and the dumps at Calais and Denderleuw made by SNEL could not have been the sole result of VERSTRAETEN's labours. LAHAYE has now confirmed the evidence already in our possession and has presented us with what is almost certainly an exhaustive account of the sabotage arrangements made by the S.D. before its withdrawal. According to this account, plans for stay-behind sabotage were begun in May 1944, at the suggestion of the B.d.N. for Belgium and Northern France, (CANARIS) and VERSTRAETEN was, as our other sources testify, in charge of this sabotage organization, which had the cover-name HENRIETTE. The original intention was to leave behind ten sabotage agents, but of these, two were executed by the S.D. at the last moment on suspicion of having betrayed the organisation to the Brigade Blanche. A third, SNEL alias DE BEER, together with his material, had already been identified, while the leader, VERSTRAETEN and the V/T operator HUYGHEM alias HAUSER retreated with the Germans. The surviving members of this group who are

unknown to us and who have not been identified up to date are as follows:-

1. CORVELDEN, Edward, at Beuvogem.
2. Mrs. LAGROU alias LE BLEU, at Ostende and Brussels.
3. DE RIDDER alias CHEVALIER at Antwerp.
4. TINTLOT alias BOOM (the name BOOM was given us by HULSMAN as that of the principal sabotage agent for Western Flanders).
5. WALGRAVE alias HAUNEN at Blankenbergh.

VERSTRAETEN and HUYGHEN, according to LAHAYE, have now returned to Belgium and are intended to work with LAHAYE.

According to LAHAYE ten sabotage dumps were laid by the S.D. before their withdrawal from Belgium. Of these, two had already been identified as a result of HULSMAN's evidence, and of the remaining eight, two are at addresses specified by LAHAYE at Antwerp, one at an unspecified address in Antwerp, one at a specified address in Brussels, one at a specified address in Ostende, and there are three other dumps whose location LAHAYE cannot remember.

The sabotage organization described by LAHAYE is plainly the same as that of which fragmentary details only have been given us by HULSMAN and other agents in our hands. LAHAYE had access at the R.S.H.A. in Berlin to the files of correspondence between Berlin and Brussels concerning the laying down of the HENRIETTE organization, and it seems extremely unlikely that any sabotage preparations were made by the S.D. in Belgium in addition to those which LAHAYE describes. This conclusion is supported strongly by the particulars which LAHAYE gives of his own mission, since one of his main tasks was to discover whether the dumps of sabotage material and the agents left behind were still safe and available for work, and also to reconnoitre suitable areas for dropping new sabotage material by parachute. It can therefore be inferred with reasonable confidence that if the dumps of material described by LAHAYE are located, the S.D. will have no material resources in Belgium for sabotage until they succeed in dropping new supplies, though the possibility that there may be Abwehr dumps to which Amt VI will now have access (as they have in France) is worth remembering.

Concrete evidence as to the R.S.M.A.'s stay-behind plans in Belgium does not really go beyond that described above, but it would not be surprising, notwithstanding the hurry in which the Germans retired from Belgium if some further plans, probably of an unrealistic and slipshod character, had been at least partially put into operation. Some assignments must almost certainly have been given to some of the many Abt. VI agents named by our sources, and the withdrawal of Abt. IV must have freed numbers of agents of that department for work as spies, saboteurs and trouble-makers, and some rudimentary instructions may have been given to them. For these reasons the control of both these classes of S.D. agents is a matter of security importance. The same is true of all the collaborating or pro-Fascist elements who have not departed with the Germans and to a lesser degree of the classes from whom the S.D. recruited many of their agents, e.g. the communities of Spaniards, Italians and other foreigners in Brussels. These various classes of general suspects, however, as distinct from the specific stay-behind organisations described above, are unlikely to be dangerous until they are provided by the Germans with communications, including W/T, material for sabotage, and effective direction. Their importance, therefore, lies in their ability to serve as raw material for the operations of the R.S.M.A. since its withdrawal from Belgium.

CONCLUSIONS.

1. The S.D. stay-behind organisation of W/T agents - the I.NETZ - has almost certainly been either destroyed or rendered impotent.
2. Apart from the cases of Adolf PITTERY and ROEBURG mentioned in Para. 4 above, there is no evidence and little likelihood that the S.D. has left behind an effective espionage organization other than the I.NETZ.
3. If LAHAYE's evidence is successfully exploited, the S.D. stay-behind organisation of saboteurs will probably have been destroyed.

4. Unidentified and undiscovered S.D. agents in Belgium are dangerous if and to the extent to which the Germans succeed in regaining contact with them by the insertion of new agents.

PART TWO

6. S.D. PLANS SINCE THE WITHDRAWAL.

Since the date of the German withdrawal from Belgium changes have taken place in the R.S.M.A. which without doubt will render its operations far more formidable than those so carelessly and amateurishly planned by Abt. VI while still in Belgium. Foremost among these changes is the unification under Sturmbannführer SKORZENY of Amt VI-S and Milant D. of the R.S.M.A. and the injection of new order and vigour into the training and command of irregular units such as the S.S. Jäger Battalion 502, and the Jagd-Verbände, destined for all forms of irregular warfare from physical sabotage to the exploitation of any signs of disunion and discontent. From the cases of LEHMERS and DESMENT it is evident that Belgians, notably Flemings, have made a considerable contribution to the numbers undergoing the intensive training under SKORZENY's command, and there is a further direct evidence from a recent line-crosser, DE VREESE, that large numbers of Belgian agents are intended to be despatched secretly back into Belgium, when the moment is judged opportune.

Though there is no doubt about the scale and intensity of SKORZENY's preparations, the detailed evidence so far available in London is insufficient to give more than a general indication of the form and objectives of the attack. Indeed, of the three principal cases which have come into our hands, KULLERBERG, Robert DE VREESE and Hugo LABAYE, one, if not two, represents little more than an experiment intended to test out the

nature of our security controls and to collect documents and other evidence which will facilitate the insertion of future agents. All three sources agree that SKORZENY's plans have scarcely passed the preparatory stage so far as Belgium is concerned.

The following, however, is a SUMMARY of what we can reasonably infer from the available evidence:-

(1) Objectives.

We must expect future S.D. agents to attempt to make their way into Belgium with one or more of the following objectives:-

(a) Physical Sabotage

As appears from LAHAYE's case the Germans are anxious to establish the extent to which they can still rely on the S.D. stay-behind sabotage organization, but are evidently prepared for a disappointing answer. It would be reasonable, therefore, to expect that as soon as reception facilities are available, attempts will be made to drop sabotage supplies by aircraft and meanwhile the insertion of individual saboteurs with missions to accomplish like that of LAHAYE himself, i.e. to poison water supplies, should be expected.

(b) Direction and Organisation of Anti-Allied Resistance Movements.

This ranks especially high in SKORZENY's general programme and there is enough evidence to make its application to Belgium a matter of serious concern. Thus, DE VRIESSE was instructed to seek out the D.D. organization apparently an inner circle and intelligence bureau of the V.N.V. so as to establish communication which would enable it to be efficiently directed from Germany. KULLENBERG had a general assignment to make contacts within any anti-Allied movements and both he and DE VRIESSE were to find out the main sources of unrest and to organize "cells" of resistance.

(c) Disturbance.

LAHAYE had instructions to provoke acts of violence at public meetings and elsewhere in such a manner as to make the blame appear to rest with Left Wing or Communist movements, the hope no doubt being to encourage a reaction in favour of even a collaborationist Right Wing.

(d) Espionage.

The most important espionage function required of these agents is the collection of political intelligence specially relating to anti-Allied underground movements and the position of pro-Fascist and pro-German elements. Though ancillary assignments are also given, such as the collection of information about food supplies, relations between the Allies, etc., it is easy to discern SKORZENY's overriding anxiety to keep his finger on the pulse of political movements or quarrels which could be used for his purposes.

(11) Method.

The agents that have so far come into our hands have been inserted as line-crossers, and no doubt this form will be used frequently. On the other hand, we have ample evidence that both individual agents and small formations are trained in parachute jumping at the SKORZENY training schools, and certainly some members of Abt. VI in Brussels, e.g. HENGMANN, expected to return by parachute.

The S.D. line-crossers have so far used civilian clothes and have posed as refugees making good their escape from German hands. In contrast to many previous cases the three most recent ones exhibit a considerable degree of care in the preliminary preparations for despatch. Thus, KULLENBERG was made to study in some detail the career of the Dutch comedian whom he impersonated, and DE VREESE bore a Belgian identity card belonging to a Belgian worker in Germany with whose past he had made himself acquainted. Every effort, according to KULLENBERG, had been made by those who despatched him to find out the documents required to ensure the passage of the agent through Belgium, and it was not through carelessness but through lack of supplies that DE VREESE was supplied with old Belgian currency. This attention to detail exhibits a great improvement on past form both of the Abwehr and the S.D. in the use of this type of agent and may increase the difficulties of our security control.

(111) Types of Agent Employed.

If SKORZENY proposes to utilize his agents in Belgium on a grand scale, it may well be that many of them will be of inferior quality or at least intelligence, but if neither LAHAYE nor de VREESE were formidable characters, KULLENBERG at least had a long career as a penetration agent in Holland which would have been a good qualification for his work. There are sufficient supplies of ex-agents available to Amt VI to make it improbable that we shall merely have to do with the raw recruit. It should be borne in mind that according to LAHAYE's evidence, skilled agents like Jos VERSTRAETEN and HUTHENS have already made their way back

into Belgium while according to DE VREESE at least two others, LEERS and HEINEZ (possibly identical with the stay-behind agent of the same name mentioned by KULSHAN, who may also be well qualified) left for Belgium at approximately the same time as he did.

(iv) Facilities available in Belgium.

It is probable that there are ample facilities (apart from sabotage material) available, though no doubt in a decreasing measure, for use by agents, whom the Germans expected to insert into Belgium, in the form of safe houses, cover addresses, and according to DE VREESE, buried wireless sets or wireless parts, e.g. crystals. There can be little doubt of the willingness and possibly of the ability of the members of the V.N.V. Resist and other pro-Nazi groups, to provide accommodation for emissaries from their late masters and in this respect Belgium must be considered favourable ground for exploitation.

CONCLUSIONS

1. We must expect an attempt, probably on a large scale, to insert into Belgium, both as line-crossers and parachutists, agents of the organizations working under SKORZENY, for the purpose both of physical sabotage and preparing and directing violent disturbances, possibly on a large scale.
2. If these agents are successfully inserted into Belgium, they may escape detection and find a fruitful soil for their work.
3. If our security resources are divided and capable of re-allocation, between the tasks of locating stay-behind agents in Belgium and of preventing the insertion of new agents, the latter should be regarded as of paramount importance.
4. As large and as well instructed a force of security personnel as possible should be detailed to the task of frustrating the attempts of line-crossers to insert themselves into Belgium.

December 1944.

EXTRACT.

1a

Extract for File No.: S.F.52/4/16 Name: ABWEHR POST-WAR PLANS
Original in File No.: PF.601.357 HAGEMANN Serial: 259 Dated: 22.3.45
Original from: S.C.I. 12th A.G. Under Ref.: S-837
Extracted on: 30.6.45 by: R.I. Section: WS/HAM.
Extract from S.C.I. interrogation report on Julius HAGEMANN, Trupp 123
agent-recruiter.

.....
FIRST MEETING WITH EDGAR WEDEPOHL (LE PROFESSEUR):
.....

9. It must have been at the end of 1941 that Major KRUGER telephoned Subject at his hotel and asked him to meet one of his friends, a certain Edgar WEDEPOHL.....The two men got together very well.....

10. WEDEPOHL mentioned the "Friedensorganisation" many times. This was a plan of the German Abwehr for after the war, and WEDEPOHL promised Subject the position of a secret agent in France.
.....

✓
S.I.
4/7/45

1-2/116
6-7-45

Theories additional to those incorporated in paper of 6.1.45

1. The "Societe Commerciale d'Affretements et de Commission" 2. Rue Lord Byron, referred to in the previous paper, sounds very much like the "Societe de Consignation et d'Affretements", "SOCONAF", which played a considerable part in the SNOW case. The "Societe Commerciale d'Affretements et de Commission" held six thousand shares in a firm known as the Societe Commerciale et Maritime, London, of which a certain Maurice OLIVIER was a director. The firm of OLIVIER & CO. apparently previously had an office in Hamburg and during this war has been regarded with a great deal of suspicion. The whole SNOW set-up worked back to Hamburg, which perhaps increases the possibility of the two firms being connected.
2. The above is intended to show that there definitely appears to be a Hamburg connection in what may be a branch of the stay-behind organisation. This theory is substantiated by the following facts. There are several M.S.S. services controlled from Hamburg, notably Hamburg-Paris, and Hamburg-Antwerp area. In 1940 Hamburg had I.M. and Gruppe II connections in Antwerp, and in the Brest outstation. A notable figure at Brest was Korv. Kapt. WITZKE, who was thought to be possibly identical with the "Commander" of the SNOW case. There is one M.S.S. trace which shows WITZKE to have been in touch with an agent Otto PISTOL, and it is tentatively suggested that this man may be identical with Otto PEUCHEL of the STOCKLING case. There is also a certain FUSSEL figuring in one of the Hamburg services. The OLIVIER LEVANT line mentioned in the previous paper was run from Hamburg. In this respect M.S.S. trace of 2.11.41 on service Hamburg-Turkey which refers to two persons with Russian sounding names and address 21 Rue Lord Byron, (possibly 21 Rue Lord Byron), may be relevant.
3. Otto PEUCHEL of STOCKLING is reported to have run before the war, a transport firm known as TRANSAT. There is a firm, Societe Commerciale de Transports et de Transits, listed in the 39 Bottin at 2. Rue Lord Byron. Transport firms seem to keep cropping up as a possible cover for stay-behind work. There is an M.S.S. trace of 29.3.43 which gives a cover address in Paris, "Les Rapides Autos Transports", Ville Montcalm XVIII, for KERSTEN I.T./LW Brussels in connection with the "RICHARD" network. Further, MOLDEHAUER and WIEGAND, the latter of West Brussels in Paris are, in the TRICYCLE case, mixed up in some car transactions. The address in Cologne at which the agent LEKERE received lessons in secret writing and Telescopic photography bore the name-plate "Poloni Transport Business". The agent REGNIER seems also to be connected with transport in some way. Major PEUCHEL'S firm is, according to an F.B.I. report, supposed to have branch offices in South America, with whom funds are being deposited for the paying of agents.
4. On re-reading the LECOQ file information has come to light regarding a firm at 12 Rue Presbourg where a certain DEUDOND dealt in wine, and ran a firm which LECOQ calls Bureau de Courtage et de Commerce. The '39 Bottin however lists at this address Societe d'Etudes Techniques et de Commerce Kle 4697. There are two other firms in the building dealing in Jute and raw materials with telephone numbers Kle 4694 and 4696. As the other occupants of the building have completely different telephone numbers, it seems just possible that there is housed here another bunch of phoney firms, and that is why they have consecutive telephone numbers. LECOQ states this firm to have been in touch with B.E.M.I.C. at 1 Rue Lord Byron for business purposes. (None of this has been carded, so it might be worth looking into.)
5. On looking through the SNOW case for further details of SOCONAF, there came to light a certain William STUECKLIN, Swiss, born Basle 30.8.94. yarn agent representing WAEFFLER & CO. since 1922. In 1939 this man contacted who was convinced he was a German agent. There is further a most strange post-card in the file addressed to ERWIN from 'Tante Else' referring to 'Uncle Otto', whom knows does not exist in the family. Uncle Otto adds a p.s. giving an address in

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Switzerland to which ERWIN can write for forwarding to Germany. Charlie apparently told SNOW he thought STUECKLIN was connected in some way with one von BRANDTETH. All this admittedly is not very conclusive. At first it seemed possible that STUECKLIN might be identical with Max STOECKLING, but this is now improbable as STUECKLIN's H.O. papers show his date of birth and the Christian name of his father and maiden name of his mother to be different from the information given by Max STOECKLING about his parents. It does however, seem more than a coincidence that STUECKLIN should in some way be connected with a von BRANDTETH, and Erwin [redacted] with an Uncle OTTO who is definitely fictitious. It seems not impossible therefore, that both von BRANDTETH and Uncle OTTO should be OTTO BRANDEL @ BRANDT. It might be worth making enquiries about STUECKLIN as he figures in the live section of the C.A.R. which is indicative that he is still in this country. He might at least be a relation of MAX and possibly acting as contact man in this country for BRANDEL and Nest Cologne. got SNOW to ask RANTZAU about STUECKLIN: RANTZAU replied that he did not know anything about him and that he was possibly working for the "other section" - (possibly meaning Cologne as opposed to Hamburg) This adds weight to the theory that BRANDTETH might be BRANDEL.

6. REGNIER is a further case of considerable interest. His reference to firearms may link in some way with that on M.S.S. referring to a firearms licence which the official KOEPKE was endeavouring to obtain for LACROIX. REGNIER also might know if there is a division between a short term stay-behind reporting service and a long term net-work. Georges MONTET whom I gather we have captured, should be able to help us considerably. Also possibly Alexander TCHERBATCHEF referred to in the previous note and now captured. LEENAKITS who is still under interrogation, comes into the same category. He worked for the Germans before 1940.

7. Another aspect possibly worth looking into is the function of Gruppe II J, which is known to work through indigenous parties. SNOW, through G.W. worked with Welsh Nationalists. He met RANTZAU and the "Commander" at the flat of the head of the Flemish Nationalists in Antwerp. RUSTON and TESTER mentioned in the previous note, were Scottish Nationalists and members of B.U.F. respectively.

8. Though the above facts are seemingly unconnected, the following points stand out.

Possible Control Centres.

Working to Hamburg	Societe Commerciale d'Affretements et de Commission, possibly connected with "SOCONAF" = S.C.W.
Working to Cologne	BRANDEL = purchasing commission. STOECKLING = B.E.M.I.C. OTTO PEUCHER = TRANSAT.

Commercial Cover.

This appears to be the cover for any long term set-up. Notably: -

BRANDEL's Purchasing commission.
1. Rue Lord Byron (B.E.M.I.C.)
2. Paul Boidin, Villa Montcalm, XVIII. (Les Rapides Autos Transports)
26 Rue de Liege (STOECKLING's address before 1. Rue Lord Byron)
12. Rue de Presbourg (DEUDOND)
TRANSAT.

There are indications that Transport firms are used as cover in the same way as purchasing concerns.

8th February 1945

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This paper is intended as an exposé of the information at present available about stay-behind organisations and their agents and also to include the names and addresses of such persons, firms and organisations who may, with varying degrees of certainty, be connected with stay-behind groups. It should be appreciated that very little research has been done into the matter and equally little collation. This paper will, therefore, include plain lists of such persons etc. mentioned above without any attempt being made to fit them into a pattern. It is nevertheless very apparent that a certain amount of research work, comparing the information now available with the relevant special material of the past year or so, would more than repay the work it would entail. There is every reason to believe that the long term stay-behind organisation established in the first place by the Abwehr, with a certain amount of co-operation from and co-ordination with the S.D., and presumably under the control of the R.S.H.A. Mil. Amt, is indeed a formidable organisation.

This paper will for convenience's sake be divided into two parts:-

- (i) A brief survey of the relevant factual information, and
- (ii) All possibly connected information, and the theories based thereon.

Evidently the principal figure in the sphere of stay-behind work is Otto BRANDEL. The information about this man is comparatively scant, but for present purposes the salient facts about him are:-

- (a) That he has worked for the Abwehr for many years, at least since 1932;
- (b) That his controlling Stelle for many years was Nest Cologne;
- (c) He is known to have worked against Belgium and to have had interests in Spain;
- (d) He is also known to have employed White Russians;
- (e) He was on very good terms with Goering and is possibly connected with, or using as cover, the Office of the Four Year Plan;
- (f) As well as being employed in the establishment of a stay-behind network, he is known to have been engaged in IIIF work and the detection of Allied airmen;
- (g) This stay-behind network appears to have been established on I lines, chiefly the acquisition of I.N. information under commercial cover. There is also evidence, however, that he is connected with Gruppe II matters.

The second organisation involved, which has many characteristics in common with that of Otto BRANDEL, is that run by Max STOECKLING under cover of a firm REMIC at 1 rue Lord Byron, Paris. STOECKLING also worked for the Abwehr before the war, his control was Cologne, he also worked in Belgium before France, and has recently had connections in Spain, he too employed many White Russians and was engaged in espionage activities whilst using commercial cover. He was also engaged in tracing British agents, but seems at the same time to have trained his agents in more offensive work. STOECKLING does not appear to have any connection with Gruppe II work. He was closely connected with Switzerland whence he travelled at least once a week.

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The third organisation with many similar characteristics is that in which Alberto KOPKE, Boris LOEWSON and Sdf WERNER are the prominent figures. This organisation is clearly I.H., and it has sent many agents to this country. On the other hand it has claimed to have many more agents than we have apprehended, and it seems possible that it is also engaged in the setting up of a stay-behind network. WERNER in fact was responsible for the establishment in Belgium of short term stay-behind agents. The main links between this organisation and the two groups mentioned above are:- that it works through Belgium, France and Spain, and has connections in Switzerland. Most of its officials and agents are involved in Black Market activities and phoney commercial houses. MONTET, the principal recruiter, uses the cover of a Société de Conserves, whilst Comit. LACROIX states that he is a member of a purchasing commission for the Lufthansa. The main address in Paris used by this group is 1 bis rue Jean Mermoy, but LACROIX is known to have an office at 1 rue Lord Byron, which, as previously stated, is the address of HEMIG.

A fourth set-up which is possibly connected is that with which the agent POISSON was in contact. POISSON had many associated in the Black Market, and amongst them many White Russians. He visited several addresses in the Rue Jean Mermoy, and it seems just possible that some of his friends might be stay-behind agents; they certainly appear to have many of the necessary qualifications. POISSON also had many links with Marseilles, and it seems that BRANDEL may have connections with the South of France. This however is an avenue as yet unexplored.

These four groups bring us to the end of factual evidence of those engaged in the establishment of stay-behind agents. Several points do however emerge from this resumé. It would appear that the organisation is one large network operating through Spain, France and Belgium. There seems a reason to believe that it may be controlled from Switzerland. Its cover is evidently to be commercial, possibly phoney firms, but in any case it is a cover which is difficult to break. It would appear to be mainly interested in the acquisition of military information, but this may be but the first phase which, after the collapse of the Wehrmacht, will no longer be of interest and therefore will be turned to I.Wi. and general reporting on any activities of the Allies which the Germans could undermine, or finding the weak points in our post-war armour. Another main activity may be that of sabotaging communications and other vulnerable points again, firstly with a view to interfering with matters military while that phase is still of paramount importance, secondly with a view to creating unrest in Allied zones of influence and thus undermining our chances of establishing the liberated countries as strong and independent communities.

(11) We now enter the vast realm of conjecture, much of which seems feasible and a certain amount of which improbable. There is much special material which has in the past been unrelated and which very possibly is closely connected with the plans for the establishment of the stay-behind organisation. For instance, there are several services controlled from Hamburg which show that this Stelle was maintaining many agents in France and Spain. The work of these agents appears to have been the acquisition of I.H. information - movements of troops, possible Allied landing places, etc. Most of this intelligence was obtained from neutral diplomats, highly placed bankers and industrialists, and other sources, which give these agents an I.Wi. tinge. It is nevertheless clear that they were only using this as a cover. The other services of interest are some of those controlled by Ast Wiesbaden. A certain Hapt. JEWNEWEIN seems to have controlled from here a group of agents run from Paris. Haupt. JEWNEWEIN was himself an I.H. official; many of his agents seem to have been trained for stay-behind work. In this connection it is interesting to remember that Peter BIEL, also an official of Ast Wiesbaden, was connected with a concern known as DECUSSA, Deutsches Gold und Silberscheide Austalt. This firm sounds typical of those used as a cover for such agents. It is also possible that Cologne, which was for a long time the Stelle controlling the Low Countries and to which both Oberst RUDOLF and Otto BRANDEL worked for many years, is in some way implicated and a study of some of those services might well repay the work entailed.

/Another aspect ...

Another aspect which should be thoroughly investigated is anything pertaining to phoney firms. A list of these which we have so far encountered is attached.

White Russians are another important factor in this matter. They are, for obvious political reasons, the ideal persons for the Germans to approach and employ. It is known already that many White Russians are implicated in both the Paris and (probably) Brussels ends of the network, and for this reason a list is attached of all those whose past histories and present activities might be worth investigating.

Further lists are attached of persons who for various reasons (as stated at the head of each list) are thought to be possibly connected, and there is also a list of addresses of possible interest.

Separate notes are attached on what may be the Brussels end of the network and also on what appears to have been a possibly similar pro-war group in England. In the case of the Brussels note, all the information that we have encountered and which appeared to be relevant has been included, but it is by no means complete. The contents of the English note was however come upon quite by chance when investigating, in connection with the PIANA case, the traces for the Europa Press. This service was thought to be possibly identical with the European Press Agency, which, as will be seen in the note, may, through one TESTER and various suspicious firms, be connected with Max STORCKLING. No work has been done on this, but it has been possible to piece together a brief sketch of what appears to have been taking place, whilst only reading the files necessary to write an appreciation on the Europa Press. For this reason therefore it may not be an altogether accurate account, and is certainly not complete.

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that all this information was stumbled on quite by chance, and this appears to be an additional point in favour of the argument that it is essential to maintain a system of continuity in investigating these matters. It is useless to isolate one precise period and look into the happenings of that time as though they bore no relation to the past and would have no effect on the future. It is obvious that Intelligence work is essentially based on the past, carried out in the present and planned for the future. These three phases dealt with as a whole create a complete picture, but any one of them dealt with separately is inclined to be incomplete and therefore inaccurate.

BELGIUM

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There was in existence before the war a ^{group} of White Russians in Brussels with their H.Q. at the Cercle Militaire Russe, 103 Rue Belliard, Brussels. These characters were variously reported as being in touch with the Abwehr and the Military Attaché at the German Embassy.

One of the more sinister of these White Russians seems to have been von BASSAWITZ or Felix DASSEL, who in 1940 was said to direct "German military intelligence against the U.K. from Brussels, and to be distributing anti-war propaganda in France through Russian refugees". Another White Russian (?German), Arthur Emile BAY, has a long record of anti-Communist activity and since 1936 has been suspected of espionage on behalf of the Germans in France and Belgium. He was said to work for the Ribbentrop Bureau (but nobody seems to know when) and in 1939 was known to have met "German Intelligence Officers" in Brussels. In 1940 a certain Vladimir PETROFF (no further information is available about him) was apparently recruiting agents through a Mlle. de BOINON in Brussels for work in France. Nicholas Dmitrievitch DOUBINEY, who owned a garage in Brussels financed by the Germans, was arrested by the Belgians (presumably for espionage) and made to leave the country. He was reported to have returned to Brussels in February 1940. Heinrich Romain KAPTAL, Count KAWAROVENY, Alexander SCHABACHEV and WELAK were all known members of the White Russian circle in Brussels and thought to be connected with the Abwehr, but there is no further information about their activities. On the fringe of this set-up was Richard ALTER, an import agent, who liaised between the White Russians and the German Embassy.

It seems possible that this group of Russians may be as involved with the Abwehr and S.D. as their compatriots in Paris, and that they may be the Brussels end of the same organisation. It is exceedingly difficult on the meagre information available to find any connecting link, but it seems possible that one may exist and that investigation into their current activities might produce something interesting. It seems possible that RUDOLF may have worked, in his early Cologne days, through nests of White Russians, first in Belgium and later used the same medium in France.

There are a number of improbable sounding firms in Brussels, which may now be the basis on which the long term stay behind agents are planted.

INDUSCHIMIE. - Adolphe ZIEREN was Director of this firm, and was a personal friend of Goering. He and the Manager of the firm, Felix BRUNNINCK, were both suspected of economic espionage. The latter's brother was the Krupp's representative in Brussels. (As far as I remember INDUSCHIMIE's activities rather declined after the rise of KOESSLER).

ORCA, 53 Avenue des Arts, Brussels. M.P.H. de HAAS was buying goods for the Germans through this firm early in the war after he had visited the Chamber of Commerce in Berlin in September, 1939.

E.C.M.A. - Directed by Dr. Eugene BRUNSAUER, who in October 1939 was reported to be running a post-box for the receipt of intelligence reports from France and the U.K. at 4, rue d'Epernay, Luxembourg.

Comptoir d'Achat de Matieres Premieres, 222a rue Royale, Brussels. Albert STABLEN recruited agents, probably for the S.D. He was a cotton merchant in this firm.

MEGONS, Avenue de l'Observatoire, Liège. Wine merchant, in January 1943 reported as double agent and in December as "Gestapo".

/As in ...

As in the case of White Russians, there is very little information about these firms anyhow in the Purple Primer, but it seems that they might all have been working for some German organization, either before or in the early days of the war, apparently connected with intelligence activities, such as the Four-Year Plan, and having been tried out and found reliable, may now have long term agents planted in them. It is perhaps possible that the I.R. Officers who came from Wiesbaden to Brussels really were dealing with economic and military matters. One of these Officers was MIROW.

Two other possible connections with the long term stay behind organization are JOOSTENS (Brussels Who's Who) and Fritz JUNGES (Antwerp Who's Who).

JOOSTENS seems to have carried out extensive black market deals, to be closely connected with the stay behind organization, and to have been sent to Paris in November 1943 (temporarily).

JUNGES has a paint business in Lille with a branch at Ostend and travels Lille, Ostend, Antwerp, Brussels and Berlin. He is a friend of and agent recruiter for ACKERMANN. His brother-in-law worked for the Abwehr in Paris and is married to a Russian. He knows of Ernst BISHOFF's O. Henri BOUILLON's activities. All this in 1943.

It seems probable that investigation into the activities of both KARSTEN, Leiter I Luft Brussels in early 1944, and KERSTEN, I. T/LW Brussels, in connection with their activities in France and Spain, would be profitable, as it appears from M.S.S. that KERSTEN at least was concerned with the R. Network.

ENGLAND

By chance an interesting sidelight on the activities of Max STOECKLING has been found, from which it appears that he had connections in England in 1938. The information about STOECKLING was discovered as a result of investigating the activities of the European Press Agency, which was endeavouring to buy on behalf of the German Propaganda Ministry (apparently backed by industrialists) a Belgian newspaper which could be used as a vehicle for anti-Communist and anti-left propaganda. To conceal the true ownership of the paper it was to be financed by apparently bona fide business men in England who would in reality be using money paid to them from Germany. The Directors of the European Press Agency were AGG-LARGE and J.V.A. RUSTON. A certain Dr. A.A. TESTER, a pillar of the B.U.F., was chief adviser to the latter, and when investigation was made into the activities of the European Press, it was found that TESTER was connected with a number of firms with improbable names, all with an address at 14 St. James's Place. The companies run from this address were:-

Roumanian National Industrial Holdings, among the original Directors of which was Max STOECKLING, described as a Belgian Company Promoter. TESTER later became a shareholder in this concern.

Consolidated Industrial and Agricultural Finance Corporation. TESTER's fellow Directors included M. LEBMANN, a Hamburg industrialist, and three of the shareholders named were German, one French and one Roumanian.

British Glycerine, which had some extremely strange financial dealings with Belgium.

Victor Holdings Ltd., closely connected with British Glycerine.

Further points of interest are that TESTER apparently had some connection with von der COLLE, who worked directly under Goering in the Four-Year Plan. (This perhaps lends weight to the theory set out in the note on Belgium). He was connected with Baron BRUGMANN de WALZIN and J.V.A. RUSTON, both living in Brussels, who later bought Victor Holdings Ltd. He apparently owned the Nassauer Hof Hotel in Wiesbaden, and a small straw which perhaps shows which way the wind blew was the fact that he had on his desk a calendar marked Krupp Grossenwerk. This last is a very small point indeed, but in view of the large part played by German industrialists in financing intelligence activities, it may not be without significance.

At the time when this information was brought to light, Max STOECKLING was working for the Abwehr (RUDOLPH) under commercial cover in Belgium and Holland, so it seems from the above information that RUDOLPH's interest may have extended to this country anyhow as a means of furthering his activities in the Low Countries.

J.V.A. RUSTON, who was connected with TESTER, appears to have been a very suspicious character, for in addition to his connection with the European Press Agency he was employed by Jean PRICE and Moritz STRAUSS, a wine importing firm which was set up with the capital remaining from British Glycerine when that firm ceased to function. Most of the money in this concern belonged to Baron BRUGMANN de WALZIN.

RUSTON's salary was £1100 per annum, which in view of his total lack of experience seems excessive. In this connection it is perhaps relevant to recall that Max STOECKLING worked under cover of the wholesale wine business. Another shady connection in which

/RUSTON has ...

RUSTON has featured in the firm Uniberias, whose books in this country defied a series of chartered accountants. This firm appears to have operated mainly in Spain.

A small possible link between these concerns and the present known stay behind organisation is the name van HEEMSTRA. RUSTON married a Baroness van HEEMSTRA, and it is known that a Baron van HEEMSTRA, who is presumably a connection, works at 1 rue Lord Byron, Paris, which is the address of BENIC, Max STORCKLING's firm.

In 1939 RUSTON was reported to be connected with one ATHA (Irene M. YOUNG), but denied this before the Home Office Advisory Committee. This woman, who was strongly suspected of espionage by the French in 1940, appears to have had a number of strange commercial contacts in England and on the continent, and in 1939 was ostensibly trying to find an agent in England to work on behalf of a champagne firm with offices in Paris and Marseilles. Another contact of hers in England was Maurice OLIVIER, a director of the Société Commerciale et Maritime, London. Six thousand shares in this concern were held by the Société Commerciale d'Affrètements et de Commission of 2 rue Lord Byron, Paris. (1 rue Lord Byron was Max STORCKLING's address). From the street directory it appears that both 1 and 2 rue Lord Byron house a vast number of firms, and it might possibly be worth seeing if these two buildings intercommunicate. The firm of Olivier and Co. formerly had an office in Hamburg, and during this war has been regarded with a great deal of suspicion. Again there is a possible family connection between this firm and the known stay behind organisation. Maurice OLIVIER's mother was a Mlle. FABRE, and there is a Jean FABRE who works closely with Max STORCKLING.

These points taken separately are admittedly not very convincing, but taken together it seems that it must be more than mere coincidence that so many of these names should have come to light in connection with suspicious commercial undertakings working in this country and on the continent before the war and later in connection with the stay behind organisation working in Western Europe. TESTER's group of firms in England seems to be organised on remarkably similar lines to those run by STORCKLING on behalf of RUDOLPH, first in the Low Countries and later in France, and it is an alarming possibility that such phoney firms could equally well have been used to finance pro-German (or even more sinister) activities in England, either through such organisations as the B.U.F., or by doing business with genuine firms. It must be emphasised that this note has been written as a result of reading P.F.R. 3276 Olivier Levant Line volume 1, P.P.47133 J.V.A. RUSTON volume 3, and P.P.38951 A.A. TESTER volume 5 only.

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Otto BRAUNDEL - STOECKLING - BENIC - BORIS/PEDRO *(L.H. R. R. R.)*

Up to date these persons and their organisations have always been dealt with separately and regarded as unconnected except where there is actual evidence that individuals are associated.

1. The purpose of this note is (i) to amplify the original minute of .5.44 in which was laid out all the information then available on STOECKLING/BENIC and BRAUNDEL showing how, though there was no evidence to substantiate the theory, Max STOECKLING and Otto BRAUNDEL must in some way be connected. The little information so far obtained from STOECKLING proves this theory correct. It seems advisable, therefore, at this stage, and before the arrival of STOECKLING at Camp 020 to put on record any further theories about these persons. Such a paper should greatly assist in the interrogation of STOECKLING and be instrumental in acquiring from him the maximum amount of information (ii) to state that the stay behind organisation established by the Abwehr in Western Europe is probably ^a more widespread and efficient network than has yet been appreciated and that it appears to have all the characteristics of a truly long term undertaking. At present its strength lies in its ability to operate unnoticed. Though we have a certain amount of disconnected information about its administration, we do not yet know anything about its ultimate control, the disposition and modus operandi of its agents or the full extent of its ramifications. It seems possible that this is not due so much to our lack of knowledge, as to the way in which the network has been constructed. It appears to consist of a series of separate groups which are nevertheless connected and it is the links between these groups which are so difficult to discover. For these reasons, therefore, it is essential that the problem be considered as a whole and that all parallel and similar organisations be investigated simultaneously, with a view to finding out any connecting links with the stay behind network as we already know it.
2. It seems possible that the present method of study may lead to a situation similar to that extant after the last war. The state of affairs at that time has been brought to light in the reading of files dealing with the immediate post-war period, in an endeavour to discover the precise means whereby the Germans re-established an offensive intelligence organisation which was forbidden them by the terms of the Versailles Treaty. This task is rendered almost insuperable, or at least insuperable within a reasonable time limit, by the total lack of appreciation, collation and evaluation then carried out. There are files for

some

some of the organisations, such as the Ueberseedienst and the Ostdienst, but many other extremely important associations such as the Nuntia Bureau and the International Press Service, have traces scattered throughout the personal files of their respective suspects. Furthermore, no attempt has been made to work all this vast amount of material into any semblance of a pattern and no adequate summaries have been written on even the personal files. It is necessary, therefore, if you wish to discover the story of the International Press Service for example, to send for the files of the numerous individuals concerned and read through their many volumes, then, if you wish to have some idea how this organisation fits in with its contemporaries, it is necessary to repeat the process until sufficient knowledge has been gained to give even a slight idea of the whole system.

3. It seems that there will again be much un-collated material, though probably more readily available as we have now perfected to a large extent the system of filing and cross referencing. Nevertheless it would be extremely difficult to have to sit down, in as little as five years time, and endeavour to write a comprehensive document on the "ways and means employed by the Germans to leave behind them, in their retreat from Europe to the frontiers of the Reich, an organisation which could be used in the years after their defeat as the rock on which to build an Intelligence Service."

4. How would one set about such a task? Presumably in five years time there would still be persons available who would be able to give the names of files in which information could be found, but failing this, would there be obtainable in the registries any relevant documents which could be used for guidance? It appears that, according to the present system, it would be necessary to send for many personal files such as those of STOBORLING, BRANDEL and LAPONT and from them and any additional files which may by that date be available, piece together the facts and draw from them such inferences as seem logical. Could not this very laborious means of gleaning information in the future be avoided by writing at fixed intervals current appreciations on certain subject matters? It is inevitable that sometimes such papers written in the early stages of a case should be slightly inaccurate, but whenever a statement in a later paper contradicts that in a previous document, this should be pointed out and the final summing up, if and when such a summing up is propitious, should include a note on the aspects of the case at various dates and how they altered on development. If this method were adopted, the writer of the
future

future would only have to send for a number of subject papers all of which would contain digested material and include pointers as to the possible connections with another subject. His task would be an easy one and consequently would take less time.

5. It is evident that there are many arguments against this suggestion, the principal one, perhaps, being the time and labour involved at a moment when all hands are needed at the plough of current work. In favour of the project it can be said that a moderate amount of work put in now would save increasingly more labour as time goes on. Five years has been chosen to illustrate this point as it seems a moderate but imagine undertaking the same task in twenty five years time when it would be five times more difficult. This contingency cannot be ignored as at this moment it is apparently considered important to study the developments after the last war. The chief difficulties after such a lapse of time would be the lack of personnel available with a detailed knowledge of the period.

Reed. 7 Mc. 44.

GAERTNER

W

The career of Margarete GAERTNER and her associates to some extent illustrates the development and continuity of German Intelligence work since the last war. She first came to notice in 1915 when she was working at 62, Wilhelmstrasse, Berlin in connection with the German News Service in Spain. This organisation was set up in August, 1914 ostensibly to furnish the Spanish Press with direct news of the war. To supply this news there were apparently German wireless stations which the Spanish vainly tried to discover and suppress. Eventually they gave up the unequal struggle and allowed the communications sent by this means to appear in the Press. (It seems probable that these W/T communications were used for more than the transmission of news although the influencing of the Spanish Press seems to have been thought important.) In 1920 Margarete GAERTNER worked at Kronprinzstrasse, Berlin where she received pro-German propaganda sent to her by British pacifists. It is uncertain what her exact occupation was at this time.

By 1921 she was conducting tours round the Ruhr and Rhineland pointing out the iniquities of the Treaty of Versailles and sometime during this year started a small information office in this connection which was financed by Krupps of Essen. This office appears to have expanded into the Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft e.V. which was registered on 26.8.22. The function of this organisation was to assist the economic and political development of Germany at home and abroad. It was said to be supported by voluntary contributions from members and is known to have been closely connected with the Government. A certain Dr Otto FISCHER was Chairman of this concern. The address in 1923 was 31a Luisenstrasse, Berlin. (31 Luisenstrasse was the address of BOUS, a Russian Intelligence organisation run by MOSKOFF and SLOVNIKOFF and reported to be in close touch with the KUBITIA Bureau. 31b, Luisenstrasse was the address of POLONIA and/or the Allgemeines Politische Informationsbureau G.m.b.H.) By 1924 the Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft had moved to 2, Schwedstrasse, Berlin and it appears that Margarete GAERTNER'S activities were directed by a certain Herr BRUNN of Krupps A.G. She seems to have been mainly occupied from this time onwards with contacting pro-German or disaffected Labour or Socialist elements in this country and through them spreading propaganda on behalf of Germany and influencing English public opinion in favour of Germany on specific questions such as Upper Silesia, the Tyrol and the Polish corridor. In addition to this she was sent cuttings from newspapers through the German Embassy in London showing to what extent the German propaganda she provided was published in the English Press. Her activities continued after the accession to power of the Nazi Party. Between the years 1923 and 1926 Margarete GAERTNER worked closely with DUFOUR PERONCE who was Counsellor at the German Embassy in London.

It is interesting to note that DUFOUR PERONCE was not a Diplomat by profession but before his appointment to the Embassy in 1920, had been director of the Informationsbureau of the German Gross Industrie. In this capacity his task was to collect information about industrial secrets and the state of trade etc. in various countries. During the war he spent his time in neutral countries doing this work and was sent to the Embassy in London as an expert on trade matters. He accepted this post only on condition that he could continue his work on behalf of the Verband der Gross Industrie. In 1922 DUFOUR PERONCE'S activities aroused suspicion as he was known to be concerned in a scheme to set up W/T communications between Germany and London. This service was ostensibly to transmit stock exchange information and a commercial code was to be used. In connection with this project he is known to have sent a telegram to a German address connected with espionage activities.

In 1924 he came under further suspicion as he was visited "on private business" by a German named GHEIST who was reported to have directed espionage activities against this country from Holland during the last war. In this year also it is known that the German Consul at Liverpool, FALPHOFFER, received £30 a month through DUFOUR PERONCE and it appears that this was not for his normal Consular duties as he was told not to discuss this matter with anyone but DUFOUR PERONCE. In October, 1924 Herr BRUNN of Krupps (who was also directing Margarete GAERTNER'S work at this time) discussed with DUFOUR PERONCE the possibility of setting up an information service in England. This was to consist of reliable English and German journalists with good connections politically and economically and was to be controlled from Essen. It was mainly in connection with this kind of work that Margarete GAERTNER was in touch with DUFOUR PERONCE. This project seems to have been planned in

conjunction with one Hermann BUCHER of 28 Koenigin Augustastrasse, Berlin who was also in touch with DUFOUR PERONCE. In 1925 BRUNN continued to keep in touch with DUFOUR PERONCE and appeared to be interested in influencing English opinion on the Silesian question (probably through Margarete GAERTNER).

In 1926 it became apparent that the Auswaertiges Amt began to take an interest in collecting information from England. BOSENICK wrote from the Verwaltungsrat der Zweigstellen des Auswaertigen Amtes fur Aussenhandel u. der Reichsnachrichtenstellen 8, Wilhelmplatz, Berlin to DUFOUR PERONCE, saying that a newspaper, Industrie und Handelszeitung, which had apparently gone down with the collapse of the Stinnes concern had been acquired by the Administrator and was no longer to be published privately but in the interests of the Auswaertiges Amt. Foreign economic information had apparently been so sadly neglected that he had decided to send Dr. Andre ROSTIN "in whom the sacred fire still burns" to England. DUFOUR PERONCE was asked to assist ROSTIN in every way as it was essential that he should maintain close relations with the Embassy without making this fact obvious. Ostensibly ROSTIN was working for a semi-official newspaper in which the Auswaertiges Amt was interested.

On DUFOUR PERONCE'S appointment to Geneva, DIECKHOFF appears to have taken over his duties. ROSTIN at this time was paid by D. but the ultimate authority in the matter was a certain SCHNEIDER in Berlin who arranged for the money to be paid through Industrie und Handelszeitung.

In April, 1927 there was a meeting in Paris attended by DUFOUR PERONCE from Geneva, ROSTIN and GLIMP from London, FLEISCHER and Herr SCHULTHEISS from Frankfurt and Wilhelm HACK.

DUFOUR PERONCE was with the League of Nations.

ROSTIN and GLIMP ? Europa Press in England. GLIMP'S object was to meet FLEISCHER and HACK'S representative.

FLEISCHER was chief of the Fleischer Bureau of the Europa Press 6, Biebergasse, Frankfurt.

SCHULTHEISS ? Europa Press representative in Paris.

Wilhelm HACK was chief political writer of the Deutsche Tageszeitung and a close friend of von KRIES and was thought to work for the Deutsche Marine Amt.

Europa Press and the Telegrafien Union were strongly suspected of being a cover for espionage and were thought to be subsidised by the Auswaertiges Amt at this time.

Nov 44

MORDRELLE.OLIVIER MARIE
JOSEPH

PF602431/V1



PF602431/V1

SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

Serial No.	Star Designation	Date	Serial No.	Star Designation	Date	Serial No.	Star Designation	Date
	KV		2	/		3	4	10

S.1630 Edn.2

S.1630 Edn.2

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PF 602,431.

See Also

Officer or Serial No.	Section	Date	Officer or Serial No.	Section	Date	Officer or Serial No.	Section	Date
		20 FEB 1959						
		26 FEB 1959						
		23 MAR 1959						
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of the oppressed nationalities of the West, in particular Brittany, Ireland and Iceland.

MINUTE SHEET.

Referred P.F. 602,431

	1.	
Undated.	Copy of Complete Information Card for MORDRELL & MORDREL.	1a
	2.	
Undated.	Copy of SHARP Card for MORDRELL.	2a
	3.	
20.11.44.	From DUBLIN (G2/X/1358), encl: Note of O. MORDREL.	3a
	4.	
31.5.45.	From V.B.5. ref. telegram from Rome, re. MORDRELL.	4a
	5.	
1.6.45.	B.I.H. Note on Olivier MORDREL.	5a
	6.	
20.6.45.	To S.I.S., encl: Note (as at 5a) of questions to be put to MORDREL.	6a
	7.	
3.6.45.	From V.F.7., re. MORDRELL - extract from interrogation of Adolf WULF.	7a
	8.	
3.6.45.	W.R.C.3d memo. to V.B.5., with points for interr. of WULF re. MORDRELL.	8a
	9.	
6.6.45.	From V.F.7, further to 7a, re. MORDRELL.. Inf. from Italy.	9a
		(OVER

(1000 2570/1351)
2000 000 8/49 JCASAL
Cp444/229
(REGIMINT)
6.6.45

	10.	
21.6.45.	Incoming Telegram from Saint, Rome, re. MORDRELLE.	10a
	11.	
23.6.45.	PAIR traces on 10a.	11a
	12.	
27.6.45.	To V.P. ref. Amazon 536 of 23.6.45 on VERMUNFT, and ref. 10a re. MORDRELLE.	12a
	13.	
27.6.45.	From Section V, ecnl: further inf. from the Field in Italy, re. MORDRELLE.	13a
	14.	
30.6.45.	Outgoing Telegram to 12th A.G., re.f. 536 on VERMUNFT.	14a.
	15.	
6.7.45.	Interrogation Report form A.F.H.Q. dated 14.6.45. re MORDRELLE.	15a
17.7.45.	Covering note from S.I.S. sending MORDRELLE interrogation, copy of which is already filed at 15a.	15b
19.7.45.	To S.I.S. re 15b	16x
19.7.45.	Minute from B.I.N. to W.R.C.3a.	16a.
	17.	
	<u>B.I.N.</u> <i>h.</i>	
	Reference your minute at 16a, I have been in touch with Townshend of S.I.S. as the MORDRELLE case has been handled by Ryder Street and not be the War Room. He confirms that a copy of your questionnaire at 5a was sent to the S.C.I. representative in Rome. He has promised to send a telegram today to the S.C.I. there to ensure that the questionnaire was passed to C.S.D.I.C. where MORDRELLE is now under interrogation.	
	W.R.C.3a <i>mm</i> 20.7.45.	
7.2.46.	Interrogation Report on MORDRELLE from A.F.H.Q. dated 30.1.46. re MORDRELLE. (filed 7.5.46)	17b.

18

- 6.3.46. Minute and attachment to D/WR on GSDIC/CMF/SD 100.
6.3.46. Note to Capt. McGrath re above report on MORDREL.

18a
18b

19.

- 7.3.46. Note from WRCY/b to Capt McGrath, Section V re MORDREL's release.

19a

20.

- 12 3.46. From A.F.H.Q. giving information about the escape of MORDREL.

20a

21.

- 1.4.46. To V.F., V.48 P., Discoe and P.1b, attaching copy of 20a.

21a

22.

- 4.4.46 To E.2d passing them a copy of 20a


22a

23.

REVIEW OF T.R.N. FILES.

This file need no longer have a limited circulation. Please send it to R.J. to be kept as an open file.

R.5.
2.5.46.



... as read in cc.

- May 40. Leader of the Breton Autonomist Party. Condemned to death "in absentia" by a Military Court in Rennes, as he was found to be in pay of the Germans. On the outbreak of war, the French Govt. announced the dissolution of the Breton Nationalist Party. MORDELL and De BAUVAIS, another leader returned to Rennes at the end of Jun.40. With the help of the Germans, they formed the Conseil National Breton, the leaders of which were MORDELL, De BAUVAIS, Marcel GUIRYSSÉ and Celestin LAINE. This was not a success, and the Germans replaced MORDELL by Raymond DELAFORTE in December. Hq. of Breton Nat. Party - 20, rue Waldeck-Roussseau, RENNES.
In December, had Frank RYAN, one of the chiefs of the I.R.A. who was at that time directing the Irish Section of the Abwehr, staying with him.
- Mar.43. Political director, collaborator of Staf. BICKLER of Amt VI, as manager of Breton journal "STUR" Introduced VISSAULT to Hscho. LUANG, Abt.VI H,SD. Robert LABOULETTE worked for him as private secretary at one time. VISSAULT first met him in March, 1937.
1944. In touch with Stelle of German Sabotage section in France (N.-West)

VISSAULT de
CONTLOGON
PF 600,237

S.I.S.
SP 52/France/2
link v. 20k

'HELD' FILE NOW DE-RESTRICTED

File Number: .PF.602.431.....

Name: .MOBDELL, Olivier Marie Joseph Charles.....

Formerly held by: .W.B.H.....

WRH/RV: Carding in Central

Index checked by: .M.V.....

Number book noted by: .M.V.....

Label cancelled by: .M.V..... Date: 7.9.46...

R.3. Held book noted by:

Transit card checked by: Date:

22a

P.F. 602,431

B.2d.

I am passing to you copy of a letter
ref. GBI, 389.701/PT/1753 received from Allied Forces H.Q. - 200.
the contents of which may be of interest to you.

B.1a/Harreo

4.4.46

H.C. Harrison,
S/Ldr.

516
Bldg. 6.01

21a

V.F.
V.L.B.F.
Dindoo
H. H.

P.F. GORAN

We are passing to you a copy of a letter received from
Allied Force H.C., the contents of which may be of interest.

W.H.C.3.
1.1.46.

H.C. Harrison,
E/Ldr.

FILE
810.14 46

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

GBI.389.701/PP/1753

12 March 1946

SUBJECT: MORDRELLIE, Lt. Oliver Marie Joseph Charles.
o MUREY, Jean o REISTER, Otto o KERTENS, Hans.

TO : See Distribution.

1. Subject, an enemy agent, escaped on 11 Mar '46 between 0230 and 0700 from GSDIO, ROSE.

2. Subject is a Frenchman who was condemned to death by the French Military Authorities in May 1940, for continued political activity in connection with the Breton Separatist Movement and for failure to report for Military service. He is wanted both because of his connection with the CIS and as a war criminal.

3. Description of Subject is as follows:

Age - 45
Weight - 145 lbs
Height - 5' 7"
Hair - Black, turning gray
Eyes - Hazel - wears glasses
Complexion - Pale - bearded - mustached
False teeth.

4. If Subject is apprehended this HQ should be notified immediately.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Robert R. Covington
for D...D. YOUNG,
Lt. Colonel, G.S. 5th Lt.
G-2(CI) Section

DISTRIBUTION:

G.S.I. HQ, XIII Corps
G.S.I. HQ, No. 2 District
G.S.I. HQ, No. 3 District
A.C. of S., G-2 R.M.C.
A.C. of S., G-3 Hq P.D.S. (Main)
No. 4 PS Control R.A.F. Agent POMERLEAU Airport
Security Branch, ...G.
AFHQ LO HQ L.I. ROSE
CIC Airport Control Agent, B.A.R.I.
CI War Room q/o UK Base APO 413.

HRC/epf

SECRET

June 8/3

(94)

19a
Lee

P.F. 602,431.

Capt. MC. Grath - Section V.

D/WR, Mr. Bossard, has spoken to me of your recent conversations with him on the subject of the release of MORDRELL.

This will confirm his statement that, for purposes of the War Room and the Special Agencies which it represents, there is no objection to MORDRELL's being released.

T.J. Burke,
Lieut.

W.R.C. 3.b.
7.3.46.

128

Ans
WRC

SECRET

176

P.P. 602,431/B.I.B.

Captain McGrath,
Ryder Street.

With reference to your recent telephone call about the case of Olivier MORDREL, attached is a note on CSBIC/CMF/SD/100 dated 30.1.46. Interrogation report. As you will see from this there is no further point arising on which it is suggested that MORDREL should be interrogated, as far as Abw.-Breton Autonomist-Irish activities are concerned. I cannot of course speak for other sections in this office and it would seem therefore advisable that the all clear should be given through the War Room here, and I am therefore forwarding them the top copy of this note.

We have just spoken, and are in agreement with this course of action.

6.2.46.

Cecil Liddell.

176
7/3/46

P.F. 602,431

C.R. No.

MINUTE SHEET No. *18a*

W
D/WR. (Through B.I.B. Major Vesey).

With reference to GSDIC/CMF/SD 100 interrogation report on MORDREL forwarded with your minute of 15.2.46 attache is a note of my observations on this report from which you will see that as far as this section is concerned I see no reason for any further interrogation. In the meantime however there is a certain amount of look up and a good deal of extracting which should be done on this report. I should be grateful therefore if the report could be returned for this purpose as soon as possible.

B.I.B.
6.3.46.

Cecil Liddell
Cecil Liddell.

NOTE on CSDIC/CMF/SD 100 dated 30.1.1946.

1. The attached is an excellent and very interesting interrogation report. Generally speaking it gives the impression that MORDREL has given accurately the information within his knowledge concerning the Abwehr-Breton Autonomist-Irish connections.
2. Helmuth (page 5 para 3a) is clearly identical with Helmuth CLISSMANN who is mentioned in the note on the MULCAHY family in the addendum to the Questionnaire supplied for source by G-2(CI)A.F.H.Q. dated 15.6.45. He is referred to elsewhere in the interrogation. He went to Ireland in 1933 as an exchange lecturer, joined the N.S.A.D.P. in 1934, represented the Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst in Dublin until July 1939, when he returned to Germany. Early in 1940 joined the Lehr Regiment Brandenburg and in the autumn was believed to have been working with S/F Dr. Kurt HALLER of Abt. II as Irish expert. Later CLISSMANN was attached in the same capacity to the Büro VEESENMAYER under Dr. Edmund VEESENMAYER of the German Foreign Office who had a special charter for political espionage in Eire. CLISSMANN is now under interrogation at C.S.D.I.C. (WEA) (Interrogation report on his Irish connections C.S.D.I.C. (WEA) P.R.41 of 8.2.46.)
3. "SCARFACE" page 5 para 3(b). This man is believed to be Dr. Hermann GOERTZ alias Heinz KRUSE, though the alias of SCARFACE was not known. He has not formerly lived in Ireland but was arrested and imprisoned for espionage in England in 1936. GOERTZ was arrested in November 1941 eighteen months after he landed by parachute in Eire on 5th May 1940. His accomplice an Irishman of German extraction, Stephen Carroll HELD, was arrested on 23rd May 1940, but GOERTZ escaped at that time.

Original
It is assumed Source has given all his information on this subject, but any information as to how GOERTZ' alias SCARFACE's mission to Eire would be of interest. In particular it is known that Stephen Carroll HELD visited Berlin in April 1940 with an offer by the I.R.A. to assist the Germans in a landing in Northern Ireland. MORDREL was himself in Germany at that time and may know something of HELD's visit to which it is believed SCARFACE's mission was a sequel.

4. Page 7 para 3(c) for identity of Dr. Edmund VEESENMAYER, see para 2 of this note.

Page 7 para 3(d) Sean O'BRIEN is clearly identical with Sean RUSSELL the I.R.A. leader. Arrived Germany from U.S.A. May 1940. Died from natural causes in submarine on his way to Eire with Frank RYAN in August 1940. (See p.6 3(c)).
5. Can Source give any information as to the activities of the "Australian STUART". This man is identical with Henry Francis STUART who went to Berlin in January 1940. He has stated that the mission of Sean RUSSELL and Frank RYAN by submarine to Eire in August 1940 (see above) was to contact the I.R.A. and prepare for a landing of a cargo of arms which STUART was to take to Eire. On the death of RUSSELL the scheme is said to have been abandoned.

B.I.H.
5.3.46.

COPY

SECRET

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

REF. 309.701/PP/1753

12 March 1946

SUBJECT: HENDRELL, Lt. Oliver Marie Joseph Charles
G. MAUREY, Jean G. MAUREY, Otto G. MAUREY, Phm.

TO : See Distribution.

1. Subject, an enemy agent, escaped on 11 Mar '46 between 0230 and 0700 from CHIC, ROMA.
2. Subject is a Frenchman who was condemned to death by the French Military Authorities in May 1940, for continued political activity in connection with the Breton Separatist Movement and for failure to report for Military service. He is wanted both because of his connection with the GIC and as a war criminal.
3. Description of Subject is as follows:
Age - 45
Weight - 145 lbs
Height - 5'7"
Hair - Black, turning grey
Eyes - Hazel - wears glasses
Complexion - Pale - bearded - mustached.
False teeth
4. If subject is apprehended this HQ should be notified immediately
For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

(Signed) Robert R. Covington
St. Lt

for D.A.D. Young
Lt. Colonel, G.S.
G-2 (CI) Section

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RHC/cpf

SECRET

Mr. Liddell.

Have you seen the attached report on MORDREL?

The file is P.F. 602,431 and it was marked to D/WR on 8.3.46.

W.R.H. 4.
1.4.46.

Cecilia Harbury.

D/R 8/3

PA in
PF 602,431

CSDIC/CMF Report.

B/H en pp. 2-7, 13 & 19.

WRC.

WRH.

P.F. 602,431. 2/4/27
2/3.

For information. Register action to
be taken by WRH.

BTS

15.2.46.

Longdon

B.L.B. (Major Vesey)

The attached reports are passed to you for information and retention.

G.S.D. (C.A.D.)
12 Feb 46

Quintan
Cap.

8005

(49)

I think
be supplied
Penthouse

Please for file C-1512

C.R. No.

MINUTE SHEET No.

160
187

W.R.C.3.a.

I have read the interrogation at 15a. It would not, however, appear from this that any of the points referred to in the questionnaire at 5a have been covered.

P. 602,774

The only other comment is that on pages 14 - 15 are descriptions of [VOGT @ MERTENS] and Dr. WELTER @ Dr. JACOB. I think it almost certain that VOGT is identical with [Dr. VOGT @ MERTENS @ MORGAN] and ~~that~~ Dr. WELTER with Dr. Otto WAGNER @ Dr. JACOB, both of whom are referred to in the VISSAULT case (P.F. 600,237 attached), who were responsible for recruiting VISSAULT in the latter half of 1940, to work for the Abwehr. (See P.F. 600,237 vol 3,90a pages 2 and 3, and Appendix II page 4.)

102/143
16/9/45

R.I.H.
19.7.45.

Cecil Liddell

Cecil Liddell.

8 FEB 1941

ENCL	Rpr
TO	DCAD
REF	

5235/2.

Bie/m, vally

SECRET

CSDIC/CMF/SD 100

Copy No. 16

FIRST DETAILED INTERROGATION REPORT ON
MOTREEL, Ollor

This report contains information on the contacts of Breton Nationalists with EIRE and Celtic circles in GREAT BRITAIN, on GIS activities concerning IRELAND, on GIS exploitation of the Breton Nationalist Movement, and on personalities. It is largely in answer to a Questionnaire for Sources supplied by G-2 (CI) AFK. It should be read in conjunction with CSDIC/SC/15.G/SD 21.

CONTENTS

Page

1. SOURCE

(a) Personal Details	2
(b) History and Career	2
(c) Assessment	2

2. BRETON CONTACTS WITH EIRE AND CELTIC CIRCLES IN GREAT BRITAIN

(a) Introduction	2
(b) Source's Visit to DUBLIN, 1925	3
(c) First Visit to WALES, 1925	3
(d) Second Visit to WALES, 1935	3
(e) Loe MILLARDEN	3
(f) Mission of Fred MOYSE to ENGLAND, 1939	4

3. GIS ACTIVITIES CONCERNING IRELAND

(a) Ven TEVENAR's Visits to EIRE	5
(b) "SCARFACE" and Mission to IRELAND	5
(c) Activities of Frank O'RYAN	6
(d) Sean O'IRIEN	7
(e) Other Activities concerning IRELAND	7
(f) Jupp and Viktor HOVEN	7

4. GIS EXPLOITATION OF THE BRETON NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

(a) <u>Abwehr</u>	
(i) Before the War	7
(ii) During the War	9
(b) <u>Sipo und SD</u>	
(i) General Policy	10
(ii) LAINE	11
(iii) Guy VISSAULT de COETLOGON	11
(iv) DEBAUVAIS	12

5. PERSONALITIES

(a) <u>Abwehr</u>	13
(b) <u>Sipo und SD and Waffen SS</u>	16
(c) <u>Miscellaneous Germans Associated with the Breton Nationalists.</u>	17
(d) <u>Breton Agents of the Germans</u>	18
(e) <u>French Agents of the Germans</u>	20

CSDIC,
CMF.
30 Jan 46

F.G. Adams,
Cor (H.T. SHERGOLD)
Major I.
OG Army Sect

SECRET

CSDIC/CAT/ED 100

(a) Personal Details

Name : MONREUEL Olier / Marie Joseph Charles
 Aliases : HUREY Jowi, MEISTER Otto, MERTENS Hans (used in BERLIN before occupation of FRANCE.)
 Unit : Last employed by Gruppe III B, RSHA
 Id No. : None
 FP No. : None
 Party No. : None
 SS No. : None
 Home Address : No Fixed address
 Captured : Gave himself up at BOLZANO, 24 May 45
 Secret No. : 13.5/828
 Interrogated : CSDIC, CAT, Dec 45 and Jan 46

(b) History and Career

Cf. CSDIC/SC/15AG/SD 21 para 1 b.

(c) Assessment

Cf. CSDIC/SC/15AG/SD 21 para 1 c. It may be added that during subsequent interrogation at this centre Source has shown himself apparently eager to give all the information he knows, and it is not thought that he has been keeping anything back. That he has given is considered reliable. Source's memory appears still reasonably good despite the lapse of time since many of the incidents he has been asked to recall.

Reliability : Good.

(Interrogated by C.H. and P.C.A.)

BIN

2. BRETON CONTACTS WITH EIRE AND CELTIC CIRCLES IN GREAT BRITAIN(a) Introduction

Source states that before the war (he knows nothing of contacts during the war) contacts between BRITANNY on the one hand and EIRE, SCOTLAND, CORNWALL and WALES on the other were of two kinds. There was a good deal of correspondence between individual members of Breton cultural societies and the Gaelic League and other Celtic bodies in Great BRITAIN, on purely cultural and linguistic matters, of no political significance whatsoever; and from 1937 onwards, when Source met Yves DELAPORTE began producing the review "Peuples et Frontieres", which was concerned with the aspirations of various minorities in the West such as the Flemings, French Basques, Alsatians, Welsh Nationalists and Irish, there was an exchange of correspondence on the matter with members of the Gaelic League and Scottish and Welsh nationalists, conducted by the Breton Nationalist FRED MOYSE in BRUSSELS. Source states that there was nothing in the least clandestine about this correspondence, which dealt with the same racial and cultural matters as appeared in the review.

Source denies knowledge of any organized liaison between EIRE and the Breton Nationalists, for which he, DEBAUVAIS and LAINE were responsible, as stated under interrogation by Guy VIESSANT de COETLOCCON (Questionnaire for Source supplied by G-2 (CI) AFHQ refers). He knows of only two instances of an "official" visit of Breton Nationalists to EIRE, or GREAT BRITAIN, when he and a few others attended the Celtic Congress in DUBLIN in 1925, and a similar visit to the Celtic Congress in CARDIFF in 1935. Two members of the Gaelic League, ERNEST JOYNT and MCCARTHY-WILLIS, attended a summer congress of the Breton Nationalist Party (then known as Parti Autonomiste Breton) in BRITANNY in 1928. He knows of no "official" contacts with the IRA, either by exchange of visits or correspondence, and states he certainly had no part in any such matter himself. He met casually during his stay in EIRE in 1925 (for details of which see sub-para b) the Irish nationalist FRANK O'RYAN, whom he saw later as a German agent in BERLIN in ex (see para 3 c), but had no political

CSBIS/CIF/SD 10C

or subversive dealings with him of any kind. He adds, however, that it is possible that DEBAUVAIS and LAINE, who since about 1928 had begun to oust him from his position as Breton nationalist leader, carried out certain activities with the IRA of which he knows nothing; he knows that Fred ROYSE, in summer 35, went on at least one mission to IRELAND, almost certainly for DEBAUVAIS for whom he had an admiration approaching mania, and says it is possible that it was concerned with the IRA (for details see sub-para f). Finally, VISCOUNT would not be aware that Source had been virtually ousted from control of the Movement, and for this reason it is likely that he associated Source, as titular head of the Movement, with all its activities.

For Source's knowledge of a visit to KIRE of the Breton nationalist HERVEY COFF to Leo MILLARDEN in 1936 or 37, and for his knowledge of Leo MILLARDEN, see paras 3 a and 2 c respectively.

(b) Source's Visit to DUBLIN, 1925

In summer 25 Source attended the Celtic Congress in DUBLIN with four other Breton representatives, viz. Mervan MARCHAL, who had restarted the Breton Nationalist Movement after the 1914-18 war by founding the Groupe Regionaliste Breton, Louis HEN, Yves IREZEN and JAFFRENOU. Source's expenses for the journey were paid by Lord ASHBURGH, whom he had met in PARIS, and Source and MARCHAL stayed with Professor COFFEY of DUBLIN University. All the delegates spent a fortnight at the Gaelic summer school in DUNEGAL.

Source was himself canvassing the project of a Union of Celtic Youth Movements which would have its own magazine, and in this connection he had conversations with Gillion O'BROGHIAN, Bernard LEWIS and a certain MACLEOD representing SCOTLAND, and Professor Ambrose BERR of BANGOR University. Nothing came of the project. On this occasion Source met the Irish Nationalist Frank O'RYAN, as mentioned in sub-para (a). He also had a talk on linguistics with a certain KICWILL, who was making a census of the Erse-speaking population of KIRE. He knows of no others in KIRE who had connections with the Breton Nationalist Party either at this time or later, beyond Ernest JOINT, and McARTHEER-WILLIS (see sub-para a).

(c) First Visit to WALES, 1925

Before going on to DUBLIN Source and MARCHAL spent three or four days with Professor David JONES of SWANSEA, whom he had met as a student of French at REIMS University. He did not discuss Welsh Nationalism with JONES, who was not a supporter of the movement. JONES was his only contact in WALES, though in DUBLIN at the Congress he made the acquaintance of the Welsh delegates Ambrose BERR, Mary WILLIAMS of SWANSEA, E.T. JONES, the President of the Congress, and Pastor OWEN of CARDIFF.

(d) Second Visit to WALES, 1935

In 1935 Source and three other Bretons, DEBAUVAIS, FOUERE and BOUILLE, attended the Celtic Congress in CARDIFF, where he made the additional acquaintance of the Welsh Nationalists Iorwerth BEATE and DANIEL.

(e) Leo MILLARDEN

Reference para 3 of Questionnaire for Source supplied by G-2 (OI) AFHQ.

Source has known Leo MILLARDEN, real Breton name MILLARDET, for many years, since about 1920. In 1924/25 he was secretary of the Groupe Regionaliste Breton. He moved to DUBLIN in 1928, to 11 Unity Buildings, and remained in correspondence with Source and DEBAUVAIS, always showing interest in the progress of the Breton Movement. As Source learnt from

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DEBAUVAIS, who was treasurer of the Breton Nationalist Party, he often sent small subscriptions by post to the Party funds.

Leo MILLARDEN has stated in interrogation that while visiting BRITTANY in 1935 he arranged with Source and DEBAUVAIS to receive money from a German source and pay it into his account in DUBLIN, at the same time arranging with his brother Robert MILLARDET of GUINGAMP to release a like amount to them; Robert owed Leo money following the purchase of his business in BRITTANY. Source denies categorically that Leo MILLARDEN, during his visit to BRITTANY in 1935, ever discussed with him any such matter; Source claims that to the best of his recollection he never saw MILLARDET in the company of DEBAUVAIS during his visit, and that whatever was arranged must have been done with DEBAUVAIS alone.

Source does remember, however, that on one occasion in 1935 or beg 36 DEBAUVAIS telephoned him and asked him if he would be likely to be passing through GUINGAMP in the near future. Source said that he would, as his architectural work often took him there. DEBAUVAIS then asked him if he would call on Robert MILLARDET and collect an envelope, addressed to DEBAUVAIS. Source did this, and was given an envelope for DEBAUVAIS; he believes that Robert may have put a cheque inside before sealing it down but as it is so long ago, and he never paid any attention to the matter as for all he knew it was a personal affair between DEBAUVAIS and MILLARDET, he can no longer recall any details of the incident.

Robert MILLARDET, according to Source, was never a member of the Breton Nationalist Movement. He never saw him again after collecting the envelope for DEBAUVAIS, and never saw his brother Leo after his visit to BRITTANY in 1935, though he still kept up a personal correspondence with him in DUBLIN.

(f) Mission of Fred MOYSE to ENGLAND, 1939

MOYSE, who lived in BRUSSELS, where he was employed by a publicity firm in the Place Brouckere, first made contact with the Breton Nationalist Party in 1932. He became a fanatical adherent, and was appointed liaison member between the Party and the Flemish Nationalists. He also publicized as far as possible the aims of the Breton Movement in the Belgian press. From 1937, as mentioned in sub-para a, he was in correspondence with the Gaelic League and the Scottish and Welsh Nationalists - Source does not know which - in connection with the review "Peuples of Frontieres". He had previously been in correspondence with them on the subject of Celtic music, for which he was an enthusiast.

DEBAUVAIS stayed with MOYSE in BRUSSELS in summer 38, when he was in hiding from the French police because of his connection with certain anti-French sabotage activities of LAUNE, and MOYSE became fanatically attached to him. He also knew well the German journalist von TEVENAR, who used to visit him in BRUSSELS from AMSTERDAM, where he was correspondent for three German papers: TEVENAR (see para 3 a) was a close supporter of the Breton nationalists, and assisted with the review "Peuples et Frontieres".

In 1939, as he told Source later, MOYSE made two trips to LONDON, the second almost immediately before the outbreak of war. On this second trip he evidently had some mission of a secret nature, though he revealed no details, as he told Source that he was travelling under the cover of a Belgian representative of a British firm manufacturing shaving brushes. Furthermore, he said that he had had difficulties in passing through the Customs and the Aliens Branch, and said that he had not felt too happy as if he had been searched he would have been found to have on him the equivalent of 700,000 francs in English money. Source can only assume that these journeys were planned either by DEBAUVAIS or by the GIS contacts of DEBAUVAIS (see para 4 a), and thinks it possible they were concerned with

dealings with the IRA, though he has nothing to support this assumption.

For MOYSE's subsequent activities during the war see para 5 d. He went on voluntary labour to GERMANY some time in 1942, and had no further connection before or after this date with missions of any kind.

3. GIS ACTIVITIES CONCERNING IRELAND

(a) Von TEVENAR's Visits to EIRE

In early 1937 the German journalist Gerhardt von TEVENAR, the correspondent of three German papers in AMSTERDAM, visited the Breton Nationalists on the "recommendation" of the Flemish Nationalists with whom he was already in contact (the Flemish and Breton Nationalist Parties kept in touch because of their similar aims). For TEVENAR's connections with the Breton Nationalists see para 4 a. He was a disciple of the HIELSCHER Movement (see further para 3 e), which aimed at the re-division of EUROPE on federal lines under German supremacy, whereby national minorities such as the Welsh, Flemings, Bretons, etc., together with EIRE, should all be represented as independent states. Source understood that the HIELSCHER Movement was not a pro-Nazi organisation, and had no official backing. Source learnt later, however, that TEVENAR had connections with Abwehr circles (see para 4 a).

Before contacting the Bretons TEVENAR had been in touch with the minority movement in HOLLAND, and, in 1935 or 1936, had visited the Scottish Nationalists in SCOTLAND and also visited DUBLIN. Source does not know whom he saw in either case. In 1937 TEVENAR visited the Welsh Nationalists, BEBB and DANIEL, at BANGOR, and paid a further visit to DUBLIN, from which he returned with records and pamphlets on Celtic subjects. On this second visit he was accompanied by a German student Helmut (LNU) who remained in DUBLIN. Source saw this man later (and for the first time) in BERLIN in spring 41 in the company of the Irish Nationalist Frank O'RYAN (see sub-para c below).

Reference paras 4 and 5 of the Questionnaire on Source. The name Hervey GOFF is unknown to Source, and he has no knowledge of anyone else accompanying TEVENAR on his visit to DUBLIN in 1937 apart from the student Helmut. He can only suggest that Helmut was using the name Hervey GOFF as an alias, or that one of two Bretons might be concerned: (i) Jean Francois LE GOFF, a priest and Breton Nationalist, though he thinks this extremely unlikely, as to his knowledge TEVENAR had no connections with Breton Catholic circles, and (ii) Herve LE HELLOCO, another Breton Nationalist, who was also a lawyer. To his knowledge neither of these men ever paid a visit to EIRE. Furthermore Source has no knowledge of TEVENAR's contacting Leo MILLARDEN during his visit to DUBLIN in 1937.

(b) "SCARFACE" and Mission to IRELAND (Gover 5)

During the period when Source and DEBAUVAIS were "in exile" in BERLIN and in contact with Abt II of the Abwehr (see para 4 b), one of the Abwehr officers with whom they had dealings, Rittmeister Baron SCHENK von STAUFFENBERG, became friendly with Source, and appeared to have a favourable view of his powers of judgement. One day in Feb or Mar 40 STAUFFENBERG told Source that he wanted his advice on a certain matter. It was proposed, he said, to parachute into IRELAND a German Obltn of the Luftwaffe to carry out an espionage mission. This man, who was nicknamed "SCARFACE" because he had been badly disfigured in the lower part of the face through a flying accident, had lived in IRELAND before the war, having been given a term of imprisonment for espionage. STAUFFENBERG introduced "SCARFACE" to Source, and one of the small points on which Source was asked for his opinion was whether he thought it a good idea if "SCARFACE"

grew a beard to hide his disfigurements. Source replied that the one way to attract attention in IRELAND was to wear a beard, as so far as he knew hardly a single Irishman ever had one.

Source heard nothing more of "SCARFACE" or of the mission until about Sep or Oct 40, after his return to BRITAIN from BERLIN. One day in that period Sonderführer "Z" Dr Kurt HALLER, at that time Referatsleiter II Nest RENNES, mentioned to Source that "SCARFACE", whom he knew Source had met previously in BERLIN, had been parachuted in IRELAND but had been caught almost immediately by the police. HALLER said that he had read an account of the capture in the "Irish Times". The plan had been for "SCARFACE" to burn his uniform after landing and change into civilian clothes; instead of burning it he had merely buried it and it had been discovered, with the result that the police were put on the alert. Source knows no details of what "SCARFACE" was supposed to achieve.

For HALLER's connections with the Irish Nationalist Frank O'RYAN see sub-para c below. Because of these connections with IRELAND, HALLER is evidently identical with the one mentioned in CSDIC(UK)SIR 1728 para 137 as connected with the Foreign Office "Unternehmen 1000".

(c) Activities of Frank O'RYAN

After his casual meeting with Frank O'RYAN in IRELAND in 1925, Source had no further contact with him until 1937, when he met him in PARIS while O'RYAN was on his way to SPAIN to fight for the Republicans. He told Source that he had gone there with 400 men to fight with the International Brigade, having convinced the IRA that it would be good for the prestige of that body if Irishmen fought for the Republicans, had been wounded in SPAIN, and after a short convalescence in DUBLIN was now on his way to rejoin his unit.

Reference para 11 of Questionnaire for Source, Source denies in the most absolute terms that he ever introduced Frank O'RYAN to Guy VISSAULT de COETLOUEN in RENNES, either in 1940 or 41 or at any other time. The only suggestion he can make on VISSAULT's reason for such a statement is that when he met O'RYAN in BERLIN in spring 41 O'RYAN told Source that he had seen him in RENNES in about Aug 40 but had not spoken to him (for reason see below). Source thinks it just possible that O'RYAN subsequently met VISSAULT, though he did not know the two were acquainted, and recounted this incident, and VISSAULT has now given a garbled version.

The next time Source came across O'RYAN was in Spring 41 in BERLIN. Source was in BERLIN at this period because he had been removed from BRITAIN on orders of the Abwehr, for creating political disturbances, and was now awaiting permission from the RSHA to return to FRANCE. He saw O'RYAN casually and intermittently in BERLIN till end Apr, when Source returned to FRANCE. Source met O'RYAN through Dr HALLER who had installed him at Traunsteinerstrasse 7 in a room in his flat. O'RYAN did not tell Source at any time what plans HALLER had for him: at this time HALLER was in Abt II of the Abwehr after being recalled from Nest RENNES in autumn 40.

O'RYAN's history after Source had last seen him in PARIS in 1937 was as follows. He had been taken prisoner by FRANCO's forces, and put in a PW camp at BURGOS. He had been "rescued" from there by German agents (he gave no details) and had been taken to BERLIN, where he engaged to go on a mission to IRELAND. Source presumes this was for the Abwehr, in view of O'RYAN's connection with HALLER. He had in fact set out from a German port about Aug 40 in a U-boat, and was to be landed by dinghy on the coast of TRALEE. As there were very heavy seas running it was not possible for him to land, and after two days of waiting the U-boat turned back and went to LORIENT for repairs. O'RYAN had then returned to BERLIN, passing through RENNES on the way, where he said he had seen Source in the street but had not spoken to him because of the secret nature of the mission on which he had been engaged.

In BERLIN he had shared lodgings with the Australian STUART and the Irish Nationalist Mrs O'MARA. He had subsequently had a disagreement with them, and had finally moved to the room in HALLER's flat.

Source often met O'RYAN in BERLIN in Spring 41 with STUART and O'MARA (cf. CSDIC(UK)SIR 1728 para 205 and paras 196-201. He also saw in his company the German courier with (LHM) who had gone to DUBLIN with von AN never told Source what

were the activities of these three.

O'RYAN himself, in spring 41, was engaged in unspecified negotiations concerning IRELAND with a Dr WEISENMAYER (aliases, according to Source, who does not know him, WIESENMAIER and V. SEENMAIER) of the German Foreign Office - see a/m CSDIC (UK) report para 205 and paras 132 - 135. Source gathered that O'RYAN was reluctant to enter into any activities which would merely benefit the Germans and not aid the cause of IRELAND. He was also in disagreement with the head of the IRA at this time.

In Apr 41 O'RYAN went to COPENHAGEN, where Source believes he was engaged in some kind of mission under the cover of an American, and was to spend a lot of time lounging in bars. However, he soon became involved in a car smash and went to hospital. Source did not keep up contact with O'RYAN after his own return to FRANCE in May 41.

(d) Sean O'BRIEN (Sean Russell)

On one occasion in BERLIN in spring 40 Dr HALLER pointed out to Source in the street a short, thick-set man who was passing and said "That's Sean O'BRIEN, the head of the IRA. The English would give a lot to know he is here, as they think he is in the USA". Later, Nov 40, HALLER told Source in PARIS that O'BRIEN had died in GERMANY.

(e) Other Activities Concerning IRELAND

Because of his knowledge of the HIELSCHER Movement, though he claims not to have met HIELSCHER personally, Source was questioned on his knowledge of HIELSCHER's meeting with the Breton "NEVEN" in BRITAIN in 1943 - see a/m CSDIC(UK) report, paras 168-173. He states that "NEVEN" was a Breton nom de plume adopted by Celestin LAINE, one of the leaders of the Breton Nationalist movement, who had been a fervent disciple of the HIELSCHER Movement since 1937, when he was introduced to it by von TEVENAR. Source denies all knowledge, however, of HIELSCHER's meeting with LAINE in 1943, or of LAINE's activities concerning IRELAND, though he did know that HIELSCHER was on a visit to BRITAIN in autumn 43. He heard this from SS Standartenfuhrer BICKLER, Leiter VI Bds PARIS, a friend of Source's because of his connections with the Alsatian Autonomist Party before the war, and with whom he maintained social and black market contacts after BICKLER came to Bds PARIS in mid 43. Seeing that Source was not aware of what was going on, BICKLER dropped the subject.

(f) Jupp and Viktor HOVEN

Reference para 12 of Questionnaire for Source. Source does not know Viktor HOVEN, but met Jupp HOVEN his brother in BERLIN on one occasion in about May 40, being introduced to him by von TEVENAR. He has no knowledge of any interest of Jupp in IRELAND, and all he knows of his interest in the Breton Nationalists is that he was a personal friend of the Nationalist Yves DELAPORTE, as they were students together in BERLIN.

4. GIS EXPLOITATION OF THE BRETON NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

(a) Abwehr

(i) Before the War

Source's knowledge of this question is based on the following. For some years before the war Source had been playing less and less of a prominent part in the Parti National Breton because of his architectural commitments, and DEBAUVAIS and Celestin LAINE had virtually taken charge; these two did all they could to keep Source out of the picture, for reasons of jealousy. Source gathered that they were obtaining assistance from the German Intelligence in funds and arms

OSD/CMS/SD 100

but had no direct indication; funds for DEBAUVAIS for the Parti National Breton, though Source did not know what DEBAUVAIS did in return for this, and arms and explosives for LAINE for his small terrorist group "Gwenn Ha Du", which carried out small acts of sabotage, blowing up French monuments in BRITTANY and posting anti-French slogans, on the lines of the IRA. He learnt that his suspicions were well-founded after his flight with DEBAUVAIS to BERLIN at end Aug 39. (The two decided to flee because the French had declared the Parti National Breton illegal once general mobilisation had started, and as they did not want to fight in a war which they considered FRANCE's affair and not BRITTANY's, and wanted to be able to continue with propaganda for the Breton cause, they turned to GERMANY; DEBAUVAIS because he said he had important contacts there, Source because certain Germans had shown interest in the cultural and political aims of the Movement - see below). On reaching BERLIN DEBAUVAIS took Source to Major MERWEDE, in Abt II of the Abwehr, who appeared to be in charge of a section dealing with subversion in the West, and it was from MERWEDE, who assumed that Source knew all about Abwehr dealings with the Breton Movement before the war, that Source discovered what had transpired. From his own knowledge of the movements and German contacts of DEBAUVAIS and LAINE he could piece the picture together.

Abt II had evidently been watching the Breton Movement for some years before the war because they saw in it a promising source of subversion against FRANCE. As far back as 1926 a Dr WELTER, whom Source discovered in BERLIN was a member of the Abwehr (As COLOGNE), had contacted the Nationalists because he was making a study of European minorities. This man maintained intermittent contact with the Movement, keeping himself informed of its cultural and political aims.

After a visit of DEBAUVAIS to BERLIN in 1936 at the invitation of a "Direktor SANDERS", the funds of the Parti National Breton increased by 30,000 francs for which DEBAUVAIS, who controlled the financial side, refused to give an explanation. "SANDERS" had met Source and DEBAUVAIS at a congress of the Comité des Minorités Nationales de FRANCE, held at BERNE, in 1934. Source heard from MERWEDE that "SANDERS" had been his predecessor till 1937 in Abt II. At BERNE "SANDERS" had given no indication that he was in the Abwehr, but merely interested in Western minority questions. DEBAUVAIS told Source that he had also seen WELTER during his visit.

On one occasion in 1937 DEBAUVAIS asked Source if he could find out from his sea-faring friends if arrangements were being made to equip French ships with paravanes, but was not told for whom the information was required, and never heard anything more of the matter. He does not know if DEBAUVAIS had accepted an espionage commitment from the Germans at this time. In fact, both DEBAUVAIS and LAINE let it be known among their supporters that if any one of them accepted an espionage mission from the Germans he would be expelled from the Movement; Source believes this was to prevent wholesale collaboration with the Germans and inevitable detection by the French police.

LAINE spent six months in BERLIN in 1937 as the guest of the German journalist von TEVENUR, who had come to BRITTANY in 1937 to examine the political aims of the Nationalist Movement (see para 3 a). While in BERLIN LAINE approached the Abwehr - presumably Abt II - and asked for support in the supplying of arms and explosives for his "Gwenn Ha Du" group; TEVENUR told Source later that the Abwehr had at first not been willing to grant this, but that he himself had gone to CUNARIS - he did not say through what connections - and persuaded him that it might be useful for the Germans to have a small secret armed force in BRITTANY which was hostile to FRANCE. Some time probably in the course of 1938 an agreement was made with MERWEDE between LAINE and DEBAUVAIS whereby LAINE received arms and explosives and in return guaranteed to attack transport and communications at the time of

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the French general mobilisation, and DEBAUVAIS received funds for the Parti National Breton with the understanding that he would at the same time cause diversion and unrest by propaganda and meetings. The Party's funds increased considerably at beg 39, but DEBAUVAIS refused to tell Source where they came from.

During 1939 LAINE made several trips to GERMANY, and during this year several consignments of arms and explosives were landed secretly in BRITTANY after being despatched by sea from GERMANY. Several chests of propaganda material were landed at the same time. One such chest was washed up off JERSEY and reported to the French police. When the French began mobilisation LAINE had no success in his intention to "paralyse" communications because mobilising was done by echelons and not by a levee en masse as in 1914. LAINE was shortly after arrested by the French, and DEBAUVAIS fled to GERMANY, so that the Abwehr plans bore no fruit at all.

(ii) During the War

During their "exile" in GERMANY, Sep 39 - Jun 40, Source and DEBAUVAIS considered themselves as the representatives of an unofficial Breton government, and asked MARWEDE for assistance in setting up an organization for keeping in touch with Breton Nationalists still in BRITTANY. MARWEDE did not state definitely at this time what the Abwehr hoped to gain from supporting the Movement, but agreed to give them some assistance. In Nov 39, DEBAUVAIS was permitted to go to AMSTERDAM where he arranged with an acquaintance VAN ETTEN, a member of the MUSSERT Party, and the Breton Nationalist Fred MOYSE, in BRUSSELS, (for details see para 2 f), to act as letter-boxes for correspondence from BRITTANY which they could pass on to DEBAUVAIS in BERLIN. MARWEDE also allowed Source to go to ITALY in 1939 and HUNGARY in May 40, from where he posted to BRITTANY copies of a review "Quest Informations" which DEBAUVAIS had arranged to have printed in HOLLAND. Source and DEBAUVAIS were also given some financial assistance by MARWEDE and were allowed to set up an office and billet at Trautsteinstrasse 7, where they worked on keeping up to date records of the Movement and filing of Breton literature obtained through the post from BRITTANY.

Other Abwehr officers in MARWEDE's section were Rittmeister Baron SCHENK von STAUFFENBERG and Sonderführer "Z" Dr Kurt HALLER. A Hpt RADEMACHER von LWA was also probably in the section: he accompanied Source to ITALY for his distribution of "Quest Informations" in autumn 39.

During the first half of 1940 the Abwehr II policy towards the Breton Nationalist Movement, though not definitely stated, became clearer. As a propaganda gesture Breton PW were segregated in camps in GERMANY, and Source and DEBAUVAIS began broadcasts in Breton to BRITTANY from the OKW station in BRENS, in which they used themes of Breton propaganda employed before the war. Abwehr II in fact appeared to want to continue with a policy of subversion towards FRANCE. In Mar 40 it was suggested to DEBAUVAIS and Source that they should be landed with some released PW in BRITTANY for carrying out sabotage, but the scheme was never developed.

The Foreign Office was opposed to the Abwehr II policy towards the Breton Nationalists because the official Foreign Office policy at that time was "reconciliation" with FRANCE. Source and DEBAUVAIS had an interview with Otto ABETZ in Dec 39, to whom DEBAUVAIS explained the Federalist aims of the Breton Movement. ABETZ made it clear that the Foreign Office disapproved of the Abwehr incursions into the political sphere.

During this period in BERLIN Source and DEBAUVAIS were in frequent contact with von TEVENAR, and told him what work they were doing in keeping contact with the Breton Movement, and what plans they thought Abwehr II had for them. This was despite a warning from MARWEDE or STAUFFENBERG that von TEVENAR was "a dangerous man" and should not be told any plans that were

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affect. For subsequent activities of von TEVENAR in the field of Celtic culture before his death in mid 43 see para 5 c.

In Jan 40 Source and DEBAUVAIS returned to BRITTANY, with the intention of reforming a Breton Nationalist Party. HALLER and STAUFENBERG accompanied them, and both joined Nest RENNES - attached to Referat II, of which Dr WELTER now appeared as Leiter, with the rank of Sonderführer "K" and alias of Hans Otto WAGNER. They maintained close touch with Source, DEBAUVAIS and LAINE, now released from prison by the Germans, and insisted, probably through representations by the Foreign Office, that no anti-French propaganda should be adopted by the Nationalists. A small subsidy was given to the newly formed Conseil National Breton.

STAUFENBERG told Source that Abwehr II now hoped, after its encouragement of the Nationalist Movement, that it would be able to recruit from among the members of the Movement reliable people to act as agents after the Germans had left BRITTANY. STAUFENBERG engaged Opte MARTY, who had been released from captivity in GERMANY, to tour BRITTANY and make contact with other released PW, but shortly after Source heard that MARTY had obtained permission from VICHY to go to unoccupied FRANCE, and is certain that he had no success in finding agents.

LAINE was allotted a Chateau for billeting his reformed "terrorist" group and collected together some 80 men, most of them released PW, who were given permission to carry arms by Referat II Nest RENNES. Source does not know what the Abwehr hoped to achieve by its assistance to LAINE.

In about Sep 40 Source came across three young Breton Nationalists in RENNES in a bad state of disrepair, and very shabbily dressed. They told him that they were employed by Uffz VOGT, alias MERCIENS, of Referat II Nest RENNES, for whom they often went on various journeys - they did not say what was the nature of this work. They had not asked for any payment for this work, and had been given no money or clothing after their return from captivity in GERMANY, hence their present condition. They also told Source that they were connected in their work for VOGT with Guy VISSAULT de COETLOGON. Source gave them some money to buy clothes, not liking to see any Breton Nationalists in such a condition, and that is the last he saw of them. He cannot remember their names. He saw VISSAULT once or twice in RENNES in summer and winter 40, and gathered that he was engaged on work of some kind for the Germans. For further activities of VISSAULT see sub para b iii.

At end Jul the Abwehr II subsidy to the Conseil National Breton was withdrawn and by Nov 40 HALLER, STAUFENBERG and WELTER had been recalled to BERLIN. This was the result of a misunderstanding: Radio PARIS and several newspapers in FRANCE and GERMANY came out with the story that a Breton Nationalist State had been created, and the Foreign Office, afraid that the official policy of conciliation would be compromised, apparently ordered that all political support of the Breton Nationalists must cease. Source was himself sent to GERMANY under semi-arrest in Dec 40 for attempting to revive the Nationalist spirit in BRITTANY, being escorted there by Uffz VOGT, who, Source says, was a friend of LAINE and had been instrumental in having Source removed to GERMANY partly because of LAINE's personal hostility to him. In summer 41 control of all political movements in FRANCE passed to the Sipo und SD and the Abwehr ceased to have any more connection with the Breton Nationalists.

(b) Sipo und SD

(1) General Policy

The policy of the Sipo und SD, administered through KdS RENNES, to the Breton Nationalists conformed with the Foreign Office of conciliation to VICHY, and though a few subsidies were granted to various branches and individuals of the Movement, these were very small. A few

Bretans passed over to the service of the Sipo und SD, as given below, but there was no large scale exploitation of the Movement as a source of espionage.

(ii) LAINÉ

After falling foul of KdS RENNES in Oct 41 because of his opposition to the non-militant Institut Celtique de Bretagne which was sponsored by the Sipo und SD, LAINÉ was restored to favour in winter 43/44 and was given a subsidy by KdS RENNES for maintaining his small group of "terrorists". In return the group, now only about 30 strong, collaborated with the KdS in rounding up Allied parachutists, detection of W/T sets and intelligence against the Maquis and clandestine escape routes to ENGLAND by fishing boat, etc. His men were known as the Service Speciale de la SS.

In mid 43, with growing resistance to the Germans on the part of the Maquis, the Germans began to form local bodies of French Hilfsgeladene to combat underground movements, and LAINÉ offered the services of his group to SS Hauptsturmführer WEST of Abt IV (?) Bds PARIS, who was in charge of the formation of these police units, on the condition that his force should be recognised as an autonomous Breton unit. This was agreed, and LAINÉ set up the Unité Ferret, recruiting some 50 men on more or less false pretences to add to his original 30, and installing them in a barracks in RENNES. The men were given SS uniform and attached under orders of KdS RENNES.

For LAINÉ's contact with HIELSCHER in autumn 43 see para 3 c.

At end Jul 44 LAINÉ and his group were evacuated from RENNES by the KdS, having suffered 10% casualties. After a period in ALGERIE the unit was regrouped at TUEBINGEN, at beg 45. LAINÉ, now promoted honorary SS Untersturmführer, completely neglected them and did not even trouble to see that they had their rations. Shortly before the collapse SS Standartenführer DICKLER of Leitstelle WEST sent SS Untersturmführer WILD to dissolve the unit; some of the men were sent to Waffen SS units. Source met about a dozen of them wandering about between SIGMaringen and INNSBRUCK in Apr 45, who told him there was a rumour that LAINÉ had been killed. Source cannot give the names of any other members of the unit except an honorary SS Unterscharführer LUES who he saw at TUEBINGEN in Mar 45, and an honorary SS Oberscharführer PARESE seen at the same time.

(iii) Guy VISSAULT de COETLOGON

At end 42 VISSAULT, after working for VOGT (sub para a ii above), became an agent of KdS RENNES, and worked under SS Hauptscharführer GRIMM (given in CSDIC(UK)SIR 806 as in Abt III). When SS Standartenführer DICKLER took over Abt VI Bds PARIS in mid 43 he transferred to that department, though he continued to undertake missions in BRITAIN and reported to KdS RENNES; at this time he came under a certain "Georges". Source knows these details because he frequently came across him in RENNES and PARIS up to the time of the evacuation from FRANCE; the contacts between the two, according to Source, were purely social and because of VISSAULT's keen support of the Breton cause.

VISSAULT had also engaged in other activities before becoming a Sipo und SD agent. At end 41 or beg 42 he joined the anti-Communist Legion, but was dismissed after a fortnight. Later in 1942 he joined LAINÉ's Service Special, but soon left because of dissatisfaction with LAINÉ's harsh treatment of the men under him.

Source knows no details of VISSAULT's work for the Sipo und SD, except that in Spring 44 he appeared to be in charge of a small group of

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Bretons being trained in sabotage and W/T procedure, under the orders of SS Sturmbannfuhrer LANG of BGS PARIS (Comment: of CSDIC/CF/SD 68 para 12 a, where LANG is given as OC Technical and Agents Section - Abt VI). VISSAULT told Source that he had sworn an oath of loyalty to LANG, and had at the same time vouched for the unfailing loyalty of his group. These men were trained in the outskirts of PARIS, at BESSINGOUR. The course finished in Apr 44.

At this time VISSAULT often visited Source at the latter's PARIS flat. On one occasion Source saw him with three other Bretons, Georges his brother, Patrick GUTIN and BERNARD; Source had often seen these three with him in 1943. He assumes that they had been taking the course at BESSINGOUR. Others whom he had seen with VISSAULT in 1943, who may also have taken the course, were JOILEY and MENARD.

Reference questions concerning VISSAULT's interrogation contained in Questionnaire supplied through G-2 (CI) AFHQ.

Para 10. In Jul 40, Dec 40 and Mar 41 VISSAULT claims to have met MOREL in RENNES. What is the latter's opinion of VISSAULT?

Source states that he may have met VISSAULT in RENNES in 1940 during the months stated, but certainly did not do so in Mar 41, as at that time he was in BERLIN awaiting permission from the NSDAP to return to FRANCE. His opinion of VISSAULT is that he is an adventurer, full of high spirits and little sense of responsibility, though certainly sincere in his idealism for the Breton cause. Source found it hard to reconcile this idealism with VISSAULT's fervent adherence to the Germans; he told Source on one occasion that he considered himself as a German soldier, hence his ardent work for BGS PARIS. He is an amusing character and excellent company. He early came under German influence through von TEVENAR, who invited him to stay in GERMANY in 1938/39 because he thought him an excellent recruit for the HILSCHER Movement.

Para 13. In Mar 43, VISSAULT stated, MOREL introduced him in his flat in Avenue Georges V, PARIS, to SS Hauptscharfuhrer ZUING of the SD.

Source denies categorically that he made this introduction, and states that he has never even heard of a Hauptscharfuhrer ZUING. He cannot understand how VISSAULT came to make such a statement, and suggests that he will be unable, if pressed, to substantiate it.

Para 14. VISSAULT stated that ZUING introduced him to BICKLER of Abt VI, who asked him to train a sabotage group for the SD. VISSAULT was introduced to five prospective agents, among whom ALBERT, HENE and PIERRE, and gave them a month's training in sabotage. Can MOREL supply the full names of these five agents and say what eventually happened to them?

Source states that the three a/m names of VISSAULT's agents are unknown to him. He knows of no others apart from the ones already given above.

(iv) DEBAUVAIS

In 1942, after discussions with (?) KAS RENNES, DEBAUVAIS opened a "political documentation" office, ostensibly concerned only with the Nationalist Movement, but in fact probably a cover for work on behalf of Abt IVI KAS RENNES. This continued till his death in Feb 43.

5. PERSONALITIES

(a) Abwehr

HALLER, Dr Kurt

Sonderführer "2". In MARWEDE's (q.v.) section of Abt II of the Abwehr in BERLIN. Assisted Source and DECAUVAIS and 39 - summer 40 to set up their Breton Information and Records office in BERLIN. In summer 40 was transferred to Referat II Nest RENNES, and "advised" on political questions affecting the reborn Breton Nationalist Movement. Recalled to GERMANY in autumn 40 when the Foreign Office protested at the Abwehr encouragement of the anti-VICHY Breton Movement. To Source's knowledge had no part in recruitment of agents. He had been introduced to the Breton question in 1931 by acquaintances in the Deutsches Klub in BERLIN, but played no part in the Abwehr's exploitation of the Movement.

Was concerned probably with sabotage in BELGIUM before the Belgian campaign, as in Mar 40 Source saw on his office desk in Abt II in BERLIN detailed plans of the ALBERT Canal.

In autumn 40 knew of failure of "SURFACE" (q.v.) mission to IRELAND. In spring 41 the Irish Nationalist Frank O'RYAN was living in a room in his flat in BERLIN, Traunsteinerstrasse 7. Also knew Mrs O'MULLA, the Australian STUART and the German student Helmuth (q.v.). Knew of the IRA leader Sean O'RIEN in BERLIN in 1940.

Age about 35. From BERLIN. About 1.72 m tall, normal build, squarecut features, prominent jaw, dark complexion.

(BERLIN - end Apr 41)
(cf. OSDIC(UK)SIR 1729 para 137, where a Dr HALLER is said to have been concerned with the Foreign Office "Unternehmen 1000" project against IRELAND).

KINAST

Offz of Regt HILDENBURG. Attached to Nest RENNES till Oct 40. Escorted convoy of liberated Breton PW from GERMANY to BRITAIN in summer 40. Posted away from RENNES Oct 40.

No description available.

(RENNES - Oct 40)

KOHLHASS

Hpt. Referatsleiter II, Nest RENNES end Oct 40 - beg 41.

Age about 50, former journalist from BERLIN or HAMBURG.

About 1.72 m tall, average build. No further details available.

(RENNES - early 41)

MARWEDE
alias:
MESSERSCHMIDT

Major. In Abt II of the Abwehr in BERLIN since 1937. Concerned with exploiting the Breton Nationalist question for subversive purposes, and believed to have been head of section dealing with political subversion in the West.

Age about 50, married to former actress, 3 or 4 children.

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MARWEDE
alias:
MEISSERSCHMIDT

cont'd/....

About 1.75 m tall, slim build, dark gray close-cropped hair, blue eyes, close resemblance to Dr. SMITH, wears glasses, nervous gestures.
(BERLIN - Jun 40)

RAEMERER von URM

Maj. Probably in Abt II of the Abwehr in BERLIN. At request of von STAUFFENBERG (q.v.) escorted Source to ITALY from BERLIN in Nov 39, when Source was engaged on posting Breton pamphlets from that country to BRITAIN. Hinted that he was engaged on the production of false documents for German agents, and when Source met him by chance in MERANO in May 45 offered to provide him with a false Swiss or Hungarian passport, which did not materialize.
Age about 55, married to an Italian from MERANO. About 1.62 m tall, slim build, dark-gray cropped hair, blue eyes, square-cut features, sickly appearance, wears monocle.
Address: MERANO area.
(MERANO - early May 45)

"SANDERS"
(real name
unknown)

Believed to have had MARWEDE's job (q.v.) in Abt II of the Abwehr in BERLIN (political subversion in the West) till 1937, when he was dismissed. Source met him with WELTER (q.v.) at the congress of the Comité des Minorités Nationales de France, held at PERRE, in 1934, without knowing he had anything to do with the Abwehr. He was introduced as "Direktor". Source heard from MARWEDE in BERLIN in 1939 that "SANDERS" had been his predecessor in Abt II, till 1937. DEPAUVAIS was in touch with "SANDERS" and WELTER (q.v.) in BERLIN in 1936, "SANDERS" having asked him and Source to pay a visit to discuss the political aims of the Breton Nationalist Movement (Source could not go), after which the funds of the Parti National Breton increased mysteriously by 30,000 francs.
Age about 35.
About 1.67 m tall, corpulent, fair very close-cropped hair, typical Prussian appearance, red complexion.
(BERLIN - 1935)

STAUFFENBERG,
Baron
SCHENK von

Rittmeister. In MARWEDE's (q.v.) section of Abt II of the Abwehr in BERLIN. Arranged for segregation of Breton PW and the despatch of some 500 to BRITAIN summer and winter 40. Attached to Referat II Nest RENNES summer-autumn 40 as political adviser to newly constituted Breton Nationalist Party. Made some attempt to recruit agents from among repatriated Breton PW, and commissioned one of them, Cpte MARTY (q.v.) to act as recruiter. Recalled to GERMANY autumn 40 when the Foreign Office protested at Abwehr encouragement of the anti-VICHY Breton Movement.
Age 65-70.
About 1.68 m tall, spare build, fair hair going grey, blue eyes, narrow face, fresh complexion. Walks with stick as a result of wounds in the 1914-18 war. Anti-Nazi.
(BERLIN - end 40)

"VAN LOO" (alias)

Officer in MARWEDE's (q.v.) section of Abt II of the Abwehr in BERLIN. Replaced HALIER (q.v.) for a short time at Nest RENNES in autumn 40, and was then recalled to BERLIN.
Age about 33, tall, dark hair. No further particulars available.
(RENNES - autumn 40)

VOGT
alias "BERTENS"

Offa of Regt BRANDEBURG. Secretary and interpreter in Nest RENNES Aug 40 - spring 41, when he was recalled to GERMANY. Friend of Celestin LAINE (q.v.) and according to Source was instrumental in having Source removed as leader of his newly constituted Parti National Breton in autumn 40, at the instigation of LAINE, who was opposed to Source on personal grounds. Escorted Source to GERMANY (Aust STUTTGART) under semi-arrest Dec 40, when Source was temporarily "expelled" from BRITANNY on orders of Ast PARIS because of his uncompromising attitude to VICHY. Employed Guy VISSAULT de COETLOGON and at least three others as agents in 1940, in BRITANNY. Age about 38, married, 3 children. German father and Welsh mother, born in ANTWERP. Agent for engineering firm in OBERLENNINGEN. About 1.68 m tall, broad-shouldered, white hair, blue eyes, square features, black eyebrows, wrinkled forehead, sunken cheeks, large ears, fresh complexion, occasionally wears glasses. Speaks perfect English, French and Flemish. (RENNES - spring 41)

WELTER, Dr
alias "Dr WAGNER"
or "Dr JAKOB"

Sonderführer "K". Referatsleiter II, Nest RENNES till Oct 40 when he was recalled to Abt II of the Abwehr in BERLIN. Previously with Ast COLOGNE since about early 38. First contacted Breton Nationalist Movement in 1926, when he visited the summer congress of the Groupe Regionaliste Breton, not in an Abwehr capacity, but as member of the German National Student Association and the Deutsches Klub in BERLIN; he was interested in minority questions in SE EUROPE, FLANDERS and ALSACE-LORRAINE, and had been "recommended" to the Breton Movement by friends of his in the Flemish Nationalist Movement. Since 1926 continued to make occasional visits to BRITANNY to keep informed of aims and progress of the Breton Nationalists, and in 1934 attended a congress of the Comité des Minorités Nationales de France, held at RENNES. Wrote articles on the Alsatian question for the paper "Elsass-Lothringische Heimatstimmen" run by Dr Robert ERNST, an Alsatian who had taken German citizenship and lived in GERMANY - the future Mayor of STRASBOURG after the German occupation.

Source does not know when WELTER first joined the Abwehr, nor the exact part he played in Abwehr dealings with the Breton Movement before the war: he claims not to have known WELTER was a member of the Abwehr till shortly before he fled to GERMANY, at end Aug 39, and that WELTER never discussed with him any German exploitation of the Movement. However, following a visit by DEROUAIS to GERMANY in 1936, during which he saw WELTER and "SANDERS" (q.v.), the funds of the Parti National Breton were increased by a contribution of 30,000 francs. After WELTER had become Referatsleiter II Nest RENNES he had little direct dealings with the Breton Movement, and Source does not think he was concerned with recruitment of agents.

Age about 48, married, 1 child. From the RHINELAND. About 1.70 m tall, thin brown hair, short head, narrow face, thin lips, protruding ears. (BERLIN - end Jan 41)

(b) Sipo und SD and Waffen SS

Note: only personalities not previously given by Source in CSDIC/SC/15AG/SD 21 are given here, as Source was unable to add any particulars to those contained in that report.

LEST SS Hauptsturmfuehrer. In Abt IV (?) B&S PARIS. In autumn 43 organised French Hilfspolizei groups for combating the resistance movement. No description available. (PARIS - Aug 44)

GRIMM SS Hauptscharfuehrer. Leiter III (?) K&S RENNES 1942-44, and in control of political activities of the Breton Nationalists vis-a-vis VICHY. Formerly 1940-42 in GFP in BRUSSELS. In winter 42/43 gave subsidy to LAINE (q.v.) for his Breton "terrorist" group. Also employed VISSAULT de OCTOLOGON and other Bretons as agents, work unspecified. Age about 50, single. Alsatian who opted for German citizenship in 1919, and volunteer of Baltic Free Corps. About 1.75 m tall, normal build, white hair, blue eyes, rounded head, broad forehead, fair complexion. (RENNES - May 44) (cf: CSDIC(UK)SIR 806)

HIELSCHER Not known by Source to be a member of the Sipo und SD, merely as founder of the HIELSCHER Movement, of which he heard from von TEVENAR (q.v.) in 1937. Recruited LAINE (q.v.) to his Movement in 1937. The Movement aimed at a federal union of Western EUROPE with independence for national minorities such as Welsh, Flemings and Bretons. BICKLER, Leiter VI, B&S PARIS, told Source HIELSCHER was in BRITTANY in autumn 43. No description available. (cf: CSDIC(UK)SIR 1728, where HIELSCHER is given as in Referat VI D 2 RSHA, and paras 168-173 for his activities with LAINE ("NEVEN") in BRITTANY in autumn 43).

LANG SS Sturmbannfuehrer. In Abt VI B&S PARIS since (?) mid 43. Age about 34. Alsatian, known to Source before the war as Alsatian autonomist. About 1.80 m tall, normal build, brown hair, long face. (SIGMARINGEN - early 45) (cf: CSDIC/CMF/SD 68 para 12 a)

MUEHLHAUSEN, Prof SS rank unknown. President of Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Keltische Studien since 1938. In summer 40 supervised broadcasts in Breton from GERMANY, and in 1941/42 supervised broadcasts in Frse. Often seen in 1943/44 in PARIS with BICKLER, Leiter VI B&S PARIS, wearing Waffen SS uniform. Age about 50. 11, medium build, blue eyes. forehead, too

SIEMERS

SS rank unknown. Director of SS Ahnenerbe Institute. Organized expedition for von TEVENAR (q.v.) to study megalithic monuments in BRITANY in 1942/43.
No description available.
(cf: OSDIC (UK) SIR 1728 para 141, where his rank is given as SS Standartenfuhrer)

WILD

SS Untersturmfuhrer. In Abt VI BLS PARIS since mid 43, arriving with BICKLER. Went to Leitstelle WEST after evacuation of FRANCE, and spring 45 assumed control of LAINE's (q.v.) Hilfspolizei group at TUEBINGEN because of LAINE's neglect.
Age about 28, Alsatian.
About 1.78 m tall, light brown hair, blue eyes, high forehead, large mouth, fair complexion.
(TUEBINGEN - spring 45)

(c) Miscellaneous Germans Associated with the Breton Nationalists

BURCKHEISER

Adherent of the HIELSCHER Movement till 1938.
LAINE (q.v.) stayed with him in BERLIN in 1937.
Age about 35, divorced.
About 1.78 m tall, black hair and eyes, round head.
(BERLIN - autumn 39)

TEVENAR,
Gerhardt von
(died mid 43)

Journalist, adherent of the HIELSCHER Movement. Contacted national minorities in this connection, Flemings, Welsh, Scots, Irish, Bretons. For visits to BICE and GREAT BRITAIN 1935-37 see para 3 a. Contacted Breton Nationalists in 1937, helped Source find the review "Peuples et Frontieres", for which TEVENAR was also in touch with the Breton Fred MOYSE (q.v.) in BRUSSELS, whom he visited frequently from AMSTERDAM where he was correspondent for three German papers before the war. Close friend of the Breton Nationalist LAINE (q.v.) whom he invited to BERLIN in 1937, and converted to the HIELSCHER Movement. Also, invited to BERLIN the Breton Nationalist Guy VISSAULT de CORTLOGN and PERESSE in 1938 (q.v.). Founded the Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Keltische Studien in 1937. Was in touch with Source and DEBAUVAIS in BERLIN 1939/40, but had no official dealings with them. Had connections with Abwehr circles. In 1937 visited CANARIS to persuade him to give Abwehr support to LAINE and his Breton "terrorist" groups. During a visit by Source to BERLIN in 1938 TEVENAR put through a call to a Major in HAMBURG and the conversation suggested some connection with intelligence matters; in 1937 TEVENAR had taken photographs of shipping at NANTES. On the other hand Source and DEBAUVAIS were warned by STAUFFENBERG (q.v.) in BERLIN in early 40 that TEVENAR was "a dangerous man" and should not be told about the Abwehr II plans for the Bretons. In 1938 imprisoned on a charge of homosexuality but released after five months. At end 40 was given a job with the Informationsstelle of the Foreign Office, but was dismissed, according to him at the instigation of the Gestapo, in Apr 41. Shortly after he married the grand-daughter of General STULENAGEL, Militaerbefehlshaber in FRANKS, and took up his residence in STRASSBOURG, where he devoted all his time until his death in mid 43 to the Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Keltische Studien. As far as Source knows this activity was purely cultural and was not a cover for intelligence.

CSDIC/CAT/SD 100

WEISGERBER, Prof.

Contacted Source and DEBAUVAIS during their period of exile in BERLIN, 1939/40; discussed cultural and Breton politics with them. Wrote articles for the Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Keltische Studien. Organized Breton radio talks 1941 - 44. Knew Abwehr II circles in BERLIN and in touch with Propaganda Ministry officials in RENNES.
Age about 50, professor of MARBURG University. About 1.72 m tall, light-brown hair, broad forehead, long nose and face, fair complexion.
(RENNES - early 44)

(d) Breton Agents of the Germans

Note: a large number of Breton Nationalists may be said to have collaborated with the Germans during the war, inasmuch as Breton PW accepted repatriation or worked in the Breton information office in BERLIN in 1939/40, and numbers agreed to the acceptance of German financial assistance in restarting the Movement after the German occupation. These men, however, cannot be said to be German agents from the intelligence point of view, and such as Source can remember are not included here unless their activities passed beyond purely internal Breton interests or unless information has been specifically requested in the Questionnaire on Source supplied by G-2 (CI) AFHQ.

BERNARD

Presumed agent of VISSAULT de OCTOLOGON (q.v.) working for Abt III KAS RENNES and Abt VI Bds PARIS 1943/44.
No description available.
(PARIS - early 44)

DEBAUVAIS
(died Feb 43)

For activities with Abwehr II before and during the war see para 4 a. For activities for the Sipo und SD see para 4 b iv.

GUERIN, Patrick

Presumed agent of VISSAULT de OCTOLOGON (q.v.), working for Abt III KAS RENNES and Abt VI Bds PARIS 1943/44.
Age about 35. Architect, born at RENNES. About 1.70 m tall, light brown hair, prominent chin, wears glasses.
(Fled to GERMANY Aug 44, where he said he was going to stay with Prof. MUEHLHAUSEN).

HERVO Andre

Blackmarketeer, believed denouncer of FFI members to the Germans, possible post-war German agent in SPAIN. For particulars see CSDIC/SC/15AG/SD 21, para 4.

JOLLEY

Presumed agent of VISSAULT de OCTOLOGON (q.v.), working for Abt III KAS RENNES and Abt VI Bds PARIS 1943/44.
No description available.
(RENNES - 1943)

LALINE, Celestin
(cover name "NEVEN")

Honorary SS Untersturmfuehrer since 1945. For activities with Abwehr II before and during the war see para 4 a. For activities with Sipo und SD see para 4 b ii. For activities with HIELSCHER in BRITTANY in autumn 43 see para 3 c. Age about 37, born at NANTES. Engineer in PARIS. About 1.73 m tall, black hair, blue eyes,
non

SECRET

-19-

CSDIC/CMF/SD 100

LAINÉ, Celestin
cont'd./.

longish face, fair complexion.
(Fled to GERMANY Aug 44 and maintained his group of Breton Hilfspolizei at TUEBINGEN. Source heard from some of his men in Apr 45 a rumour that LAINÉ had been killed with the Volkssturm).

LE GOFF, Jean
Francis

Possibly the Hervy GOFF said in paras 4 and 5 of Questionnaire for Source supplied by G-2 (CI) AFHQ to have visited MILLARDEN in IRELAND (q.v.) in 1936 and 37, though Source knows nothing of such visits.
Was repatriated to BRITTANY from POW camp in GERMANY in 1940. Catholic priest. Rector of MELGVEN, Finistère, since Dec 40.

LE HELLOCO, Herve

Possibly the Hervy GOFF mentioned above. This man is said in the Questionnaire to be a lawyer. LE HELLOCO Herve is a lawyer in PARIS. Source knows nothing of visits to IRELAND, however. LE HELLOCO was in the Breton Office in BERLIN under Source and DEBAUVAIS in 1940 after release from German captivity, was repatriated in 1940. (PARIS - Aug 44)

LUEO

Honorary SS Unterscharfuehrer. Member of LAINÉ's (q.v.) Service Speciale and Hilfspolizei group (see para 4 b ii).
Age about 22.
No description available.
(TUEBINGEN - Mar 45)

MARTY

Capitaine. Repatriated to BRITTANY from German captivity in summer 40 and engaged by STAUFFENBERG of Referat II Nord RENNES (q.v.) to recruit agents from among other repatriated PW. So far as Source knows he had no success.
Age about 40, married.
About 1.75 m tall, normal build, black hair, blue eyes, square features, small nose, florid complexion.
(Went to unoccupied FRANCE by arrangement with the VICHY authorities in early 41).

MENARD

Presumed agent of VISSAULT de CRETIGNON (q.v.), working for Abt III KAS RENNES and Abt VI Bds PARIS in 1943/44.
No description available.
(RENNES - 1943)

MILLARDEN, Lec
(Breton name
MILLARDET Leon)

Breton Nationalist who went to DUBLIN to live in 1928. For account of Source's knowledge of financial transaction with DEBAUVAIS over payment of German money to DEBAUVAIS through his brother Robert MILLARDET of GUINGAMP see para 2 e. His brother is not a Breton Nationalist.

MOYSE, Fred

For activities before the war see para 2 f. After outbreak of war first acted as letter box for DEBAUVAIS in BRUSSELS for correspondence with Breton Nationalists in BRITTANY, then in Feb 40 came to BERLIN and assisted in the Breton information and records under DEBAUVAIS. cont'd.

MOISE, Fred conta/...
Returned to BRITTANY in Jun 40 and became member of newly formed Parti National Breton under Source, but in 1942 went to GERMANY as voluntary worker. Age about 33, before the war employed by publicity firm in Place Broeckere, BRUSSELS. About 1.68 m tall, slim build, black hair, long face, large Roman nose, protruding ears, high forehead, pale complexion. (Went to GERMANY as voluntary worker - 1942)

PERESSE, Ange Honorary SS Oberscharfuhrer since beg 45. Member of LAINE's (q.v.) "Gwenn Ha Du" terrorists in BRITTANY since 39, later in his Service Speciale since mid 40, and the Hilfspolizei group since mid 43 (see para 4 b ii). Had gone to GERMANY with VISSAULT de COETLOGON (q.v.) on invitation of von TEVENAR (q.v.) Passed over to Waffen SS spring 45, after going to GERMANY with LAINE's Hilfspolizei in Aug 44. Age about 23. About 1.73 m tall, large nose, big mouth, brown hair and eyes, florid complexion. (TUEBINGEN - spring 45)

VISSAULT de COETLOGON, Georges Presumed agent of his brother Guy (q.v.), working for Abt III KAS RENNES and Abt VI Bds PARIS 1943/44. No description available. (PARIS - spring 44)

VISSAULT de COETLOGON, Guy Agent of VOGT of Referat II Nest RENNES in 1940, and of Abt III KAS RENNES and Abt VI Bds PARIS and 42 - Aug 44. For details of activities see paras 4 a ii and 4 b iii.

(c) French Agents of the Germans

QUESNOY, Pierre Prominent figure in Nordiste movement in Northern FRANCE. Returned from unoccupied zone in 1942 and collaborated with the Gestapo against the resistance movement. Attempted to create Allgemeine SS movement in Northern FRANCE, and in summer 43 some of his men attended a course at the SS Standarte "Westland" Depot at ANTWERP. Fled to BERLIN in Aug 44, and was attached to Gruppe III/B RSHA under SS Hauptsturmfuehrer (later Sturmabfuhrer) FREY. In Nov/Dec 44 collected two groups of Frenchmen, 15 each, for a course in the SS barracks at LAJEWITZ. Age about 42, physician and biologist from DOUAI. About 1.68 m tall, fat, black hair, blue eyes, longish face, reddish complexion, exceptionally fast gait. (KONSTANZ - 10 Apr 45)

RAENAG, Jean Blackmarketeer and possible German agent in SPAIN. For details see OSDIO/SC/15AG/SD 21 para 4.

SAINT-SERGE Agent of Bds PARIS 1941 (?) - Aug 44. Under SS Hauptsturmfuehrer BAUCKLICH, LC to VICHY, or SS Hauptsturmfuehrer KUNZE of Abt IV till mid 43 when BICKLER took over Abt VI, when Source often saw him near Abt VI in Boulevard Flandin. Left for GERMANY with BICKLER in uniform of SS Unterscharfuhrer in Aug 44 and was employed at Leitstelle WEST. Sent during late 44 and early 45 to give political education to LAINE's (q.v.) group of Hilfspolizei at TUEBINGEN. Age 50 - 55. Born at ~~BERLIN~~ TS, but not a Breton. No description ne (BERLIN - c

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F.1a/Warrec Secretary.

We spoke. I have not succeeded in drawing this file but, on the face of it, this does not appear to be of interest to B.2.d. (formerly B.1.C/H).

B.2.d. Secretary.
18.4.46.

A. Armstrong.

Please card & new
aliases. Please card
this file also in CR.
make it an open file.

P.A. Plan
Worches 16 Feb.
PF602,431

P.F. 602,431

B.20.

I am passing to you copy of a letter
ref. CBI.369.701/P/1753 received from Allied Forces H.Q.
the contents of which may be of interest to you.

B.1a/Warrec

4.4.46

H.C. Harrison
H.C. Harrison,
S/Ldr.

p.a. P.F. 602,431 MONDRELL **16x**

(written on wrong no. n error) - file as above
75/France/10/BIN

19th July 1945.

Dear Pakenham, **ut**

Thank you for your CX/12792/1821/V.D.6
of 16.7.45.

I have read the interrogation of MONDRELL
with interest, but unfortunately, it would
appear that the questionnaire sent to you
with my letter, 75/France/10/BIN of 2.6.45.
was not covered by this interrogation. **6a**
I have informed the War Room of this, and
also of the probable identification of VOGT
and Dr. WELTHER, (see pages 14 and 15 of the
interrogation,) with Dr. VOGT and Dr. Otto
FACHER & Dr. JACOB, referred to in the case
of Vassault de CORTLOUX.

Yours sincerely,

Cecil Liddell

Major H.D.V. Pakenham,
S.I.9.
G/CJH

MINUTE SHEET

HS. P.F. 602, 4513
2417
CX 12799/1821.....
Source32799/A'A.....
No.739/2151.....
Date ..17.6.45.....

DISTRIBUTION

War Room

(via V.P.G.)

WPH.

15-
We enclose herewith two copies of
interrogation report on Lt. MORDRELL, Olivier.
sent to us by our representative in Italy and
received here on 5.7.45.

V.D.6.

16.7.45.

ACTION PROPOSED

20 JUL 1945

Secret.

In reply, state NUMBER and DATE.

Copy = 5/June/10
SF 600491
Mordrelle.

156

235'

CX/12799/1821 of 16.7.45.
V.D.6.

Dear Liddell,

We spoke.

Herewith copy of interrogation report on

Lt. MORDRELLE, Olivier.

Yours sincerely,

Transmittion

For Major H.D.V. Pakenham.

Duplicate of report
at 15.7.45
sent with this
filed in 75/June/10

C. Liddell, Esq.,
M.I.5.

Report

BIH./EG

I have not been as of any
the points in our questionnaire
were dealt with at this
interrogation - Gen 17

To B.I.B. (Mr. Bird) 348

FOR DISCLOSAL

FOR INFORMATION

&

Copy to RETENTION

M.I. 5

20:5-45.

G.2./D.C.&D.

Copy in 3F.75/France/10 BRETON AUTONOMIST MOVEMENT

112 f
15a

Interrogation Report

on

Lieut MORDRELLE, Olivier

TOP SECRET

CSDIC/SC/15AG/SD 21.

Copy No: 1/4

This report contains information on Source's activities with the SD in FRANCE and GERMANY, and also with the Breton Separatist Movement, and Personalities connected with these organisations.

INDEX

1. SOURCE

(a) Personal Details.....	Page No 1
(b) History and Career to Sep 1939.....	1
(c) Assessment.....	2

2. ACTIVITIES SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

(a) Attempted Formation of Breton National Party on Neutral Territory	2
(b) Formation of Breton National Party under Nest KENNES.....	3
(c) Activities with Abwehr and SD.....	4
(d) Further Activities with SD.....	4
(e) Trading in PARIS with the GIS.....	4
(f) Attempt to evade RSHA Control.....	5
(g) Activities with Amt III B at RSHA.....	5

3. THE POST-WAR PLANS OF AMT III B RSHA..... 6

PERSONALITIES..... 7

5. DISPOSAL..... 15

CSDIC SC,
CMF,
14 Jun 45.

R. V. WEDEKIND, Major, I.O.
C.O., CSDIC Sub-Centre.
HQ 15 Army Group, CMF.

CLASS: TOP SECRET
BY AUTHY: SACMED
INITIALS: *CHP/JS*

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
E. B. N.
Copy No. 1

GPT 389.701-PF-1753

30 June 1945

SUBJECT: Lt. Olivier Marie Joseph Charles MORDELLIE,
@ MAUREY Jean, MEISTER Otto, MERTENS Hans.

TO : CI War Room SHAEF (Rear).

1. Copy of CSDIC interrogation ^{No. 4} report on the above-named (ref. CSDIC/30/15AG/SD21 dated 14 Jun 45) is enclosed for your information.

2. Will you please state whether at this stage you have any interest in having him interrogated further on the BRATON Separatist Movement, and if so will you please forward a list of questions.

3. Attention is invited to "The Post War Plans of Amt. IIIB RSHA" described on page 6 of the report. In deciding whether his knowledge of this Subject is sufficiently great to warrant his detailed interrogation in the UK account should be taken of the CSDIC assessment of his character and activities. Furthermore, a prolonged interrogation in the UK might impede his early transfer to the French authorities which is considered to be the best means of disposing of Subject.

For the A C of S, G-2.

CHK/JS *CHP/JS*
Earle B. NICHOLS,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Asst. A C of S, G-2

Encl.

Copy to: CSDIC CMP.

DISTRIBUTION SLIP.

Name.....Lt. MORDRELL, alias MAUREY, MEISTER...File No. 602.431
 Date received.....5.7.45.....Received from.....A.F.H.Q.
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 Date

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 WR-

W.R. Form 11

6 - JUL 1945

SECRET

CSDIC/SC/15AG/SD 21

1. SOURCE

(a) Personal Details

Name: MORDFELLE, Olivier Marie Joseph Charles
 Alias: "MAUREY Jean", "MEISTER Otto", "MERTENS Hans"
 Rank: Reserve Lieut in French Army
 Unit: Last employed by Amt III B, RSHA, BERLIN
 Id No: -----
 FP No: -----
 Party No: -----
 SS No: -----
 Home Address: No fixed address. Wife and three children in refugee camp at FELDKIRCH. Mother refugee at EN ROZIERES, ST AMANS-SOULT, YARN, FRANCE, after destruction of NANTES home.
 Captured: BOLZANO, 24 May 45
 Interrogated: 11 Jun 45, CSDIC Sub-Centre, HQ 15 Army Group, CMF.

(b) History and Career to Sep 1939

Source was born in PARIS on 29 Apr 1901. His father was an officer in the French Colonial Forces, who retired from the post of Military Governor in MAKAR with the rank of General in 1925 and died in NANTES in 1942.

Source's parents both came of Breton stock, his wife (Marguerite, nee LE CUELLEC) was a native of DOUARNENEZ (Brittany), and his three children were born between 1928 and 1932 at QUIMPER (Brittany).

Source was educated in RENNES and PARIS, studying architecture at the Ecole Nationale de Beaux Arts in PARIS. He also served with the French Army, attaining the rank of Lieut in the 67 Eng Regt. After passing his examinations, Source settled in QUIMPER as a qualified architect. In 1928 he became consulting architect to the Cooperatives Agricoles de Bretagne at LANIERNEAU and in 1936 was appointed "Architecte Municipal" at QUIMPER. He claims to have designed produce warehouses, reinforced concrete garages (for RENAULT and Maison Villard) in QUIMPER and a civilian hospital in KEST, in 1935.

From 1918 onwards, Source took an increasing interest in the question of Breton independence. Between 1922 and 1928, he ran a journal called "BREIZ ATAO" which represented Breton culture, but was forced to hand over to his assistant - Francis DEBAUVAIS - because of the time he had to devote to his architectural profession.

In 1929 Source was ordered to appear before a military tribunal on a charge of engaging in political activity whilst a French Army officer on the reserve list and was sentenced to loss of one year's seniority.

In 1931 and 1932 Source engaged in electioneering campaigns in support of Federalist Europe members (Candidats Federalistes Europeens).

Resuming his journalistic bent in 1934 Source became editor of a publication in French and Breton called "STUR", the aim of which was to promote Celtic culture. The civilian authorities of QUIMPER took firm action in 1936 by ordering the seizure of his effects and bank account, his ejection from public office, and expulsion from the town limits. This action resulted from his efforts to form a "Breton Front" to defend the rights and interests of BRITTANY during the elections in that year. Source moved to PARIS and was employed by ITH, a branch of a British asbestos firm specialising in theatre acoustics.

/A year later

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A year later Source collaborated in the production of a paper called "Peuples et Frontieres", designed to defend the rights of the Western linguistic minorities in FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND, GREAT BRITAIN and IRELAND".

In 1938 Source was again in trouble, being sentenced to one year's imprisonment (not served) and a fine of 11,000 Francs for advocating non-participation of the Breton people in any war engaged in by FRANCE without its consent.

At the outbreak of war Source fled to BERLIN with his collaborator DEBAUVAIS, taking with him funds amounting to 100,000 Francs.

(c) Assessment

Source would appear to be a petty political agitator whose efforts to create an independent BRITTANY were treated too indulgently by the French before the outbreak of war.

He claims that he considered in 1939 that the Germans would conquer the West completely and that they in any case would have the most understanding for his aims. This was sufficient justification for his fleeing to GERMANY at the outbreak of war. He was in close contact with the Germans all through the war years, although he claims he lost heart quite early on.

During the whole of the war period Source's family was paid an amount of 5,000 Francs monthly and he himself was in receipt of fluctuating sums, so that he must be regarded as a paid agent of the Abwehr and later of the SD.

Source wishes to be taken over by the British and to "vanish" from French sight, in order to escape the death sentence or a term of imprisonment. He considers that he could be useful in tracing German agents in SPAIN and that there would be additional uses for him politically.

It is considered, however, that the French authorities are best able to deal with him.

Reliability: Good
(Interrogated by R.V.M.)

2. ACTIVITIES SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

(a) Attempted Formation of Breton National Party on Neutral Territory

(Sep 39-Jun 40)

DEBAUVAIS, who had been Source's junior in the Breton separatist movement until 1928, had in the interval of ten years worked his way up to titular head. Although Source still supplied a more facile pen and a better grasp of the Breton ideals, he nevertheless found himself very much subordinate to DEBAUVAIS, who was extremely secretive and jealous. It was DEBAUVAIS who had contacted the Abwehr and prepared the way for the flight into GERMANY before the war started. The Abwehr was interested in having the leaders of any French minority under its control in order to have the means of exploiting any minority question through important mouthpieces or of holding the same leaders as hostages for the good behaviour of the minorities.

The Germans were reasonably helpful to DEBAUVAIS and Source and enabled the former to get away to HOLLAND and BELGIUM to assess the possibility of starting up a Breton separatist movement in either country. It was stressed that any such movement must be piloted from neutral territory and not from GERMANY proper, in order to retain the "idealistic" flavour. DEBAUVAIS was, of course, unfortunate inasmuch as the Germans did not hesitate to make a battlefield of both HOLLAND and BELGIUM.

/Source, who had

Source, who had other ideas on suitable terrain for starting his movement, applied for a visa for ITALY. This was granted at the end Nov 39 by a Major MARWEDE, alias "MESSERSCHMIDT", who was the only representative of the Abwehr whom Source had seen personally up to that time. Source had been living quietly in various small hotels in BERLIN under false names ("Jean MAUREY", "Otto MEISTER", and "Hans MERTENS") since his arrival and was periodically contacted by very unassuming messengers with obviously false names.

Accompanied by a Rittm RADEMACHER von URNA, Source travelled down to ROME and endeavoured to obtain permission to work in ITALY as a political refugee from FRANCE. As he had not been successful at the end Dec 39 and his money was running short, Source returned to BERLIN for Christmas.

Between Jan and May 1940, DEBAUVAIS (who had since returned from HOLLAND) and Source made an effort to obtain preferential treatment from the GOW for Breton PW. Aided by a Baron von STAUFFENBERG, they set aside a compound at LUCKENWALD PW Camp, near BERLIN, and a total of about 500 Bretons were assembled there: the last of these PW were returned to BRITANNY in Dec 40. The excuse given to the German authorities was that these men could be used as agents for the new Party, although in fact none of them was paid any money or worked for the Germans.

In May 40 Source went to BUDAPEST to set up an organisation on neutral territory and wrote from there to various friends of his in BRITANNY. With the end of the French campaign, however, Source felt that he could return to FRANCE, in spite of the fact that he had heard that the French military authorities had passed the death sentence on him on 7 May for his continued political activity and failure to report for military service.

(b) Formation of Breton National Party under Nest RENNES (Jul-Nov 40)

After having received permission to go back to BRITANNY to revive the Breton separatist movement, Source returned to RENNES on 1 Jul 40 and reported to the Nest there, his contacts being a Sdnf "K" Dr WELTER, alias "JACOB", and an Uffs VOGT of Abwehr II.

He found that DEBAUVAIS, who had left BERLIN a few weeks before him, was already founding the "CONSEIL NATIONAL BRETON". Source was invited to join the council, which consisted of the president and five members, and which was actually constituted on 3 Jul 40 at PONTIVY. No sooner had the council been formed than the German political attitude became more apparent. While in some directions (such as the obtaining of various permits) Nest RENNES was very helpful, in others it proved adamant, particularly in refusing to allow too energetic a representation of Breton aims. DEBAUVAIS became more and more dispirited as time went on, and by Sep 40 the council was in process of dissolution.

Source, who all along had observed that the Germans were aiming higher by arranging the unified control of FRANCE through the VICHY Government and only playing with the minorities, emerged again as the Breton leader and himself reformed the pre-war "PARTI NATIONAL BRETON" in Oct 40.

In Nov 40 Sdnf "K" Dr WELTER was replaced by a Hpt KOHLHAAS as Abwehr II in Nest RENNES. The newcomer had orders to stamp out any militant tendency on the part of the Bretons and yet to allow the Party to exist in a peaceful form, in order to satisfy the demands of both the VICHY Government and the Bretons.

As Source would not moderate his separatist demands, he was deposed, sent to PARIS under arrest, and detained for a month from 11 Nov 40 onwards in the Hotel de LOUVRE. In RENNES, the Party was told that he had fled and a Raymond DELAPORTE would be taking over.

The nomination of DELAPORTE was a shrewd one, as he was a Christian-Socialist, anti-German, and pro-VICHY. It was a relatively simple matter to impress on him the need for political solidarity in FRANCE and for him to keep the Breton ideals alive within the framework of the VICHY Government.

15a

(c) Activities with Abwehr and SD (Dec 40-Oct 41)

After signing a declaration that he would not re-engage in political activities, Source was allowed to return to RENNES to settle his private affairs. He contacted the members of his Party and explained to them how the Germans were in fact withdrawing their support and merely keeping the Party at its beck and call in case of need: they would not, however, believe him. On 15 Dec 40 Source went towards BREEST by road to attempt to get over to GREAT BRITAIN but was overtaken at QUIDMERIE by Uffz VOGT and brought back to RENNES in protective custody.

He was returned to Ast STUTTGART and kept waiting pending disposal. As he had some money left, he went on holiday to the TIROL for three weeks.

At end Jan 41 a "Herr KLEIN" explained to Source that he would have to remain in GERMANY and that he could not be employed for the time being. His family would continue to receive 5,000 Francs monthly and he would be paid RM 250 (RM 500 had been promised to him in RENNES). Source secretly posted letters to RENNES explaining his position and told "Herr KLEIN" what he had done. "Herr KLEIN" then arranged for him to travel to BERLIN and asked his pardon for his "mistake". It was obvious that "KLEIN" had been underpaying Source and pocketing the surplus.

From beg Feb 41 Source was resident at 22, Heibtreustrasse, BERLIN, in a pension owned by Frau BERNHARD. The Abwehr in the meantime handed his dossier over to the RSHA, which did not at first wish to employ him. Source did, however, finally contact a Hptstuf SCHNEIDER who was helpful and finally gave him permission to go to PARIS for a week, reporting to Ostuf BAUCKLOH, LO to the VICHY Government. Once again Source had promised not to engage in political matters.

Arriving in PARIS on 1 May 41 Source found that he could easily make friends with BAUCKLOH by arranging debauched parties in MONTMARTRE with the assistance of some of his former acquaintances. Source lived in the flat of a friend named de TRENSINVILLE at 24, Rue DENFERT-ROCHEREAU and carried on without doing any work until end Jul 41. He was allowed to meet his family at LAVAL but was not allowed to go to RENNES until Oct 41.

(d) Further Activities with SD (Oct 41-end 1942)

From Oct 41 onwards, Source had a settled existence again in RENNES. Ostuf HOLLEIT, his SD superior, proved quite amiable, requiring from him only a weekly personal appearance and a monthly morale report on the local Breton population. Source engaged in black market dealings to obtain money and also restarted his paper "L'UR" - on a quarterly basis. This paper, which was printed at the LE FLOCH printing works in MAENNE, ran to about 100 pages and cost 30 Francs a copy. Turnover was about 800-1,000 copies, mostly subscriptions being paid. The political line taken was that BREITANNY could not hope to become a separate entity but should be satisfied with keeping its tradition within the normal framework of the Government of FRANCE.

After the publication of the fourth issue, Source had orders to emphasise anti-Bolshevism in his fifth quarterly issue. As he did not wish to do so, he closed down the paper on the grounds that he had no money left, although in actual fact he had made about 15,000 Francs on the venture.

(e) Trading in PARIS with the GIS (Beg 43-Aug 44)

For nearly twenty months, Source had a relatively easy life again. He travelled back and forth between RENNES and PARIS on black market deals and finally managed to move with his family to a flat at 24, Avenue GEORGES V, PARIS, where he established an office. He dealt mainly in foodstuffs for the SS officers' mess at 60, Avenue FOCH and also bought automobile necessities for resale to the Germans.

As the news of the Allied advance came through, he grew increasingly alarmed and attempted to get into SWITZERLAND in Jul 44.

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(f) Attempt to evade RSHA Control (Aug-Oct 44)

Source maintains that during this period he had managed to escape from the clutches of the RSHA. His family was evacuated to FREIBURG im BREISGAU under the auspices of Konsul SCHLEEMANN of the German Foreign Office and Source went with them, not advising the RSHA of his intended journey.

(g) Activities with Amt III B at RSHA (Oct 44- May 45)

PF On 1 Oct 44 Source's hideout was discovered and he received orders to report to STRASBOURG. On arrival he was sent to BERLIN, where he reported to Amt III B and came under the orders of Stubaf PEREY. Source was told that his duties would be to report on the morale of French workers and evacuees in GERMANY and that all Breton questions would be dealt with by the German Foreign Office through the VICHY Government at SIGMARINGEN. He had therefore to arrange for a network of French agents to keep a check on political trends, morale, etc. As this was not to his taste, he merely wrote letters to friends in DRESDEN, MAGDEBURG, DANZIG and other places and made no attempt to recruit agents. He was warned by a typist in Dec 44 that his position was rather precarious and a month later he was threatened with imprisonment if he did not show some progress.

On 20 Jan 45 Source went to KONSTANZ and had a talk with Jacques DORIOT of the former "Parti Populaire Francais", who wished to recruit him for the French "Befreiungskomitee" which was being formed under his guidance. Source was to be the Breton representative and duly received his enrolment. He returned to BERLIN on 30 Jan 45 but spent four days en route owing to Allied air attacks.

He did not report to the RSHA on arrival on 3 Feb 45 and was put under arrest on 6 Feb 45 on charges of sabotaging SD work, attempting to flee to SWITZERLAND, etc. On 9 Feb 45 he was released when the VICHY Government confirmed that he had been enrolled for the new Freedom Committee.

On 25 Feb 45 Source went to MÜNCHEN to contact the Committee, only to find that DORIOT, its mainspring, had been killed during a ground strafing attack on 22 Feb 45. He remained in MÜNCHEN until early Apr 45 but, realising that the Allied advances were very significant, he returned to FREIBURG im BREISGAU and moved his family over to INNSBRUCK without permission. Here he contacted Hauptstuf KELLER and asked for a permit to enter ITALY. KELLER told him, however, that Amt III B had moved to MUNICH and that he should go there and contact PEREY.

Source proceeded to DEISENHOFEN, 15 km from MUNICH, on 18 Apr and found that Amt III B had installed itself in a farmhouse there. PEREY told him that they were about to discuss the future Nazi underground movement in the West against Bolshevism and that he could attend as the French representative. Sundry speeches were made and Source was told that he was to go to SPAIN to organise a Breton cell. On 21 Apr Source returned to INNSBRUCK and was told that he would hear more from Standaf STEIMLE, who would be in FREITZENS, near INNSBRUCK, at the end of the month.

On 29 Apr 45 Source proceeded to the rendezvous but did not see STEIMLE. Another SD representative, whom he did not know, appeared and explained that he could go to BOLZANO with his family and would receive instructions there on how to proceed to MADRID, where he could contact a representative in the RITZ Hotel.

On 1 May 45 Source moved with his family to BOLZANO and got his wife and children into a French refugee camp. The German Consul distributed funds at the rate of about 10,000 Lire a head, after which they were left to their own devices.

TOP SECRET

CSDIC/SC/15AG/SD 21

15a

3. [THE POST-WAR PLANS OF AMT III B RSHA] SFS2/4/16.

When Source attended the conference at HEISENHOFEN, near MUNICH, in mid Apr 45, it was presided over by an Obergruppenfuhrer in full SS uniform and comprised about fifteen representatives from countries lying West of GERMANY, and including ITALY. None of these representatives was known to Source.

It was explained first that a last-minute fusion of Amt III B and Amt VI had taken place, in order to further the great plan of promoting post-war unrest.

The speaker then proceeded to relate how ample funds had already been planted in S AMERICA - mainly in the ARGENTINE - and would become available for financing agents in due course. In order to have "bankers" who could distribute this money, certain trustworthy key men had already been sent to live in SPAIN and SWITZERLAND.

The agents were to lie low for a certain period after the end of the war in EUROPE and at a given time were to start organising "national" movements which would be thoroughly in keeping with the traditions of each country but which would all preach anti-Bolshevism and stir up unrest culminating in civil war. If the cult of anti-Bolshevism were not particularly popular, then any other sore point, such as the burden of supporting an Army of Occupation or of having to cede territory, might be seized on. The main purpose was to make the Allies' post-war task as hard as possible, so that the Nazi Party could, in time, reappear in a suitable disguise and build up a Fourth Reich.

In going to work, no movement was to make any mention of its pro-Nazi sentiments or to indulge in anti-semitic propaganda. This was stressed as a cardinal rule.

Each movement should also strive to create different slogans, methods of approach to the public, initiation ceremonies, ranks, etc., in order to lessen the risk of the affinity between movements being suspected.

Clandestine cooperation between movements in different countries was not envisaged, at least at the beginning.

The Nazis intended to form a "three-layer" organisation to control the various movements. The first layer would concentrate on forming a German "Schutzgemeinschaft" out of EUROPE and so would direct the high policy. The second layer would be that which had to model the policy of the first layer to suit the various countries. Unlike the first two layers, the third layer might (in carrying out its general propaganda work) become known to the various movements.

Source was told that he could contact a French agent in the RITZ Hotel, MADRID, if he could get there. From allusions made, he connects this German agent in SPAIN either with a certain Jean RADENAC, a former friend of his in PARIS who made a fortune by trading with the SD and passing information, or with a lesser light - Andre HERVO - who also made money by trading with the Germans and who also left for SPAIN at an opportune moment.

Source states that this last meeting had a strange air of unreality. He had the feeling that last-minute plans were being made in words and on paper when all the persons present were secretly preoccupied with the idea of how they could best save their skins.

Extract to C.I.S. Post-war plans.

4. PERSONALITIES

BRUCKLICH Friedrich

Hptstuf (promoted).
Age about 30. Married with one child.
About 1.85 m tall, stoutish, fair hair, round head, red cheeks, heavy but immature facial expression. Typical SS man, unintelligent, poorly educated and fond of drink and women.
Native of WESTPHALIA, but resident in BERLIN.
Record: Was under GUDERUNZE in PARIS and was engaged in keeping track of French political trends. Left PARIS about Oct 42 to become Stellvertreter der Sipo und SD in ST QUENTIN.
Last known to be in PARIS, end 1942.

X BICKLER Hermann X

PF 60,074 NMI
C. 84098 / 84099. NR

Standaf.
Age about 40. Married, with five children.
About 1.60 m tall, average build, broad forehead, brown hair and eyes, full rosy cheeks, pointed chin, youthful appearance, speaks slowly and in a deep voice, wears spectacles.
Speaks perfect French but rolls "r's" in German.
Native of ROERBACH (Alsace-Lorraine).
Record: Was formerly lawyer in STRASBOURG. Between 1928-39 was prominent in organising an Alsatian separatist movement with German flavour (Jungmannschaft - youth movement - newspaper called "Frei Volk"). Joined French Army in Aug 39 but arrested on charge of espionage. Released by Germans from prison in Central FRANCE during 1940. Feted by Germans on return to ALSACE. Given SS rank, sent to training school, and made Kreisleiter of STRASBOURG in 1941. Transferred Jun 43 as Leiter Abt VI, BAS, PARIS. Regarded by Germans as too moderate and retiring. Fled to GERMANY in Aug 44 and took over Leitstelle WEST in HORNBERG (Black Forest), with intention of working against FRANCE. Very pro-German, but disillusioned by Nazi brutality.

X DANNECKER Theo X

S. 88418

Hptstuf.
Age about 30. Married in 1942.
About 1.82 m tall, slender, light hair and eyes, small face, prominent nose, has nervous tic, swivels head with jerk of chin to right and blinks eyes simultaneously, bad nerves, very sadistic.
Native of TUEBINGEN.
Record: Was in PARIS dealing with Jewish problems until end 1942. Seen again casually in BERLIN in Dec 44.
Last known to be in BERLIN, Dec 44.

3.8 mi.

Traces in SF 75 France/10
Name with card in Central Registry

DEBAUVAIS

OSDIO/SC/154G/SD 15a

NA

Breton. Married, with one adopted boy of 12.
Died of a lung complaint at COLMAR in Feb 43, aged about 40.
Record: Was closely identified with the Breton separatist movement between 1928 and 1940 and he founded the Conseil National Breton on 3 Jul 40 at PONTIVY. Lost heart from Aug 40 onwards and finally disbanded the Council in Sep 40. Ran a Breton Documentation Centre from Nov 40 onwards, for recording economic and political life in BRITTANY. Earned his living by running a small factory in RENNES for Breton dolls, which sold well in PARIS.

X EHLICH Dr X
S. 3521. 'A'

Standaf.
Age about 50.
About 1.70 m tall, medium build, fair hair, small blue eyes which never meet one's gaze, narrow face. Looks like a school teacher or bank employee.
Record: Believed to be Leiter Amt III B, RSHA, 1944/45. Concentrated principally on administration and left the working initiative to his colleagues.
Last known to be in BERLIN, Feb 45.

X FALKENBERG X
NL
L.V. P

German civilian (?). Professor.
Age about 35.
About 1.80 m tall, average build, black hair - with parting, dark eyes, narrow face, very light skin, turned-up nose.
Record: Was very closely connected with Amt III B, RSHA, and believed to have been the secret observer (for SD) at the European Congress held at WEIMAR in Jan 45. Keeps very much in background, but has reputation for brains and ability.

X FISCHER Dr X
S. 26857
A

Hptstuf.
Age about 42. Married.
About 1.72 m tall, average build, light brown hair - brushed back, wide forehead tapering to pointed chin, walks like a boxer with shoulders hunched up and a rolling stride. Typical SS type, brutal and self-centred.
Native of SILESIA.
Record: Was in PARIS, 1943/4, with Amt III, office at 60, Avenue FOCH. Was assistant to PEREY in III B (I-b) from Nov 44-heavy raid on 3 Feb 45, then moved to ESSLINGEN (Wuerttemberg). Had PEIZINGER under his command. Left for BASLE end Mar 45, ostensibly to contact General GIRAUD, but may have deserted.

GUTERUNST.
GUEKUNZE

Stubaf.
Age about 40.
About 1.78 m tall, fair complexion, wears spectacles, not particularly intelligent.
Record: Known to be BAUKLOH's and KUNZE's superior in SD offices at 78, Avenue FOCH. Source had practically no contact with him.
Last known to be in PARIS, autumn 1942.

TOP SECRET

CSDIC/SC/15AG/SD 21.

HERRDT Dr.

*HERRDT, Hermann
SS/Präsident 2.
SS/Präsident 1945
will know: 8/11/45*

Ostuf.

Age about 44. Married, with children.
About 1.71 m tall, rather stout, brown hair - with parting,
medium size head without outstanding characteristics beyond
protuberant brown eyes. Intelligent and educated, but with
little personality.
Native of RHINELAND.

Record: Was originally Ministerialdirektor in the "Minister-
ium des Innern BERLIN fuer staedtische Verwaltungs-
fragen". In 1942-43 was Kdr der Sipo und SD in
RENNES. Only touched admin and police matters
there, had nothing to do with Breton separatist
movement. Main occupation "wine, women and song".
Went to PARIS in 1943 as Kdr der Sipo in the Rue de
SAUSSURES and lived - in state - North of the city
on the MONTMORENCY estate belonging to the Jewish
family of CONS-BOAS. Was posted away in 1944 for
being too weak in discharge of his duty(!).

Last known to be in PARIS, Jun 44.

XIERVO Andre

*C
NI*

Breton civilian, born in PARIS.

Age about 42. Married.
About 1.80 m tall, slender, dark hair - going grey at temples
(only sign of age in an otherwise youthful appearance), thin
face, red "tippler's" nose.

Record: Commenced black market dealings end 1941 in RENNES,
principally with the Oberbauleitung Normandie of the
TODT Organisation. By autumn 1943 had made at least
20,000,000 Francs profit. Believed to have been a
denouncer of FFI members to the Germans. Fled to
PERPIGNAN in autumn 1943, taking mistress (wife of
French officer-FW from DINARD) and her daughter with
him, with intention of going to SPAIN if threatened
by FFI. Wife remained in ST BRIEUX (Brittany) and
was well supplied with money. May be an intended
post-war German agent in SPAIN. Knows RADENAC, but
is not a very good friend of his.

HOLLERT

NI

Ostuf. Was in Sipo in RENNES. Killed during an air raid on
LYONS in 1943.

A XKELLER

NI in Innsbruck.

Hptstuf. In SD in INNSBRUCK, precise function uncertain.

Age about 38.

About 1.62 m tall, average build, brown hair, light eyes,
narrow face, thin lips, piercing gaze, speaks and acts quickly
and forcefully. Intelligent man of action, probably fanatical
Nazi.

Last known to be in INNSBRUCK, 1 May 45.

15a

TOP SECRET

CSDIC/SC/15AG/SD 21.

X KLEY Dr X

S 39420
4 traces.

Uschaf.

Age about 28.

About 1.72 m tall, medium build, fair hair, large head, wears spectacles, slow speaker and awkward manner. Never in uniform. Typical German. Quite intelligent. Spoke excellent French.

Record: Worked in Amt VI, Boulevard FLANDRIN, PARIS, and known to be responsible for tracking down Allied air crews after they had baled out. Was extremely keen on his job and believed successful. Last known to be in PARIS, Mar 44.

X KOHLHAAS X

S-115, 903.

NM!

Hpt. Abwehr II, Nest RENNES.

Age about 50.

About 1.72 m tall, average build, no noteworthy characteristics, very provincial type who left no impression.

Record: Former journalist from HAMBURG (or BERLIN). Replaced Sonder "K" Dr WELTER at end Oct 40 with orders to suppress Breton separatist movement. Made great show of painstaking attention to duty. Known to have left again during early part 1941.

X KINZE X

S-10829 + Traces.
S-10825

Hptstuf.

Age about 33. Believed married.

About 1.72 m tall, medium build, fair hair, light eyes, oval handsome face, weak-willed. Very snobbish and affected in manners, tries to ape the "English gentleman". Native of WUERTEMBERG.

Record: Was lawyer of medium intelligence. Succeeded BAUCKLOH in Oct 42. Had offices at 78, Avenue FOCH, PARIS. Had dealings with RADEMAC. Always wore plain clothes. Seen casually in Sep 44.

Last known to be in STRASBOURG, Sep 44.

X KORX X

- Kust
S. 49627 + 42004

4 traces - A

Hptstuf.

Age about 32. Married.

About 1.66 m tall, slender - with poor constitution, dark hair-with parting, light eyes, round face.

Record: Was admin officer in Amt VI, PARIS, until Aug 44. Then to Leitstelle WEST, under BICKLER, to train underground movement agents. Not considered a very dangerous type.

[LOEW Dr. von X]

~~SECRET~~

CSDIC/SC/15AG/SD 21

PF 602,598

S. 56.

S. 42010

Ostufaf.

Age about 45.

About 1.65 m tall, very thin, brown hair and eyes, pale and sickly face. Very intelligent and cultured, displays considerable tact, but probably has shallow character. Cautious nature.

Record: Appeared to be university professor. Was in Amt III B, RSHA, from 1941-45. Controlled political activities in N EUROPE, from HOLLAND to FINLAND. Was ordered to organise a Fifth Column in his area in Mar/Apr 45. Started growing a beard in Feb 45 (almost certainly with GERMANY's ultimate defeat in mind).

Last known to be in BERLIN, Feb 45.

X MARWEDE alias
"MESSERSCHMIDT" (?)

Prob S. 47233 + traces

last seen 2/4

MESSERSCHMIDT

PF 600,237 + 1,2,3,4

X MAULAZ Dr X

S. 47235 NNI

1 traces

Major. Abwehr II, RSHA, BERLIN.

Age about 50. Married to former actress, 3 or 4 children.

About 1.76 m tall, slender, dark-grey cropped hair, blue eyes, similar features to Dr SCHACHT, wears spectacles, very nervous gestures, suffers from bad health. Typical regular Prussian officer with rather limited intelligence.

Record: Was i/o political insurrection in W EUROPE.

Last known to be in BERLIN, Jun 40.

Stubaf.

Age about 40.

About 1.68 m tall, rather corpulent - broad body, brown sparkling eyes, square face, red cheeks, slothful look but actually very quick and temperamental, general head shape rather like that of MUSSOLINI. Typical SD type, ruthless, egoistic, strong Nazi, selfish. Hardworking and believed very efficient.

Native of AUSTRIA.

Record: Was admin officer in Amt III, DAS, PARIS, from 1941-Aug 44. Had absolute control over money matters and is believed to have feathered his own nest. Led very luxurious life. Reported to be in the RSHA after Aug 44, as head of an information section on Germans evacuated from Allied Occupied Territory.

X NOSEK X

NNI WR

PF 600,212

Paris 6/4

Sharp 459 + traces

Stubaf.

Age about 40.

About 1.80 m tall, rather fat, thin dark hair - brushed back, stooping carriage, small oval face, fresh complexion, general facial expression "womanish and plump", smiles continuously. Very reserved manners. Physical coward.

Record: Was in Amt VI, PARIS till Aug 44, then went to Leitstelle WEST as head of Aussenstelle KONSTANZ until capitulation. Was prominent in political intrigue in PARIS. Controlled the frontier at KONSTANZ and had contact with Freedom Committee of Jacques DORIOT. Intelligent and diplomatic type, reported to have been successful in PARIS. Lines his own pockets well.

Last known to be in KONSTANZ, Apr 45.

TOP SECRET

CSDIC/SC/15AG/SD 2

15a

[PEREY Josef]

PF 602,528

Stubaf (promoted Jan 45). Assistant to Standaf EHLICH in Amt III B, RSHA.
Age about 40. Married, no children.
About 1.75 m tall, normal build - narrow slightly hunched shoulders, dark hair, dark eyes - which he shuts when laughing, narrow forehead, heavy and sagging jowls, concave bridge to nose, rather ape-like appearance, very entertaining, physical coward, intelligent. Cunning in approach to agents. For an SD officer astonishingly honest in money matters. Heavy drinker and suspected drug-addict. Speaks excellent Dutch and good French. Native of JUELICH.

Record: Previous Party history unknown. Specialised in Belgian, Dutch and Flemish political and minority questions. Worked in BRUSSELS from the time of the occupation until he quarrelled with DEGRELLE and was sent to KATOWITZ in disgrace (date uncertain). Recalled to BERLIN in Sep 44 by Standaf EHLICH and given two tasks; administration of all Amt III B personnel throughout the Reich and political control for FRANCE, LUXEMBOURG, ALSACE-LOTHARINGEN, ITALY and SWITZERLAND. Very active, but works in a rather disorderly fashion and very often does not carry out jobs to the end. Suffers from lapses of memory which may be attributed to drug-taking.

Last known to be in DEISENHOFEN, Apr 45.

[KUEHLINGER]

PF 56344

8 49077

H

@FITZINGER
Walker

Stubaf.
Age about 35. Married, with three children (evacuated to ENGLAND from BRUSSELS in 1940).
About 1.75 m tall, medium build, thin black hair - with parting, small black eyes, thin eyebrows, oval face, broad jaws, thin lips. Unintelligent, brutal, fanatical, violently anti-British, conceited and politically ambitious. Speaks perfect French. Native of ALSACE (German National).
Record: Known to have been with execution squad in BRUSSELS as Oschaf in Gestapo until summer 1944. Believed to be personal spy of PEREY in Amt III B, RSHA. Left BERLIN for KONSTANZ after heavy air raid of 3 Feb 45.

Last known to be in KONSTANZ, 15 Apr 45.

X RADEMACHER von UNNA X

Chickely

PF 600750

547529 (250)

Hpt. In Abw II, RSHA.
Age about 55. Married to woman from MERANO, no children.
About 1.62 m tall, slender, dark grey cropped hair, blue eyes, square-out and forbidding features, sickly appearance, wears a monocle, very arrogant air of a Prussian aristocrat. Used to sport a buttonhole, cane and elegant gloves.
Record: Escorted Source from BERLIN to ROME in Nov 39. Believed to specialise in production of false documents for German agents.

Private Address: MERANO area.
Last seen in MERANO, May 45, when Source reported this fact to Allied authorities.

TOP SECRET

CSDIC/SC/15AC/SD 21.

X PAJENAC Jean X

Vass. — Pierre.

SR 50/1944/94

PF 600500 BERNDEL

PF 600577 KAUTZ

S. 112, 822.

French civilian. Director of POLVE firm of wholesale dealers at 12, Boulevard de la MADELAINE, PARIS.

Age about 40. Married, with wife in SPAIN.

About 1.65 m tall, tendency to fatness, thin dark hair - brushed back, blue eyes, light complexion, fat oval face with expression like a bishop, little pudgy hands.

Native of BRITTANY.

Record: Was introduced by Source to SS authorities in May 41 and had big-scale dealings with Germans until spring 1944. Believed to have made a profit of about 200,000,000 Francs. Had branch offices in GENEVA and BASLE. Stock of furs in BASLE was reported to be worth 200,000,000 Francs. Showed increased interest in SPAIN from 1943 onwards and drove there every month. Had offices in MADRID and BARCELONA. Assumed Uruguayan nationality in 1943, having assets and an estate in URUGUAY. Specialised in bribery and invitations to sumptuous dinners, the conversation at which would be reported to the SD. Also arranged a week in PARIS in a fully stocked flat for two Spanish frontier police officers to facilitate his frontier crossings. Went on trip to SPAIN in Mar 44 (from which he did not return), leaving his mistress in PARIS with ample funds and accommodation. May be an intended German agent but, being a bully and a coward, may probably have saved his skin in good time.

SCHNEIDER

Hptstuf. Was formerly in RSHA, BERLIN, posted voluntarily to Eastern Front, where he was killed in 1942.

X SCHUBERT X

Prob. S. 114, 816

A'

carded as

Hptstuf.

Age about 32.

About 1.75 m tall, slender, fair hair, blue eyes, long head, narrow face, rosy complexion. Not particularly clever, typical SS type, confirmed liar.

Record: Was in Amt III B, RSHA, until Dec 44, then became Leiter Amt III B in AUGSBURG.

X STADELMANN Dr X

S 18565

'A

Hptstuf.

Age about 40.

About 1.78 m tall, slender, fair hair, blue eyes, narrow face, pointed nose, wears spectacles. Not much personality.

Native of N GERMANY.

Record: Was Leiter III C in PARIS during 1943/44. Was in charge of press, theatre and cinema affairs. When seen casually in BERLIN in Dec 44, told Source that he was working in NUREMBERG.

TOP SECRET

CSDIC/SC/15AG/SD 21.

X STAUFFENBERG
Baron SCHENK von X

NNI, PF 600,000 SCHARF
S. 2229

Rittm. Reichstag member for SIGMARINGEN.
Age 65-70.
About 1.68 m tall, slender, flaxen hair - turned grey, blue eyes, narrow face, fresh complexion. Unable to walk without a stick as result of severe wounds received during World War I in right arm and left leg. Has very anti-Nazi convictions.
Record: Was in Abw II, RSHA, BERLIN. Assisted Source in repatriation of Breton PW during 1940 against opposition by OKW.
Last known to be in BERLIN, end 1940.

X STEINLE X NNI
PF 601,816
S. 47267.

Standaf. Never actually seen by Source.
Had a rendezvous with Source in FRIETZENS, near INNSBRUCK, on 29 Apr 45 which he did not keep. Source was told by an SD man who turned up instead that STEINLE had already passed through in his car "coming from the direction of MUNICH".

X SUESSE X

PF 602,598

Stubaf. Seldom seen by Source.
Age about 40.
About 1.70 m tall. Left Source with impression of being a jovial, energetic, unscrupulous and intelligent rogue.
Record: Was assistant to von LOEW in III B, RSHA. Specialist in FLANDERS affairs. Was formerly in BELGIUM.
Last known to be in BERLIN, early 1945.

VLASSOV

CR ce. NNI

Russian General. Organizer of Russian forces fighting with Germans.
Age about 45.
About 1.85 m tall, slender, small blue eyes, small face, prominent vertical lines between cheeks and mouth, clean shaven, wears spectacles.
Seen by Source in INNSBRUCK, 28 Apr 45.

PF 602,774
X VOGT
alias "MERTENS" X

S. 179 Traces
who is ? d/w
S 399
60354 H
Traces

Uffz.
Age about 45. Married, with two children.
About 1.67 m tall, average build, curly black hair, blue eyes, oval face, light complexion, Celtic type. Weak personality, but dangerous if properly led. Accomplished liar, and good imitator of nationality other than his own. Not particularly pro-Nazi.
Speaks perfect English, French and Flemish. Born in ANTWERP of German father and Welsh mother.
Record: Was probably clerk in civilian life. Was in Abw II, Nest RENNES. Assistant first to Sondf "K" Dr WELTER and later to Hpt KOHLHAAS.
Private Address: STUTTGART area.
Last known to be in STUTTGART, 22 Dec 40.

NNI.

TOP SECRET

CSDIC/SC/15AG/SD 21.

~~WELTER, Dr.~~
alias "~~Dr JACOB~~"
WEL

Sondf "K".

Age about 48.

About 1.70 m tall, average build, thin brown hair, brown eyes - with very scant eyelashes, indeterminate features, thin lips, rather outstanding ears, Has staunch German monarchist views. Speaks German, French and Flemish sibilantly and pedantically. Native of BERLIN (?).

Record: Visited Source in QUIMPER during 1930 as a student under real name of Dr WELTER, coming from German National Student Association in BERLIN. Exchanged views on Breton political aspirations. Travelled extensively among various minorities in HUNGARY, YUGOSLAVIA and other countries. Next seen on 1 Jul 40 in Abwehr II, West RENNES. Lived at end of Avenue JANVIER, RENNES. Returned to BERLIN end Oct 40 and replaced by Hpt KOHLHAAS.

Last known to be in BERLIN, end Jan 41.

5. DISPOSAL

Source is to be sent to the CI Internment Camp unless required for further interrogation.

-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-

DISTRIBUTION

REF ID: A512/RT

Copy Nos

AC of S, G-2 (CI), AFHQ.....	1 - 5
GSI (b), 15 Army Group.....	6 - 9
No 1 SCI Unit.....	10 - 28
SCI Unit "Z".....	29 - 36
MI 5, War Office.....	37
MI 19, War Office.....	38 - 39
G-2 (FW), AFHQ.....	40
SINE, CHQ, MEF.....	41 - 43
CSDIC, CLEF.....	44 - 47
G-2 (CI), 5 Army.....	48 - 52
GSI (b), 8 Army.....	53
JCO FSS.....	54 - 59
400 MU, CSDIC.....	60
File.....	61 - 63

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PF.602,431
MINUTE SHEET No. _____

A. No. _____

W.R.H. Mrs. Spence.

please p.a. the attached report in PF.602,431 for MORDRELLE. I have marked for carding and extracting to other P.Fs. In the case of SUESS and LOEW the PF is in course of preparation, and I have not been able to quote the number.

When extracting page 6 to the SD as shown, I should like a similar extract made to the PF for LOEW/SUESS etc., which does in effect cover the III B underground movement.

I have indicated a look up only in the case of FALKENBERG. Would you please give summary of traces in returning the file on completion of carding and extracting.

W.R.C.3a
6.7.45.

Julian

*Since writing the above, the PF has arrived from
to R.H. with this report enclosed. This copy can be used for cut up
& extraction*

*Now returned for copying.
Copy for cut up will follow*

99?

SECRET.

WAR ROOM

OUTGOING TELEGRAM.

PA file 14a

Typed 1415 hrs. 30.6.45.
Dispatched
Channel

Reference
Case Officer ...H. G. J. ...
File ...P. F. 602,295 662431

H4c 28/6

To : 12th A.G.

From : WAR ROOM.

Your 536 on VERHURST.

- A. This info most interesting.
- B. Your para C. Presume following Shaeff identities KUNZ 21639
WINDMANN 10897 ERNST 57976.
- C. Can VERHURST say whether there was any contact with personnel other Auster
at Munich about that time.
- D. Current report alleges fusion of Amt III and Amt VI in Munich end April.
- E. Would welcome any info soonest.

Mordelle PF 662431

Original in PF. 602,295

DISTRIBUTION

Routine

1 JUL 1945

2-7-45

MINUTE SHEET

13a
CX
Source
No.
Date

DISTRIBUTION

W.R.

We have had the following information from the Field in Italy, dated 20th June, 1945:

A. MORDRELLE under interrogation C.S.D.I.C. FLORENCE states he attended conference at DEISENHOFEN near MUNICH at which German Postwar resistance plans were discussed.

B. To facilitate these it was explained that a last minute fusion of A.M.T. ROME 3B and A.M.T. ROME 6 had taken place.

C. Funds had already been planted in SOUTH AMERICA mainly in the ARGENTINE and would be made available in due course for financing agents. Trustworthy key-men to distribute this money had already been sent SWITZERLAND and ? SPAIN.

D. To lie low for a period and then to start organizing in ? various countries nationalistic movements wherever possible ? with anti-Bolshevik trend.

E. Object of this would be to create unrest complicate Allies post war task and eventually lead to state of civil war in which Fourth Reich would re-emerge.

ACTION PROPOSED

F. Subject instructed endeavour reach MADRID and contact French agent in Ritz Hotel MADRID, who is probably to you JEAN RADENAC, a former friend of his from PARIS working for S.D., or Andre HERVO.

G. ROME only: subject now being evacuated to ANCONA as prisoner of war. Suggest on the receipt questionnaire from LONDON have him brought C.S.D.I.C. ROME and ? specially interrogated.

V.F. 26.6.45.

2-7-45

12a
(PF.601,267
(PF.602,295
HUC (PF.602,431 ✓ file
26.6.45

V.F.

Reference Amazon 536 of 23.6.45. on VERNUNFT. It is noted that para C refers to ZSCHUNKE, whom VERNUNFT states attended a meeting at Munich on 15th April. This ZSCHUNKE is of course identical with ZSCHUNKE who was recently reported as having contacted FRANCK in Brussels. In view of this latter aspect, no doubt you will wish no reference to be made to ZSCHUNKE in our comments to the Field on VERNUNFT's information.

It is interesting to note that MORDRELL is stated in Saint Caserta 2614 of 21st June to have attended a meeting at Munich in the middle of April 1945. Para 2 of this telegram states that an unknown SD Gruppenfuhrer presided at the meeting and indicated that Amt III B and IV were to be fused to promote post-war unrest. As a result of this meeting MORDRELL was sent to Spain via Italy with the ultimate intention of reaching France to carry out his mission.

There may of course be no connection between the ZSCHUNKE operation and that of MORDRELL, but at the same time it is worth while bearing in mind that both missions resulted from meetings held in Munich on presumably the same day. Much would depend on the identity of the SD Gruppen fuhrer who presided at MORDRELL's meeting.

I should be glad to have your comments on the reference to ZSCHUNKE in the VERNUNFT telegram mentioned above.

W.R.C.3a.
27.6.45.

2.7.45.

NAME; ADDRESS; PARTICULARS; INFORMATION	PP.	SUMMARY OF TRACES
RADENAC (cont)		<p>in Nov. '44. Said to have bought a large property there to lodge French collaborationists escaping from France.</p> <p>V.B. sources.</p>
HERVO : HECCKCK	1/4	<p>Pass. i/w HERVO (or HERVE) HERVE Andre, suspect "Gestapo agent. Add: 2 ave. Barthou, Rennes. Said to have been responsible for the liquidation of a Gaullist organization. (Aug. '42). Name appears on a list of what appears to be German agents found inside Sipo and SD office in Rennes. B. 10.12.06 in St. Nazaire. Married; P.N.B. Catholic. In liaison with Dienststelle Paris Abt. VI. Resident in Barcelona. Stated to be President of Secours National Francais and to have funds in a bank in Perpignan (Banque du Roussillon) which belong to Comité Separatiste Breton. Subjects brother-in-law who is the representative of the Persian Govt. in Paris recently deposited to Hervo's account in a Swiss Bank the sum of 700,000 francs. 8.12.44 Breton autonomist. At present in Spain interned by the S.I.M. in a concentration camp, following denunciation by RADENAC. Had been with R. in the Ste. "Isolation Thermique et Acoustique".</p> <p style="text-align: right;">enb/W, RC, 3.</p>

SECRET

WAR ROOM

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Sent 21. 6. 45
Received 21. 6. 45 (WRX-22/1515)
Channel OSS.....

Reference SAINT CASERTA 25614
Case Officer WRC 3
File 602, 421. HHC

CASERTA

TO: SAINT, WASHINGTON. ALSO TO WASHINGTON 53654
PARIS 15954

INFO: LONDON, MADRID NR.30. PARIS NR.1594

FROM: SAINT, ROME

RELAY OF ROME NR.1807 (BB003)

C. 20030.

*V. 2. 16 de Coetlogon 12:3.
521 France/2. 12:3.
75/2 France/10. 152.
P. 2091.*

1. FRENCH SD AGENT OLIVIER MORDRELL, ALIAS JEAN MAUREY, OTTO MEISLER, HAS MERTENS CONFERENCE AT DEISENHOFEN NEAR MUNICH IN MIDDLE OF APRIL 1945.

2. UNKNOWN S.Y. GRUPPENFUEHRER WHO PRESIDED, INDICATED AMT III B AND AMT IV WERE FUSED TO PROMOTE POST-WAR UNREST. TRUSTWORTHY MEN ALREADY SENT TO LIVE IN SPAIN AND SWITZERLAND FOR DISTRIBUTION OF MONEY.

3. PROGRAM TO ORGANIZE NATIONALISTIC MOVEMENTS WITH ANTI-BOLSHEVISTIC FRONT TO CULMINATE IN CIVIL WARS. MAIN PURPOSE TO RENDER ALL POST WAR TASKS DIFFICULT, PERMITTING NAZIS PARTY REAPPEAR

CONT

DISTRIBUTION

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1 CARD

1 JUL 1945

ACTION 4 WRC

2-7-45

100

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Reference

Case Officer

File _____

- 2 -

100, 479 Kautz. 10.
PF. 60.500 1940. 22.
25. 1940. 22.

100, 479 Kautz. 10.
PF. 60.500 1940. 22.
25. 1940. 22.

100, 479 Kautz. 10.
PF. 60.500 1940. 22.
25. 1940. 22.

6. H E R V O, BRETON CIVILIAN, BORN IN PARIS, 42 YEARS.
BEGAN ECONOMIC DEALS WITH T O D T MAKING 20,000,000 LY AUTUMN 1943.
FLED TO P E R P E R P I G N A N TO ESCAPE TO SPAIN. WIFE REMAINED IN
ST.BRIEUX, BRITTANY.

CONT.

DISTRIBUTION

file
SUMMARY OF TRACES.

SECRET

Date: 23.6.45. Name: MORDRELLE Olivier
Reference: Telephone Look Up File No.: PF.602.431

NAME; ADDRESS; PARTICULARS; INFORMATION	pp.	SUMMARY OF TRACES
MORDRELLE Olivier @ MAUREY Jean		S.F.52/France/2 Link Vol.1 c.s. PF.600,237 VISSAULT de COETLOGON Vols. 1,2 & 3 c.s. SF.75/France/10 V.1 10a.11a,12a. V.2 c.s. PF.63091 c.s. (C.R) SHAFF Card 80,030.
MEISTER Otto		N.L.T.
MERTENS Hans		? MARTIN Hans SF.52/France/13 c.s.
RADENAC Pierre		Id/w Pierre RADENAC SF.52/France/9 c.s. PF.600,500 BRANDEL Otto c.s. PF.600,847 KAUTZ c.s.
HERVO		Poss: id/w HERVE @ HECTOR @ HERBE PF.600,237 VISSAULT de COETLOGON Vols. 1 & 2 c.s.

MES/H2C/23.6.45.

MINUTE SHEET

14 602,431 / Mordrelle
CX 12799/0/0
Source 9a
No.
Date

DISTRIBUTION

W.R.C.3.a.

7a
Please refer to my minute 12799/0/C of 3.6.45.

We have now received from our representative in Italy the following additional information about Olivier MORDRELLE:-

MORDRELLE, Olivier, born 1901 Paris at present held C.S.D.L.C. Florence for tactical interrogation.

From 1918 Breton separatist. 7 September 1939 moved to Germany @ MAURY. January 1940 organised propaganda for Hungary.

After various moves interviewed January 1941 by 7Abwehr Berlin and chose collaboration rather than R.L. March 1941 passed on to S.D. and agreed to avoid politics.

October 1943 met Van ETTEN, ex-member of Dutch S.S.

October 1944, Abt. III B Berlin tried to make him recruit agents among French in Germany. 1945 member DORIOT Committee of Liberation.

? April 1945 accepted ? offer of Stubaf. PERRY to work with Abt. III B and IV in combined plan for post-war world disorder.

ACTION PROPOSED

V.F.7.
6.6.45.

25 JUN 1945

one
1-7-45 ✓

Copy.

P.F. 601,840.

1A Nordelle
602,431

V.P.5 - Mr. Townsend.

Reference our telephone conversation of today,
herewith spare copy of Adolf WLF report for your retention.

8a

We should appreciate it if NORDELLE could be interrogated on the following points : -

- (1) What does he know of the organisation of the European underground movement as described by WLF ?
- (2) Does he consider it to be strictly speaking an Amt III operation, or an RSHA operation being set up by Amt III personnel ?
- (3) What were his specific missions and to what purpose ?
- (4) To whom was he to report and through what channels ?
- (5) Did he come in contact with many Amt III personnel ?
(Mr. Ferguson considers that by hiring foreign agents, Amt III have blown their own very secret organisation which we considered to be our biggest post-occupational menace because personnel were largely known to us).
- (6) Does he consider that this espionage network was set up on the principle that there would be some form of German government functioning after the surrender ?
Or was it organised to operate regardless of any central governmental agency remaining ?

Jane Winslow.

W.R.C.3d
3.6.45.

25 JUN 1945

and
1.7.45.

7a

The following information will no doubt be of interest to you in connection with Adolf WULF (FP. 601,840).

In WULF's interrogation report he states that a certain Olivier MORDRELL was connected with the Amt III post-war underground movement which he describes. We have been informed by our representative in Rome that Olivier MORDRELL @ Olier MORDREL @ MAURY described as "before the war No. 2 and later head of the Breton separatist movement" has been captured in Italy. He states that he fled to Belgium and Germany in September 1939 and for the next five years was constantly in touch with the Abwehr and later with IIIB, RSNA, alternately as collaborator and as suspect. In early 1945 he was in Germany and fled south fearing French reprisals. He claims that prior to the German collapse he was appointed by SA Major FINEY as French representative for post-war activities of the CD. He was told to make his way to North Italy and thence to Madrid where he would make his first contacts.

It is clear from the above that this offers confirmation of WULF's story; MORDRELL is at present being held by C.S.D.I.C in Italy.

V.F.7
3.6.45.

DISTRIBUTION

- W.R.C.3.a.

ACTION PROPOSED

25 JUN 1945

and
1.7.45/

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6a

75/France/10/B.1H/G

B.H. Townshend Esq.,
S.I.S.

As requested in your ⁴² [redacted]
of May 30th, I attach a note of the questions
we should like put to MORDREL.

Our interest in this character is due to the close link between the Irish Nationalists and the Breton Nationalists, whose language and customs were very similar to their own, and who shared their desire for complete national independence. By asking the Breton leader who his contacts were in Ireland, we hope to find out who are the most ardent Nationalists in Ireland, and on whom the Germans, after successfully penetrating the various Celtic movements, would have relied in Ireland to help them in the overthrow of Great Britain.

2.6.45

RG/KBP

E. Oak.

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5a

Olivier MORDREL

Age 37/38: short: fair hair: fresh complexion: thin face: wears glasses: nervous and excitable temperament: married with five children. Architect.

Before the war was with Francois DEBEAUVAIS, leader of the Breton Separatist Movement and organiser of the weekly paper "Breiz Atao". On the outbreak of war these two men left France for Belgium in order to avoid arrest by the French Authorities and in May 1940 both were condemned to death, in their absence, by a French Military Court.

After the fall of France DEBEAUVAIS and MORDREL returned to Brittany, under the protection of the Germans, and set up the nucleus of a Breton Government at Rennes. In spite of the release of large numbers of Breton prisoners of war and extensive propaganda in the form of a new periodical "L'heure Bretonne" MORDREL and DEBEAUVAIS did not gain many recruits, and the Germans, realising they would never get very far with these two, dismissed them from their posts in the autumn of 1940, and in their place elected Raymond DELAPORTE who followed a more moderate policy.

1st June 1945

We should like MORDREL to be asked the following questions on the connection between the Breton Nationalists and the Irish Nationalists (the I.R.A.).

1. In 1924 MORDREL and a fellow student from Paris named Marcel were invited to represent Brittany at a Celtic Congress in Dublin. What was the full name of Marcel, where did they stay in Ireland, and what were their expenses. Did they contact any members of the I.R.A.?

2. After leaving Ireland MORDREL and his companion went to Swansea to visit the Welsh Representatives to the Celtic Congress. Who were their contacts in Wales?

3. A Breton Nationalist living in Ireland named Leo Victor MILLARDEN has admitted during an interrogation, that while visiting Brittany in 1935 he had a discussion with MORDREL and DEBEAUVAIS regarding the finances of the Breton Movement. They advised him that they were in a position to get money from a German source, but would have to receive it under cover in order that it should not be traced by the French Authorities. MILLARDEN arranged with them to receive this money and lodge it to his account in Dublin, and at the same time authorize his brother Robert MILLARDEN, who lived at Quingamp, Brittany, to release a like amount to them from the debt due to him by his brother following the purchase of his business.

6.11.35	marked "Payment from Rotterdam"	£65. 5. 4.
29.11.35	" " " "	£64.10. 3.
27.12.35	" "per Wilhelm in het Parkhuis, Dulseldorf"	£65. 6. 6.
31.1.36	" "per Wilhelm in het Parkhuis, Venlo"	£65. 2. 0.

For the purpose of advising his brother that he had received the money he had arranged some normal business phrase which he cannot now remember, on receipt of which the amount would be paid over to MORDREL or DEBEAUVAIS in Brittany. After the fourth payment he reconsidered the position and refused to continue the arrangement.

What does MORDREL know of MILLARDEN? Can he confirm the arrangements mentioned above and did he have any dealings with MILLARDEN after January 1936?

4. For what purpose did the Breton Nationalist Herve GOFF, a lawyer, visit Ireland in 1936? He is known to have visited MILLARDEN, whose address he obtained from the Breton Nationalist Party.

5. In 1937 GOFF called on MILLARDEN again, according to a German journalist called Gerhardt von TEVENAR. MORDREL know this latter man?

6. Has MORDREL ever heard of an Irishman named JAMES DONOVAN? What was his connection with the Breton Nationalist Party?

5a

- (photograph attached)
7. A young Breton named Guy VISSAULT de COETLOGON, who has acted as an agent for the Germans, has stated that there was a definite link between the Irish Nationalists and the Breton Separatists, though it was a sentimental rather than an active one, and that the people in Ireland most concerned were Frank RYAN, Sidney IEVERS, Radcliffe DUGAN, and members of the MULCAHY family in Sligo. What does MORDREL know about any of these people? (A short resume of our information about them will be found in an addendum to this questionnaire).
 8. Does MORDREL know of anyone else in Ireland who was connected with the Breton Nationalist Party?
 9. Has MORDREL himself visited Ireland since 1924, or does he know of anyone else who had done so on behalf of the Breton Nationalists?
 10. In July 1940, in December 1940 and March 1941 VISSAULT claims to have met MORDREL in Rennes. What is the latter's opinion of VISSAULT?
 11. On the second and third occasions when VISSAULT visited MORDREL, he found that he had staying with him an Irishman named Frank RYAN, who was introduced as one of the heads of the I.R.A. Later VISSAULT learnt that RYAN was at that time directing the Irish Section of the Abwehr. What was RYAN doing in MORDREL's house at Rennes? Did MORDREL know of his connection with the Abwehr?
 12. Has MORDREL ever met or heard of two brothers from Kornelimunster, Germany named Jupp and Viktor HOVEN (sometimes known as the OWEN brothers). Jupp HOVEN was a frequent visitor to Ireland before the war, where he had contacts in Nationalist circles, and in 1941 was trying to build up an Abwehr organisation in Ireland to collect information and create unrest as an embarrassment to the English. He was also interested in the Breton Nationalist question, and intended to form sabotage groups for work in Brittany.
 13. In February 1943 VISSAULT met MORDREL in Paris who gave him some journalistic work to do, and then the following month introduced him in his flat in the Avenue George V to Hauptcharfuhrer ZUANG who belonged to Hauptamt 6H of the S.D. What does MORDREL know of ZUANG?
 14. ZUANG introduced VISSAULT to Standartenfuhrer BICKLER, the Chief of Hauptamt VI who asked him, in view of his interest in the Celtic problem, to create and train a sabotage group to operate under the orders of the S.D. VISSAULT was introduced to the five prospective agents, three of whom were known as ALBERT, RENE and PIERRE, and gave them a month's instruction in sabotage, passing on to them what he himself had learnt from the Abwehr. VISSAULT presumed these men were destined to work as German agents in Ireland. Can MORDREL supply the full names of these five agents and say what eventually happened to them?

5a

15. Has MORDREL heard of any espionage expeditions being sent to Ireland ?
16. VISSAULT has stated that the liaison between Berlin, Ireland and Brittany depended on MORDREL, DEBEAUVAIS and LAINE (leader of the Jeunesse Bretonne). What was the exact part which MORDREL played in the German scheme for organising an espionage network in Ireland ?
17. What does MORDREL know of Dr. HALLER, the Abteilung II official and Dr. Otto WAGNER, another member of the Abwehr who were both interested in exploiting the Celtic minorities. Dr. VOGT @ MARTENS who was also interested in Celtic problems?
18. What does MORDREL know of the Breton Fred MOYSE who was in contact with Nationalists in Ireland before the war ?
19. The Keltische Gesellschaft was originally a movement that was solely interested in encouraging Celtic languages, art and customs, but in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war it was penetrated by the German Intelligence Service who regarded it as a good cover for their own activities. Has MORDREL any comments to make on this ?

5a

A D D E N D U M

Frank RYAN.

Prominent member of the I.R.A. Leader of the Irish Brigade who fought on the Communist side during the Spanish Civil War. Taken prisoner by Franco, he was released in 1940 at the request of the Germans and taken to Germany, where he is believed to have worked for the Abwehr. Died in a Dresden sanatorium June 1944.

Sidney IEVERS.

Young Irishman who, in 1937, was studying philology at the Sorbonne. Introduced VISSAULT into Irish Nationalist circles in Ireland. At present in America.

Radcliffe DUGAN.

Manxman and a member of the I.R.A. He was given a mission by the Germans to sabotage ships at Brest in November 1939. Was imprisoned at Brest where VISSAULT met him while also serving a term of imprisonment. Later escaped.

MULCAHY Family, Oakfield, Sligo.

This family consisted of a father and mother with four daughters, all of whom were ardent Nationalists. They made a point of offering hospitality to foreign students. One of the daughters is now married to a German named Helmut CLISSMANN, connected with the German Foreign Office and lives in Denmark.

16/1/44

4a

A telegram from Rome dated May 25th has informed us that Olivier MORDRELLIE @ Olier MORDREL @ MAURY has surrendered himself and has been sent to Florence. We have replied asking to have him held at CSDIC, Italy, for interrogation.

MORDRELLIE volunteered the following particulars regarding his movements since the war:-

In September 1939 he fled to Belgium and then to Germany and spent the next five years in constant contact with the Abwehr and subsequently with Abt.IIIB of the RSHA, being treated alternately as a collaborator or a suspect. Early in 1945 he was in Germany and fled South fearing French reprisals. He claims that prior to the German collapse he was appointed by SS Major Percy as French representative for post-war activities of the S.D. He was then told to make for Northern Italy and thence to Madrid, where he would make his first contacts.

The field describes MORDRELLIE as intelligent and as having a wide knowledge of the S.D.

I am informing Rome that we shall not require MORDRELLIE to be brought to the U.K., but that we shall be sending out a questionnaire as soon as possible. Perhaps you would let me know what questions you would like put to him. I understand that it takes about a week for documents to reach Florence.

A letter on the same lines has already been sent to M.I.5.

MORDRELLIE, you will recall, was mentioned in the 020 Interrogation of Guy de Vissault de Coetlegon.

V.B.5.
31.5.45.

25 JUN 1945

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W.R.

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G2/X/1358.

663

From DUBLIN:

Enclosed find a note on O. MORDREL, the first paragraph of which is entirely based on information contained in "Ouest-Informations" the second paragraph relates to a visit to Ireland a very long time ago. Your PP 600,237/B.1.H. refers.

.....
Olier Oliver MORDREL.

1. Director of "STUR" - "Revue d'Etudes Nationales Bretonne". Contributed signed or initialled articles to "Ouest-Informations" - "Bulletin de Presse".

"Ouest-Informations", No.5, May, 1940, under the heading "Bretagne", of which the following is a condensed translation:

"F. DEBAUVAIS and O. MORDREL are condemned to death..

On May 7th the Military Tribunal of Rennes tried by contumacy and behind closed doors, F. DeBauvais and O. Mordrel, prosecuted for reconstitution of dissolved societies, provocation of soldiers to desertion, attempt on the external security of the state, and treason.

Both were condemned to the penalty of death. (1)

(Footnote (1) - O. Mordrel was formally condemned besides to 6 months' imprisonment and confiscation of his property, for desertion in time of war).

This condemnation has caused a great sensation in Brittany.

The condemned, who since 1919 are at the head of the Breton national movement, enjoy an undoubted prestige among their compatriots. Their names are intimately connected with that of the journal Breiz Atao, which was one of their best weapons and the title of which rings in the ears of the Breton people as a slogan of liberation.

..... On December 14 of the same year (1938) O. Mordrel and DeBauvais were again prosecuted together for the campaign they had carried on in September against "the war for the Czechs against the will of the Breton people". They were both condemned to a year's imprisonment and heavy fines. Mordrel benefited by the law of "sursis".

During the period of tension which preceded the war, the French Government took "security" measures against the Breton movement. The arrests began from the 15th August. DeBauvais and Mordrel, particularly under the attention of the police, had to go abroad in order to avoid spending the duration of the war in prison, if not a more radical fate.....

But DeBauvais and Mordrel had not betoken themselves to neutral countries merely to await passively the end of the European drama. They organised in several states, neighbouring France, centres of action which diffused abundantly a "Declaration" signed by their names, dated October 25th, 1939, in which appeared inter alia:

"The head of the French Government said in his speech of September 21 that 'Germany had found some traitors in Brittany'. He lied. The men who for more than a century have dedicated their lives to the revival of the language and the national consciousness of Brittany are not in the service of any foreign interest. And we, as heirs of the Bretons who have fought France for fifteen centuries, answer him that treason in the eyes of true Bretons would be to serve France, which wishes to annihilate our country".

In addition they published a monthly press bulletin, "Ouest-Informations", which brought to every country, even to America, news of the oppressed nationalities of the West, in particular Brittany, Alsace and Ireland.

The French police must have immediately become uneasy at this energetic and continued action. It pursued enquiries in Belgium, Holland, and Italy, trying to discover the refuge of the Breton chief, and above all to establish so-called proofs of their collusion with German agents.....

II. As far back as 1924, Mordrel appears to have been well known from his well-informed writings on Breton subjects. In that year a Celtic Congress was to be held in Dublin. The Breton delegates invited, one Chafrenu (?) a cider manufacturer from a village in Brittany and his wife, and two students from Paris named MARCEL and MORDREL, /intimated that they could not come unless their expenses were paid. (sic) = who(?) This was agreed to, and they were informed that hospitality during their stay in Dublin was arranged. Mordrel and Marcel telegraphed from Paris for £20, which, though considered a large sum, was sent them.

The appearance of MM. Mordrel and Marcel on their arrival (they travelled third class) caused some disappointment - they looked more like Paris gamins than serious Celtologists. They stayed with a well known professor, who a few days after the Congress informed his colleagues that his Breton guests were eager to visit an Irish college in the Gaeltacht, but had no money. It was arranged to send them to Donegal, and comfortable lodgings were found for them. About a week after it was discovered that they had "painted the Gweedore district red". They procured quantities of gin by the bottle, and had "an unpleasant French outlook, especially on morality". They held seances in farm houses, in which they claimed to raise the spirits, not only of Messrs. Gordon, Booth or de Kuyper, but also of dead Irish leaders. They were consigned immediately back to Dublin, and an express letter was sent to the professor to pack them back to France as soon as possible.

They left Dublin, on their way to visit the Welsh representatives at Swansea. It was later learned from the latter that they had packed MM. Mordrel and Marcel, much to their surprise, incontinently out of Wales.

Marcel was a student of architecture, and Mordrel the son of a general in the French Army.

Some time after this Congress, it was elicited by a chance remark from the late Lord Ashbourne that he also had given them £20 to enable them to get to Dublin.

The cidermaking delegate threatened legal proceedings against the committee of the Congress to secure the sum of £47 for his expenses - he also was eventually given some £20.

At the ill-fated Congress at Dinard in 1938, one of the Irish representatives was approached by Marcel, then apparently a successful architect, though still a devotee of the bottle, to say that he had long since broken completely with Mordrel.

N.B.

NEW CARD ☐

AMENDMENT TO SHAEF No. 2a

Name: MONDRELLE, Olier or Olivier
 @ MONDREL @ MODREL @ MONDREL @ LAUNAY

Sta.	Col.	Germany:
Fr.	B	GERMANY

Status: SD agent (1945)

Address:

Description: B.c. 1905/09. Height 5'7" (1.70 m); dark hair, going bald; black eyes; thin Bourbon lip; withered face; rather heavy step. Also reported: Short fair hair, fresh complexion, thin face, glasses, excitable.

Misc: Ex-airman. Lived in MONTPELLIER. "Dumb but thinks himself bright". Architect. Leader of Breton Autonomists. Married.

Career: Left FRANCE, as condemned to death by Military court at RENNES for anti-French activities (1939). Returned to FRANCE with German occupation (1940). Collaborator of Dr. BICKER (qv), Chief of Amt. VI of SD in PARIS. Director of "Stur" - Nazi political magazine (1944). Employee in Dienststelle III B 1b (Nov 44). Trained at ORGANISATION TECHNIQUE Camp at WALD: Org. used by Amt VI for sabotage purposes (Mar 45).

ShaeF No. 80,030

File Copy
 V.R. Form 1

Source: WR/Ref. 1.7.45

Name: **NORDRELL,**

COMPLETE INFORMATION CARD

Alias: **NORDRELL,**

Race: **French.**
Date: **c. 1905/10.**

S 80,030

Age:

Sex:

Occupation: **SD agent**

Arvi

DOB: **Mar/45. Agent trained at ORGANISATION TECHNIQUE Camp at WALD; Org. used by G-2 for sabotage purposes.**

Ref: **Ex-airman. Lived in Montpellier.**

Source - WRO2 Appendix to Note on O.T.

W.R.E. 1

Ans
1-7-45

The OSS and Project SAFEHAVEN

Donald P. Steury

**“
The fear was that the
German political and
economic leadership,
sensing defeat, would act
to secretly transfer blocs
of industrial and fiscal
capital to neutral
countries, thereby
escaping confiscation
and the reparations bill.
”**

Donald P. Steury is a CIA Officer in Residence at the University of Southern California.

By the fall of 1944, it was obvious that the war in Europe was in its final year. In France, British and American forces had broken out of Normandy and were driving toward Paris and the Rhein. In the East, the Soviet Army was expanding its control westward across Europe. All over the Continent, Allied domination of the air was complete, and in the North Atlantic the back of the German *U-Bootwaffe* was finally broken. Policymakers had started to think of the peace. Future stability seemed to depend on taking measures to ensure that Germany would not provoke a third world war. Already the "German problem" was dominating Allied political thinking. In the United States, the War Department and the Department of Justice were making plans and drawing up lists for the postwar war crimes trials. At the Department of the Treasury, Secretary Henry Morgenthau had completed his scheme for the wholesale destruction of Germany's military and industrial power and its re-creation as a feudal, agrarian state. More immediately, in the wartime Foreign Economic Administration (FEA), a small group of policymakers were putting the finishing touches on Project SAFEHAVEN, an operation designed to root out and neutralize German industrial and commercial power wherever it might be found.

The origins of SAFEHAVEN are to be found in two memorandums sent from the FEA to the Departments of State and Treasury on 5

and 17 May 1944, proposing an interagency program to track down and block German assets in neutral and nonbelligerent countries throughout Europe and the Americas.¹ The fear was that the German political and economic leadership, sensing defeat, would act to transfer secretly blocs of industrial and fiscal capital to neutral countries, thereby escaping confiscation and the reparations bill. If this happened, German economic and industrial power would be largely intact and would act as a power base from which an unrepentant German leadership could build a resurgent Fourth Reich in 20 years. The military defeat of Germany thus would again be meaningless.

An Ambitious Program

The overriding goal of SAFEHAVEN was to make it impossible for Germany to start another war. Its immediate goals were to force those neutrals trading with Nazi Germany into compliance with the regulations imposed by the Allied economic blockade and to identify the points of clandestine German economic penetration. Implementation of SAFEHAVEN depended on action in four major areas:

- To restrict German economic penetration outside the borders of the Reich.
- To prevent Germany from sequestering assets in neutral countries.

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- To ensure that German assets would be available for postwar reparations and the rebuilding of Europe.
- To prevent the escape of those members of the Nazi ruling elite who had already been marked down for war crimes trials.²

In August and September 1944, directives were sent out to American legations throughout Europe and the Americas setting forth the goals of SAFEHAVEN and instructing Embassy officials to take steps to implement them.³

It is quite clear that SAFEHAVEN planners had a good idea of what they wanted to achieve, but it also is apparent that they did not have the slightest idea of how to do it. Although it was evident from the outset that SAFEHAVEN would be primarily an intelligence-gathering problem, it does not appear to have occurred to anyone to consult the intelligence services, which were excluded from the planning and implementation of SAFEHAVEN until the end of November 1944.⁴ Bureaucratic rivalries predominated. Indeed, SAFEHAVEN was nearly destroyed by internecine quarrels among the FEA, State, and Treasury, each of which wanted to control the program and to exclude the other two from any participation.

State Versus Treasury

The antagonism between the State Department and the Treasury was particularly rancorous and derived from deeper, fundamental

differences over postwar policy toward Germany. Reflecting the views of Secretary Morgenthau, opinion in the Treasury Department favored a punitive peace that would destroy German military and industrial power once and for all. The State Department was fundamentally opposed to this, arguing that a powerful but pacified Germany was necessary to maintain stability in Europe and to contain the USSR. Because it cut across political as well as economic and fiscal lines of substance, SAFEHAVEN brought out these differences in a forum in which they were incapable of resolution.

Jockeying for position reached a peak in August, when FEA official Samuel Klaus set out on a factfinding tour of Allied and neutral capitals accompanied only by State Department official Herbert J. Cummings, with the Treasury Department deliberately excluded from participation.⁵ It found out anyway, and two Treasury officials set out in hot pursuit of the Klaus mission, catching up with it in London. Klaus grudgingly allowed them to accompany him to Stockholm, but he refused to permit them to continue further with his delegation. Undeterred, the two Treasury Department officials followed Klaus to Spain. This was too much for Klaus, who canceled the

remainder of his trip and returned to Washington.

In his report, filed on 21 October 1944, Klaus criticized efforts to implement SAFEHAVEN to date and cited his belief that Embassy personnel were not devoting sufficient energy to the project. The situation was worse in Spain, where US Ambassador Carlton J. Hayes was accused of actively blocking implementation of SAFEHAVEN, although Spain was “beyond question the country in which the most damaging SAFEHAVEN activities are going on and may be expected.”⁶

Both Treasury and State rejected Klaus’s report for their separate reasons, and a flurry of bureaucratic maneuvering dominated SAFEHAVEN for the rest of the year.

OSS Becomes Involved

Although the end result of the bureaucratic battle was the emergence of the State Department as the organization principally responsible for SAFEHAVEN, from the intelligence standpoint the most important step taken was to centralize intelligence and data collection in the US Embassy in London.⁷ As a part of this move, the decision was finally taken to invite the formal participation of the OSS. Once the OSS was brought into the SAFEHAVEN fold, all the advantages of a centralized intelligence organization were brought to bear. Most important, dissemination of intelligence improved, as did evaluation of the sources from which the raw intelligence data was collected.

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Within the OSS, SAFEHAVEN fell largely under the aegis of the Secret Intelligence (SI) Branch, responsible for the gathering of intelligence from clandestine sources inside neutral and German-occupied Europe. But the unique character of SAFEHAVEN, which was both an attempt to prevent the postwar German economic penetration of foreign economies and an intelligence-gathering operation, meant that the OSS counterintelligence branch, X-2, also had an important role to play. SAFEHAVEN thus emerged as a joint SI/X-2 operation shortly after its inception, especially in the key OSS outposts in Switzerland, Spain, and Portugal, with X-2 not infrequently playing the dominant role.⁸ X-2 was particularly active in reporting on clandestine German projects to acquire important economic and industrial assets in neutral countries. These efforts intensified as Germany's military fortunes waned, especially from September 1944 onward, as the advance of Allied armies threatened to sever Germany's land links with important sources of strategic materials in southeastern Europe and the Iberian Peninsula.

In fact, the inception of SAFEHAVEN meant little more than a redirection of intelligence assets already dedicated to the collection of economic intelligence. The OSS had been collecting economic intelligence similar to that required by SAFEHAVEN since 1942 as a part of the general effort to understand the functioning of the German war economy. Gold transfers in particular were a key part of that economy. Suffering from an acute

shortage of certain key strategic resources since the proclamation of the Four-Year Plan and the onset of autarky in 1936, the German armaments industry increasingly had had to resort to specie payments or barter agreements to pay for imports of these materials since before the outbreak of the war. Conquest of Europe had done little to alleviate most of these shortages.

Moreover, due to the inefficiency of the Nazi regime—full mobilization for war production had not been achieved until 1944—the war production index for that year was nearly three times that of 1941, itself a significant increase over 1939-40.⁹ Paradoxically, therefore, the German appetite for oil, high-grade iron ore, wolfram (tungsten ore), and other strategic materials grew insatiably, even as German industry reeled under the onslaught of the Allied strategic bombing campaign and the territory under German control shrank.

In their search for war materials, Nazi leaders extended their net throughout Europe. High-grade iron ore and copper was imported from Sweden; iron ore from Poland, Austria, and Spain; wolfram from Portugal and Spain; and chromium from Turkey. Voluntarily or involuntarily, every nation in Europe fed the German war

machine with the raw materials it needed to function. Switzerland, however, was the central connecting link.

The Importance of Switzerland

In Nazi Europe, neutral Switzerland carried out business as usual, providing the international banking channels that facilitated the transfer of gold, currencies, and commodities between nations. Always heavily dependent on Swiss cooperation to pay for imports, the Reich became even more so as the ultimate defeat of the National Socialist regime became obvious and neutrals grew more wary of cooperating with the Axis belligerents. Since early 1943, Swiss cooperation had become essential as other neutrals responded to Allied pressure and refused to exchange war materials for specie. As defeat loomed, neutrals also became increasingly reluctant to accept payment in Reichsmarks. This left payment in foreign currency, of which Nazi Germany had precious little after nearly a decade of autarky and war.

In this critical situation, the Swiss banks acted as clearinghouses whereby German gold—much of which was looted from occupied countries—could be converted to a more suitable medium of exchange. An intercepted Swiss diplomatic cable shows how, allegedly without inquiring as to its origin, the Swiss National Bank helped the German Reichsbank convert some

\$15 million in (probably) looted Dutch gold into liquid assets:

In May 1943 (the Swiss National Bank) sold to the Turkish CENTRAL BANK 256 bars (of gold) amounting to 14.8 million francs, which were taken over previously from the German REICHSBANK. This gold was sold back to the German REICHSBANK by the Turkish CENTRAL BANK. Later the German REICHSBANK sold 13.8 million francs of this gold to the BANCO DE PORTUGAL in Lisbon, and one million to the BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS.¹⁰

Initially carried out through more or less routine channels of exchange, German efforts to acquire foreign currency and convert it to war materials became increasingly covert as Allied victory approached. Long-term exchange agreements became impossible, with neutrals willing to trade only on a “cash-and-carry” basis and frequently seeking a means of distancing themselves from their Nazi trading partners. To Allied observers, these covert German activities looked like a conspiracy to build an underground economy—an activity that would have profound implications for SAFEHAVEN. In fact, such efforts represented little more than the desperate attempts of the Nazi leadership to preserve access to vital sources of raw materials and had little to do with visions of a resurgent Fourth Reich. Then, too, individual Germans and German corporations were taking steps to conceal assets in foreign countries to protect them against destruction or seizure by the victorious Allied

armies.¹¹ Although, from the perspective of 50 years, the real motivations behind such efforts seem obvious, to SAFEHAVEN planners they were evidence of a grand conspiracy, one that encompassed the transfer of millions of Reichsmarks’ worth of gold as well as the purchase of individual automobiles in Stockholm and hotels and bank accounts in Portugal.¹² In the end, of course, these fears were groundless. The intelligence collected for SAFEHAVEN, however, proved to be of enormous value in the post-war settling of accounts at Nurnberg and elsewhere and later provided basic building blocks for a historical understanding of the Nazi war economy.

Because the August and September directives implementing SAFEHAVEN treated it as a departmental program—and, to some degree, an intergovernment matter—cooperation on the part of the OSS at first was on an informal basis. Not until 30 November 1944 were instructions sent out to OSS stations alerting them to the intelligence requirements expected to be generated by SAFEHAVEN.¹³ To a large extent, therefore, the collection of SAFEHAVEN material simply piggybacked onto other programs for the collection and processing of raw economic intelligence from sources already in place.

Allen Dulles in Bern

Under these circumstances, it is scarcely surprising that implementation of SAFEHAVEN measures depended largely upon the personalities of the OSS chiefs of mission and the conditions under which

they operated. In Bern, the heart of the Swiss banking and German gold transfer activity, the OSS chief was Allen W. Dulles, later (1953 to 1962) Director of Central Intelligence. An East Coast brahmin with extensive prewar ties to European banking circles, Dulles spent his tenure in Bern constructing an “old-boy” network of sources that extended throughout neutral and Axis-occupied Europe. It was an astonishingly successful system, ideally suited to his situation in neutral Switzerland and well conceived to gain access to European government and business circles. For example, Dulles counted among his close personal friends no less a personage than Thomas B. McKittrick, President of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), in Basel. A multinational corporation created to manage international currency and gold exchanges, BIS was the single-largest channel for gold transfers in prewar and wartime Europe. McKittrick also was an OSS source who provided Dulles with “comfortable access” to thinking of the bankers most responsible for moving German assets throughout Europe.¹⁴ Among other kinds of information, McKittrick kept Dulles informed of the comings and goings of *Reichsbank*vizepräsident Emil Puhl, the architect of the German gold transfer arrangements.¹⁵

Other well-placed sources available to Dulles in high European financial circles included Dr. Eduard Waetjen, Abwehr agent, member of the German resistance, and commercial adviser to the German Consul General from 15 February 1945;¹⁶ Maurice Villars, General Director of the Zurich

Electro-Bank; and Swedish economist and Economic Adviser to the BIS, Dr. Per Jacobsson, who was close to (the surprisingly extensive) Japanese diplomatic and business circles in Switzerland. In 1945, Jacobsson provided information that helped to scuttle a Japanese attempt to buy vitally needed ball bearings in Sweden and later served with Maurice Vilar as a mediator for Japanese peace feelers put forward in Switzerland.¹⁷

Such contacts were clearly important, but it also seems clear that the high value Dulles attributed to them—whether because of his social prejudices or his concern for the intelligence they provided—made him wary of intelligence activities such as SAFEHAVEN. Moreover, Dulles looked forward to a postwar settlement that envisioned the United States working closely with European business and banking circles to reshape Western and Central Europe according to American interests. Finally, Dulles could legitimately claim that his staff was already overburdened by the collection of strategic and military intelligence. On 28 December 1944, following receipt of the OSS memorandum regarding cooperation with State's SAFEHAVEN project, he cabled Washington:

Work on this project required careful planning as it might defeat direct intelligence activities and close important channels for German SI.... Today we must fish in troubled waters and maintain contacts with persons suspected of working with Nazis on such matters. For example, ... both 496¹⁸ and X-2 here

can be useful under cover but believe idea of working practically as agents of Commercial Attache and Consul General Zurich, on this project would be unwise. Further, to deal effectively with matter, it would require special staff with new cover.... At present we do not have adequate personnel to do effective job in this field and meet other demands.¹⁹

Strategic Intelligence

In part because Dulles was already fully occupied with his existing requirements for strategic intelligence reporting, in part, no doubt, because of his unwillingness to give SAFEHAVEN material the attention Washington believed it deserved, responsibility for this task in Bern was delegated to X-2.²⁰ Fortuitously, the restoration of access to Switzerland through France in November 1944 made it possible for the first X-2 operative in Switzerland to enter the country by the end of the year.²¹ By January 1945, X-2 was up and running in Switzerland, and by April it was able to provide OSS Washington with an extensive summary of Nazi gold and currency transfers arranged via Switzerland through most of the war.²² According to X-2, these included:

- Gold and bonds looted by the Nazis from all over Europe and received by certain Swiss banks.
- Funds sent by the Deutsche Verkehrs-Kreditbank of Karlsruhe to Basel.

- Securities held in Zurich by private firms for the Nazi Party.
- Large quantities of Swiss francs credited to private accounts in various Swiss banks.
- Money and property held in Liechtenstein.
- More than 2 million francs held by the Reichsbank in Switzerland.
- Forty-five million Reichsmarks held in covert Swiss bank accounts.

Apart from the obvious official transactions, these sums were brought in by German and Swiss banks and business organizations. X-2 reported only a few cases where private individuals, some of whom were believed to be with German intelligence organizations, participated. Methods used included smuggling, diplomatic pouches, undercover exchange of foreign currencies, Swiss bank accounts and trusts, sales of paintings and other valuables, and the black market.²³

From the end of 1944, SAFEHAVEN reporting originated by X-2 appeared alongside other reporting provided by Dulles's SI operation in Bern. Although Dulles's SI organization provided substantial SAFEHAVEN intelligence material,²⁴ it was swamped in a sea of other reporting on strategic and military topics: war damage to German industry; the status of German synthetic oil refining operations; how the German Reichsbahn was maintaining rail services despite extensive bomb damage; order-of-battle and operational intelligence

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on German forces in Italy and on the Western Front (for which Bern was the principal source); political intelligence on the Fascist Italian Social Republic (the puppet regime founded in 1944 after Mussolini's fall from power and subsequent rescue by German commandos); contacts with the German resistance; and—not least—from March 1945, the negotiations leading to the surrender of Axis forces in Italy.²⁵

Lieutenant Casey's Activities

By the end of 1944, reporting on the Reich from OSS Bern was being augmented by material from the SI mission in London. Dependent on agent reporting from within Germany itself, the intelligence collection by the sources available to SI London of necessity was somewhat problematic until mid-September 1944, when the liberation of Paris and much of France provided new avenues for attacking the German target. SI London moved to Paris, where it was designated SI European Theater of Operations (ETO). Its chief was then-Navy Lt. William J. Casey. The son of a Tammany Hall politician, Casey was a feisty Irishman who lacked the family connections of his counterpart in Bern.

Casey's vision of the postwar world saw the United States playing business interests in Germany against each other and against Communist and Socialist-led labor unions.²⁶ He welcomed an opportunity to collect intelligence showing Nazi connections to supposedly neutral

business circles as a means of influencing these same circles in the postwar world. As a result, Casey launched into SAFEHAVEN with such enthusiasm that he had to be restrained by Washington, in a cable dispatched on 18 January 1945:

...(W)hile SAFEHAVEN Project has certain present and potentially greater future value, no SI personnel which can possibly be used in connection agent penetration Germany...should be used for any SAFEHAVEN purpose. For this project we can be one of many supporting agencies Department State which has assumed control and direction.

*For agent penetration Germany for strategic information and for proper briefing such agents US Government can look to OSS SI only to accomplish its characteristic mission.*²⁷

This meant that SI ETO would largely confine its SAFEHAVEN activities to the areas already under Allied control. This was already the most fruitful area because, by definition, SAFEHAVEN involved assets outside Germany. By the end of the month, Casey was able to report that the “gold project” was under way in Paris, with other plans for SAFEHAVEN work in France,

Belgium, and Holland. Because these areas were already occupied by Allied forces, however, the special intelligence techniques that distinguished OSS operations proved unnecessary. Casey did not give up, though; two months later, he reported that “SAFEHAVEN work with State has shown area to be a valuable field of endeavor, especially because of the potential for leverage with German financial circles, etc., in the future,” and “Fagan SAFEHAVEN man for Embassy...feels us absolutely necessary to his work.”²⁸ Nevertheless, SI activity in this area remained a footnote to the efforts of State Department and other personnel already on the ground. An X-2 “Art Looting Investigation Unit” produced similar results.²⁹

The Iberian Peninsula

Switzerland remained the financial heart of German gold and currency transactions, but without question, for OSS the most productive areas of SAFEHAVEN activity were the other neutral centers of German commercial activity, Sweden and the Iberian Peninsula. The OSS mission in Madrid in particular had had economic intelligence as a principal function since its creation in April 1942, despite being “very considerably hampered” until shortly after VE Day by an Ambassador and diplomatic staff hostile to OSS activities.³⁰ Most OSS operatives in Spain were handled out of Lisbon under nonofficial cover because the diplomatic staff in Madrid made a practice of identifying intelligence agents to the

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Spanish police.³¹ Considering espionage against a “friendly” [sic] country³² to be “un-American,” Ambassador Carlton J. Hayes resented the OSS presence in Spain and insisted on censoring all incoming and outgoing OSS message traffic to Washington. “For a good many months,” the Embassy would not allow OSS Madrid to pass on SAFEHAVEN material, or even economic reporting, to Washington.³³

OSS Madrid nonetheless managed to provide extensive documentation of German commercial transactions throughout the war.³⁴ Bills of lading or manifests covering all merchandise shipped to France (and thence to Germany) were provided weekly, including everything from orange juice to wolfram and steel rails.³⁵ Equally important was documentation of the flagrant cooperation given the German war effort by the Spanish authorities, including the use of Spanish airfields by German aircraft, the covert supply of German submarines in Spanish harbors (Operation MORO), and in matters of espionage and counterespionage by all grades of Spanish officials.³⁶ From 1945, X-2 Madrid was able to document German economic penetration in Spain, illegal currency transfers, smuggled works of art, and plans by French collaborators, pro-Nazi individuals, and covert organizations to use Spain as a postwar hideout—as well as integration of German technicians into the Spanish military. Nearly 50 Spanish firms were identified by X-2 as having been used by Germany for espionage purposes. By VE Day, X-2 had identified some 3,000 agents in Spain and more

than 400 members of enemy clandestine services.³⁷

Operations in Portugal were made easier by that country’s traditionally pro-British stance (despite having an authoritarian regime on good terms with Franco). The local authorities provided OSS Lisbon with access to enemy safe-deposit boxes held in every bank in Portugal except four (which were covered by the British).³⁸ In January 1945, the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) of the OSS used this material to document German gold and foreign currency transactions from January 1943 to December 1944.³⁹ The Portuguese authorities were willing to extend cooperation to direct action as well. Acting on information largely provided by X-2, at the end of the war the Portuguese Government sealed up the German Embassy and withdrew recognition from German diplomatic and consular representation.⁴⁰ By war’s end, X-2 files in Lisbon listed 1,900 enemy agents and 200 enemy officials.⁴¹

Sweden

Much as in Spain and Portugal, economic reporting was a staple of intelligence activities in Sweden from the outset of American involvement in the war. Despite its

liberal democratic traditions, Sweden was Nazi Germany’s largest trading partner during the war and almost the sole source of high-grade iron ore and precision ball bearings for the German war machine. Imports of the latter from Sweden were especially important following the destruction of the VKF ball bearing plant (itself Swedish-owned) at Schweinfurt by the US Eighth Air Force in August and October 1943.⁴² OSS operatives in Swedish southern and east coast ports monitored the ore traffic and were able to provide extensive reporting on the rate and size of Swedish shipments to Germany.⁴³

From December 1943 until his arrest in May 1944, an OSS agent working in the shipping office of the SKF ball bearing plant in Goteborg supplied reports on ball bearing shipments to Germany, including serial numbers and quantities. Using this information, the Klaus Mission was able to extract an agreement from the Swedish Government to stop all future shipments of ball bearings to Germany. Intelligence data collected on iron ore shipments and exports of ball bearings were not, of course, directly related to SAFEHAVEN, but, because they accounted for much of Germany’s foreign trade with Sweden, they provided important indices that could be used to calculate specie and currency transfers.

By late 1944, German economic planners were desperate enough to try exporting crude petroleum (itself in short supply) to Sweden as a substitute for the specie payments that had funded the iron ore and ball bearing transactions.⁴⁴ Eric Erickson, an American-born Swede

working for the OSS, penetrated the German synthetic oil industry and, in addition to reporting extensively on that industry, was able to provide information on German gold and currency transactions—perhaps the best example of how it was possible to derive SAFEHAVEN material from existing OSS sources of economic and industrial intelligence.⁴⁵

By April 1945, X-2, using SI sources as well as its own, was able to document German transactions converting Swedish Kronar 100,000,000 (about \$25 million) in gold and currency into German goods (chiefly chemicals, drugs, and textiles) stored in Swedish warehouses. From at least August 1944, low-grade reporting depicted the German legation in Stockholm selling diamonds looted from the Dutch State Bank on orders from the German Reichsbank.⁴⁶ Additional activity, probably involving individuals and private firms, was documented whereby German gold was either smuggled into Sweden or converted to gasoline or salable goods.⁴⁷ This latter activity was discounted—probably correctly—in a postwar message that documented German wartime gold transfers to Sweden with official data from the Swedish *Riksbank*.⁴⁸ More difficult to document was the role of *Stockholms Enskilda Bank*, owned by the powerful Wallenberg family, which received more than \$4.5 million from the Reichsbank between May 1940 and June 1941 and was suspected of having acted as a purchasing agent (through intermediaries) for the German Government in buying up German

bonds and securities held in New York.⁴⁹

More OSS Participation

By the spring of 1945, OSS collection on the SAFEHAVEN project was extensive enough to warrant more formal treatment in the OSS hierarchy. The 30 March 1945 State Department circular warning neutral governments not to trade with Nazi Germany prompted a resurgence of effort on the part of the OSS in the collection of SAFEHAVEN material. A circular memorandum from the acting Director of Strategic Services, Edward Buxton, called on OSS to “make a substantial contribution to this program,” albeit with the caveat that “the collection of military, political, and other types of intelligence will continue to be an important function of this agency.” In fulfillment of this goal, OSS chiefs of mission were instructed to report on the status of SAFEHAVEN operations in their area. To better direct OSS participation in the program, an Economic Intelligence Collection Unit (Econic) was created under John A. Mowinckel, reporting directly to the Director’s office.⁵⁰ This unit monitored and, on occasion, synthesized SAFEHAVEN reporting into detailed reports on specific topics—for example, a massive report prepared at the request of the State Department on the activities of the Swiss firm Johann Wehrli & Co., A. G. (Wehrlibank), a private Swiss banking house with global interests then under investigation by the Justice Department for its role in

transferring private German assets overseas.⁵¹

Donovan’s Objective

This move by OSS Washington probably did not have much impact on the SAFEHAVEN intelligence effort in the field, which had been operating for more than three months. Rather, it should be seen as a part of the effort by OSS Director Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan, to carve out a place for his organization in the postwar world. Two reports were filed in the Director’s office at this time that were relevant to SAFEHAVEN, both of which were critical (at least by implication) of the State Department’s efforts in this area. One, written by R&A, correctly placed German import and transfer activity in context with the development of the German war economy since 1933, in effect discrediting the whole notion of a concerted program to fund a resurgent Fourth Reich using assets concealed in neutral countries.⁵² The other, prepared by X-2, launched a direct attack on SAFEHAVEN. Noting that “There are many problems in the SAFEHAVEN program, mainly due to the inexperience and general lack of comprehension on the part of State Department personnel,” the X-2 report argued that the project consumed personnel and resources that might better be used elsewhere. The basic flaw in the program was that it failed to distinguish between transactions that were part of “German power politics” and those that occurred in another, albeit related context—that is, the actions of individuals and

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individual corporations. Asserting that “the defeat of the Axis will not end the game of power politics between nations,” the report projected that “SAFEHAVEN may turn out to be less important than the collection of economic, political, and social intelligence in connection with other problems and other foreign countries.... SAFEHAVEN should be the starting point for large-scale and permanent economic intelligence for the protection and promotion of our economic and political interests abroad.”⁵³

In the intelligence requirements generated by SAFEHAVEN, Donovan clearly saw an argument for the existence of a central intelligence organization like the OSS after the end of the war. With this in mind, he passed the reports along to Senator Harley Kilgore, then heading a Senatorial investigation of the elimination of German war resources. Nonetheless, such action could hardly overcome the opposition that had been building to Donovan’s idea of a postwar central intelligence organization since his first proposal was ventilated in September 1943.

Postwar Restructuring

Thus it was that on 20 September 1945 the OSS was abolished by Executive Order and its component parts absorbed by various agencies in the Washington bureaucracy. R&A was absorbed by the State Department’s Interim Research and Intelligence Service, while SI and X-2 were moved into the War Department as the Strategic

Services Unit (SSU). On 22 January 1946, President Truman created a temporary Central Intelligence Group (CIG) as a body for the coordination of intelligence activities on the national level. Clandestine human-source collection remained in the War Department until the creation of the CIA in 1947.

With the end of the war in Europe, first the OSS and then the SSU began to shift resources away from support of the SAFEHAVEN program into other areas, especially collection against the Soviet Union.⁵⁴ Efforts by FEA and State Department representatives in Europe to revitalize SAFEHAVEN ran up against the stone wall of budgetary limitations. On 20 July 1945, SI Paris cabled OSS Washington:

Original definition of Safe Haven, namely tracking down German capital and assets abroad, has been very substantially broadened by (Klaus) of FEA now in Washington and Fagen of Embassy, they claim under instructions of Washington. They have asked that under Safe Haven we should now gather intelligence on “external security” namely, all German activities abroad, cultural and

*political as well as economic and financial, in short, the entire non-military SI field of activity.... We pointed out that we were presently contracting, not expanding, our activities and that his wishes and the particular targets he was suggesting required substantial additional personnel.*⁵⁵

Noting that “We would be happy to undertake intelligence operation (of this kind) and are physically equipped to do so,” Washington replied that “...no funds (are) available,” and recommended that State “officially urge OSS to procure additional funds for such purposes....”⁵⁶ No such pressure was forthcoming; to the contrary, although SAFEHAVEN remained important, with the end of the war in Europe the role of intelligence reporting in the project began to diminish. That same month, lack of Treasury and State interest prompted OSS to begin rolling up economic reporting networks in the Iberian Peninsula.⁵⁷ OSS and SSU reporting on sequestered German assets continued under the rubric of Project JETSAM, but at a much lower level of effort.

The haste with which the United States detached itself from its first central intelligence organization at the end of the war thus was replicated in Project SAFEHAVEN. As elsewhere in the government, however, the trend away from a general reliance on intelligence sources almost immediately reversed itself in the postwar follow-on to SAFEHAVEN, as the Western Allies sought to use the information collected in wartime to seek

restoration of those assets looted by Nazi Germany.

Settling Accounts

Geography and chance had left the Western Allies in control of the Reichsbank archives, as well as the vast bulk of the gold reserves remaining in Germany at the end of the war. With virtually all of Europe economically devastated and dependent on US aid for the most basic requirements of sustenance, the Western Allies thus were presented with both the opportunity and the means to compel a general settling of accounts. Switzerland was the most obvious target.⁵⁸ The Swiss had profited mightily from World War II, having taken in (by Allied estimate) \$781-785 million in Nazi gold, of which \$579 million (or 74 percent) had been looted from the victims of Nazi aggression.⁵⁹ Indeed, the postwar prosperity of Switzerland was based largely on the immense profits made from Nazi Germany in the war. On the other hand, for the Swiss, the situation in the immediate postwar period was potentially dire. Having been geographically and economically isolated from non-Nazi Europe for nearly five years, the Swiss desperately need to reconstruct the export-based economy that had existed before World War II. This, in large measure, depended on the willingness of the United States and its Allies to negotiate the trade agreements necessary to sustain a viable export economy. Moreover, Switzerland was unable to feed itself and depended totally on the Allies for the imports of food and fuel it

needed to survive. Thus, there was little the Swiss Government could do to prevent the Western Allies from imposing the most punitive settlement necessary to obtain the restoration of looted German gold, should they wish to do so.

In this, the Swiss were indeed fortunate that they were negotiating with the Western Allies and not their wartime trading partners. Although the Swiss Government was haunted by fear of the economic pressure that might be imposed throughout its negotiations with the United States, at no point did the Allies make use of their position to compel an agreement. In the end the settlement negotiated with the Swiss Government fell afoul of the Cold War and the consequent shift in postwar priorities away from the problems created by Nazi Germany. The settlement ultimately reached was essentially unsatisfactory for the Allies: the Swiss agreed to a token payment of \$58 million, and a 50-percent share of the value realized from liquidating German assets in Switzerland.

The negotiations with the Swiss Government were nonetheless noteworthy as this was perhaps the first time that US diplomacy was supported by a system of national intelligence reporting. Although the surviving documentation is fragmentary, it is clear that the Allied negotiators were fully supported by the nascent SSU and possibly also by communications intelligence provided by the Army Security Agency, predecessor of the National Security Agency.⁶⁰

Complicated Negotiations

Although preliminaries were under way as of the summer of 1945, the negotiations themselves did not begin until early the next year. In addition to the intelligence collected for SAFEHAVEN, the Allies had access to the extensive files of the Reichsbank and the *Auswärtiges Amt*, the German Foreign Office. They thus had full documentation of the movement of looted German gold, and especially gold looted from the Belgian National Bank into Switzerland. The Allies were particularly indignant over an exchange of letters between the Swiss National Bank and *Reichsbankvizepräsident* Emil Puhl revealing that the Swiss had been conducting commercial negotiations with the Nazi government at the same time that they were making an agreement with the Allies to block German assets in Switzerland.⁶¹

As negotiations got under way, the chief of the SSU, Gen. John A. Magruder, finally mobilized the SSU Mission in Bern to obtain reporting on Swiss negotiating goals and tactics. The head of the Swiss delegation to Washington, Dr. Walter Stucki, was an especially important target. Priority tasking began in March 1946. Two urgent messages were dispatched from SSU Washington that month: on the 14th, requesting "...any possible information on instructions particularly general line of defense given Stucki," followed by a "priority" request on the 19th for "...instructions to Stucki delegation re willingness Suisse permit Allied seizure German funds for use for

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None of the intelligence collected for SAFEHAVEN was useful in identifying assets that had been stolen from Jews and other victims of the Holocaust and Nazi aggression.

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reparations.... Was committee allowed latitude for decision here?”⁶²

Responding to this task, SSU Bern contacted a “reliable source” close enough to the Swiss Foreign Office to report on the thinking of Max Petitpierre, head of the Political Department and the man ultimately responsible for negotiating an agreement with the Western Allies. The reporting showed Petitpierre and a majority of the Swiss Federal Council to be “convinced” that granting Allied claims to German assets was “indispensable.” Petitpierre, a Radical Democrat, was said to be particularly concerned for the coming Swiss elections and apprehensive of a conservative reaction to Swiss resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. On 21 March, he told the SSU source that he earnestly desired to settle “the present misunderstanding with the United States to counterbalance this gesture of friendship toward the East.”

The Swiss were further prepared to accede to the demand that Allied representatives be admitted to Switzerland to track down concealed German assets, which the socialist segment of the Council admitted considerably exceeded the official estimate. According to this report, the most important Swiss demand was for reimbursement for approximately SFr 500,000,000 in unpaid-for goods shipped to Germany during the war. This they planned to take from the outstanding balance of a prewar German loan for building the Gotthard Tunnel and from German investments in the Swiss railway system.⁶³

Although this intelligence was passed to State Department on 22 March, it is far from clear that it had any immediate effect on the progress of the negotiations. For a long time, the two sides were too far apart for any progress to be made. Dr. Stucki, the head of the Swiss delegation, was a hard bargainer whose attitude contrasted sharply with the more conciliatory posture adopted by the Swiss Foreign Office in Bern. He had considerable latitude in negotiating with the Allies, and he was determined to make the best possible deal. Frustrated by the lack of progress, Stucki nevertheless retreated slowly and cautiously to his final negotiating position, apparently adhering strictly to what must have been his instructions before he left Bern.⁶⁴ He never once surrendered any moral ground. On the other hand, the intelligence that came out of SSU Bern is strong evidence that Petitpierre and the Federal Council were willing to be more flexible than they appeared in Washington—possibly even to the extent of increasing the sum they were willing to offer as restitution.⁶⁵ Moreover, the Swiss were concerned the Allies might exploit their considerable economic leverage to force them into an agreement on unfavorable terms.

It was difficult for Washington to resolve the contrast between the more flexible posture on the gold issue reportedly adopted by the Swiss Foreign Office in Bern with the firm stance taken by Walther Stucki in Washington. On 27 March, SSU chief General Magruder complained to Bern, “Everything [that the] Swiss delegation has said to date,” contradicted the information that had been received from the field, and requested that SSU Bern immediately confirm its previous reporting: “Much depends on it.”⁶⁶

At the end of the month, Stucki returned to Switzerland to discuss the progress of the negotiations with the Foreign Office. He spent about a week in Bern. On 10 April 1946, SSU Washington cabled Bern placing an “urgent” requirement for “Information re Stucki’s new instructions and report of his activities during the week he spent in Switzerland....”⁶⁷ By this point, however, SSU Bern was reporting all intelligence obtained on German assets in Switzerland directly to the Ambassador and was mute on the subject in its communications with SSU Washington.⁶⁸ No reply has been found.⁶⁹

Reaching Agreement

Over the next two weeks negotiations became acrimonious, with both sides still far apart. On 15 April, Stucki expressed his concern that the United States was obtaining information on his instructions directly from a source in Bern.⁷⁰ On 23 April, negotiations collapsed, Stucki having walked out of a session at which the Allies demanded

\$130 million for the reconstruction of Europe. Almost immediately, however, Stucki countered with an offer of SFr 200,000,000 (\$46.4 million).⁷¹ The next day he voiced his conviction that the State Department was leaking information from Bern to the American press corps on how far the Swiss were willing to go in making restitution.⁷² While each leak is impossible to confirm, the negotiators in Washington probably were receiving further reporting on the Swiss negotiating posture, with information likely being provided directly to the Ambassador as it was received. On 30 April, Magruder cabled the Bern again, "What instructions were given to Stucki on gold? How far can he go and how much has he been authorized to pay?"⁷³ The following day the Allies rejected the Swiss offer, upon which Stucki made his final proposal: SFr 250,000,000 (\$58.1 million) and half the proceeds from liquidating the German assets in Switzerland.⁷⁴ Again, no human source reporting has been found in response to Magruder's cable to Bern, but this time the American head of delegation, Randolph Paul, apparently was persuaded that there was no point to further negotiations.⁷⁵ After much discussion, on 21 May 1946 the Allies accepted Stucki's final offer.

Renewed Interest

With the conclusion of the Allied-Swiss negotiations, the files on Projects SAFEHAVEN and JETSAM were closed, and the operations themselves all but forgotten until, just over half a century later, a new

generation of researchers discovered them in a renewed search for "Nazi gold."⁷⁶ In an effort prompted by the passing of the generation chiefly victimized by the Holocaust and World War II, a team of government historians revisited the ground covered by the OSS in its efforts to track down underground sources of German industrial and commercial power. Their task was to find out what the US Government knew about Nazi efforts to exploit gold and other valuables looted from conquered countries and stolen from individual victims of the Holocaust to feed the German war effort. What they found in the SAFEHAVEN files was a mother lode of intelligence reporting on German international commercial and fiscal transactions in 1944 and 1945.

Unfortunately, none of the intelligence collected for SAFEHAVEN was useful in identifying assets that had been stolen from Jews and other victims of the Holocaust and Nazi aggression. Because of the nature of the transactions, because key records remained closed, and because the Nazis went to great lengths to conceal the origins of the gold, currencies, and other valuables transferred into neutral countries, these assets were more or less anonymous by the time they came under the purview of SAFEHAVEN collectors. There was voluminous reporting concerning transfers of gold and currency among Nazi Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Sweden, and other countries; efforts to conceal German-owned assets in neutral and non-belligerent countries at the end of the war; and attempts to transfer

assets through Spain and Portugal to South America. Although it is nearly certain that gold and other valuables stolen from European Jews figured in these transactions, these assets probably could never be separated from the much larger quantity of booty looted from Europe as a whole. Nevertheless, apart from documenting the major channels of German economic activity, these findings were valuable in that they showed US secret intelligence organizations to have been assiduous in their support of US Government policy. In the final analysis, that is what is most important.

Notes:

1. *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter cited as FRUS), 1944, Vol. II, pp. 215-16.
2. *US and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany During World War II* (hereinafter Eizenstat Report), *Preliminary Study* (May 1997), p. 15.
3. Arthur L. Smith, Jr. *Hitler's Gold: The Story of the Nazi War Loot*, (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1989, 1996), p. 68.
4. Eizenstat Report, p. 15.
5. Ironically, the FEA was administratively subordinated to the Treasury Department and made up principally of Treasury Department officials. Klaus's formal title was "Special Assistant to the General Counsel of the Treasury Department."
6. Klaus Report to Currie, Coe, and Cox, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. Quoted in the Eizenstat report, pp. 16-17. See also Margaret Clarke, *The*

Safehaven Project, Foreign Economic Administration Study #5 (Washington, DC, 1945), p. 46.

7. Eizenstat Report, p. 21.
8. In Bern, for example, SAFEHAVEN was almost exclusively the responsibility of X-2, SI being preoccupied with political, economic, and military reporting. In Madrid, the hostility of the US Ambassador to intelligence collection meant that X-2 assumed the task by default. OSS *War Report*, Vol. II, pp. 31-35, 283. All citations to this document refer to the declassified two-volume version in the possession of the CIA History Staff. The entire *War Report* is available in one-volume form in Anthony Cave-Brown, *The Secret War Report of the OSS* (New York: Berkeley, 1976).
9. Alan S. Milward, *The German Economy at War*, London: The Athlone Press, 1965; pp. 192-94. See also, *idem.*, "The Reichsmark Bloc and the International Economy" in H. W. Koch, ed., *Aspects of the Third Reich* (New York: St. Martin's, 1985), pp. 331-59.
10. Bern #246 to Washington, 23 April 1946. Intercepted Swiss diplomatic traffic also shows that the Swiss knew that they had accepted SFr 378,000,000 in looted Belgian gold. This gold had been deposited with the Bank of France in 1939 and was turned over to the German Government by the puppet Vichy regime. Swiss justification for this was that "the only way in which Belgian gold got into German hands was through the Laval government." Washington #256, to Bern; 25 April 1946.
11. A fundamental error committed by the planners of SAFEHAVEN (as well as X-2) was the assumption that the actions of individual German corporations and Nazi leaders necessarily represented the policy of the National Socialist regime. Although there were some attempts by parts of the regime to plan for underground activities after the war (such as the half-mythical *Werewolf* program), they were far less important than ever imagined by the SAFEHAVEN planners. The vast bulk of the attempts to conceal wealth in foreign countries detected by the SAFEHAVEN program were initiated by individuals and individual corporations anticipating the imminent collapse of the Reich. RG 226, Entry 116, Records of the Office of Strategic Services; Office of the Director, Microfilm Publication 1642, Reel 108; Murphy to Mowinckel, 4 June 1945, "X-2 Case Materials Illustrating German SAFEHAVEN Practices."
12. RG 226, Entry 116, Records of the OSS; Office of the Director, Microfilm Publication 1642, Reel 108; Murphy to Mowinckel, 4 June 1945, 66 "X-2 Case Materials Illustrating German SAFEHAVEN Practices."
13. RG 226, Entry 116, Records of the OSS; Office of the Director, Microfilm Publication 1642, Reel 108. Cable: Washington 16234. To 148 from Callisen, 19 December 1945.
14. Peter Grose, *Gentleman Spy. The Life of Allen Dulles*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1994), pp. 169-70.
15. RG 226, Entry 99, Box 13, Folder 41-1 OSS History Office, Cable Digest; 23 March 1945, #7387 21 March 1945, 110 (Dulles) to Washington.
16. Neal H. Petersen, ed.; *From Hitler's Doorstep: The Wartime Intelligence Reports of Allen Dulles, 1942-1945*, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996, p. 561.)
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 464, 524, 633.
18. Nb., 496 was OSS source Maurice Villars, a General Director of the Zurich Electro-Bank.
19. RG 226, Entry 116, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, Office of the Director, Microfilm Publication 1642, Reel 108. Cable: Bern 2677, 28 December 1944.
20. Because Switzerland was surrounded by Axis territory, it was impossible to provide OSS Bern with personnel to take on additional tasks for most of the war. Until the end of 1944, OSS Bern had a staff of just three intelligence officers, including Dulles. OSS *War Report*, Vol. II, p. 273.
21. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 283
22. In Operation LAURA, under way by February 1946, X-2 was able to document quantities of gold shipped from Switzerland to the Iberian Peninsula. Unfortunately, none of the reporting appears to have been preserved. CIA Job 79-00332A, Box 191, Folder 14, Joyce from Blum "(Bern) X-2 Progress Report," 1 February 1946.
23. RG 226, Entry 116, Records of the OSS; Office of the Director, Microfilm Publication 1642, Reel 108; Murphy to Mowinckel, 4 June 1945, "X-2 Case Materials Illustrating German SAFEHAVEN Practices."
24. Examples: on 26 February 1945, Bern reported that Nazi funds were being sent abroad, not through ordinary banking channels, but through other banks, to include the Dresdenerbank, the Fromberg Bank in Berlin, and the Wehrlibank in Switzerland (Robert Louis Benson and Michael Warner, ed. *Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American Response* (Washington, DC: National Security Agency & Central Intelligence Agency, 1996), pp. 219-20); Dulles provided photos of clandestinely obtained German reports documenting a December 1944 trip to Bern by Reichsbank Vice President Emil Puhl; plans for the manufacture of *Nebelwerfer* (rocket launchers) in Switzerland (both RG 226, Entry 123, Box 2 Folder 5); similar documents describing how German gold and Reichsmarks might be converted to Portuguese escudos through Switzerland (RG 226, Entry 123, Box 2 Folder 26); on 23 March 1945 a report describing

- how quantities of German gold were converted into lire by exploiting loopholes in Swiss currency laws (RG 226, Entry 108, Bern B-2118: 23 March 1945); on 16 April 1945, a report documenting German penetration of the Swiss consumer goods industry (RG 226, Entry 108, Report B-2472 16 April 1945).
25. RG 226, Entry 108, boxes 4-10 OSS Bern files, *passim*.
 26. William Casey, *The Secret War Against Hitler* (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1988), pp. 236-37.
 27. RG 226, Entry 116, Records of the OSS, Office of the Director, Microfilm Publication 1942, Reel 108. Cable: 4174, to 908 and Casey from 154 (Shepardson) 18 January 1945.
 28. RG 226, Entry 116, Records of the OSS, Office of the Director, Microfilm Publication 1642, Reel 108. Cable: Paris 9804, 154 (Shepardson) from Casey, Cassidy, Acheson; 8 March 1945.
 29. *OSS War Report, Vol. I*, p. 196.
 30. RR 226, Entry 116, Records of the OSS, Office of the Director, Microfilm Publication 1542, Reel 108. Cable: Paris 9804, 154 (Shepardson) from Casey, Cassidy, Acheson; 8 March 1945.
 31. *OSS War Report, Vol. I*, p. 196.
 32. Although frequently referred to as such, Spain was not a neutral in World War II, but was a "non-belligerent" power allied with Germany, Italy, and Japan. In November 1940, Franco's Foreign Minister, Ramon Serano Suner, signed a secret protocol by which Spain became an "adherent" of the Tripartite Pact signed on 27 September 1940 by Germany, Italy, and Japan (the so-called Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis). Spain also agreed to enter the war at some unspecified future date.
 - Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, volume XI, The War Years: September 1, 1940-January 31, 1941*; pp. 466-67, 479. See also Malcolm Muggeridge, ed.; *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers* (London: Odhams Press, Ltd., 1948), pp. 405-08.
 33. RG 226, entry 99, Box 20, Folder 64 Lisbon 329 Elton from 983: "Present Status of Safe Haven in Madrid; and Elaboration of King 58 of May 26, 1945."
 34. For Spain's place in the Nazi war economy, see Herbert Feis, *Spanish Story* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948).
 35. *OSS War Report, Vol. II*, p. 32.
 36. Charles B. Burdick, "'MORO:' the Resupply of German Submarines in Spain, 1939-1942," *Central European History* (1970): *OSS War Report, Vol. II*, p. 32.
 37. RG 226, Entry 116, Records of the OSS; Office of the Director, Microfilm Publication 1642, Reel 108; Murphy to Mowinckel, 4 June 1945, "X-2 Case Materials Illustrating German SAFEHAVEN Practices."
 38. *OSS War Report, Vol. II*, p. 37.
 39. RG 226, Entry 116, Records of the OSS, Office of the Director, Microfilm Publication 1642, Reel 108. Memorandum: Donovan from Despres, 29 November 1944.
 40. RG 226, Entry 116, Records of the OSS, Office of the Director, Microfilm Publication 1642, Reel 108. Cable: Lisbon 7247, 6 May 1945.
 41. *OSS War Report, Vol. II*, p. 36.
 42. The German VKF, *Vereinigte Kugellagerfabriken, A. G.*, was a subsidiary of *Svenska Kullagerfabriken*, (SKF), owned by the Swedish *Stockholms Enskilda Bank*. Although German requirements were met by a combination of domestic produc-
 - tion and imports from Sweden, about two-thirds of the ball bearings used in the German war effort were, in effect, produced by the same company. See Martin Fritz, "Swedish Ball Bearings and the German War Economy," *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, (1975).
 43. *OSS War Report, Vol. II*, p. 261. For the importance of high-grade Swedish iron ore to the German war economy, see Martin Fritz, *German Steel and Swedish Iron Ore, 1939-1945* (Goteborg: Ekanders Boktryckeri Artiebolag, 1974) and an exchange among Martin Fritz, Jorg-Johannes Jager, Rolf Karlhom, and Alan S. Milward in *Scandinavian Economic History Review* (1965, 1967, 1968, 1973).
 44. The Germans also envisaged the plan as a means of avoiding Allied strategic bombing attacks on the German oil industry: refinery production above and beyond Sweden's requirements would be re-exported to Germany. RG 226, Entry 116, Records of the OSS, Office of the Director, Microfilm Publication 1642, Reel 108. Cable: Enclosure No. 1 to Stockholm 4393, 28 October 1944.
 45. *OSS War Report, Vol. II*, pp. 262-63. Erickson's career (with many fictional details) is the subject of Alexander Klein's *Counterfeit Traitor* (New York: Henry Holt, 1958).
 46. RG 226, Entry 108, Box 316, Folder T-2200, "Germans Selling Diamonds in Stockholm," 11 August 1944. All wartime intelligence reporting was graded according to the reliability of the information and the source from which it was obtained. This report is graded "C-3," almost the lowest possible rating.
 47. RG 226, Entry 116, Records of the OSS; Office of the Director, Microfilm Publication 1642, Reel 108; Murphy to Mowinckel, 4 June 1945, "X-2 Case Materials Illustrating German SAFEHAVEN Practices." For

examples, see RG 226, Entry 108, Box 316, Folder T-2200; "Enemy Capital in Sweden," 14 August 1944—also a low-grade intelligence report, but typical of the kind of information obtained.

48. RG 226, Entry 108, Box 25, Folder 143. Dispatch: Stockholm 7063 Secretary of State from Ravndal, "Transmission of Information Concerning Shipments of Gold Between Sweden and Germany" SAFEHAVEN, 20 May 1946.
49. RG 226, Entry 183, Box 27, Folder 157; London 165: SAFEHAVEN No. 413, "Financial Contraband, Stockholm, Enskilda Bank, Stockholm," 8 May 1946. See also Gerard Aalders and Cees Wiebes, *The Secret Collaboration and Protection of the German War Industry by the Neutrals: The Case of Sweden* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1996).
50. RG 226, Entry 116, Records of the OSS, Office of the Director, Microfilm Publication 1642, Reel 108. Circular Memorandum for All Strategic Services Officers and Chiefs from Acting D/SS (Acting Director of Strategic Services), 16 April 1945.
51. RG 226, Entry 183, Box 21, "Wehrli combine," n.d. The economic report was based on intelligence data to complement an audit of the Wehrli-bank books by the US firm Price, Waterhouse & Co., conducted under joint British and American auspices.
52. RG 226, Entry 116, Records of the OSS, Office of the Director, Microfilm Publication 1642, Reel 108. Memorandum: Donovan from Neumann via Langer, "German Economic Penetration Abroad," 2 June 1945.
53. RG 226, entry 116, Records of the OSS, Office of the Director, Microfilm Publication 1642, Reel 108. Memorandum: Donovan from George, "RE Rebuilding of German Economic, Political, and Military Power Positions Abroad by the Evasion of Allied Controls over the Exit of German Assets and Personnel from Germany (SAFEHAVEN)," n.d., but context places it in April-June 1945.
54. Topics were sometimes similar: in June 1946, Bern was tasked to report on the Russian interests of the Swiss-owned Oerlikon Company, earlier a target of SAFEHAVEN reporting because of its connections with Germany. SSU Washington #1119, 18 June 1946.
55. RG 226/Entry 134A, Box 9, Folder 26. Paris #22534: Shepardson from Sherman, 20 July 1945.
56. RG 226/Entry 134A, Box 9, Folder 26. OSS Washington #23584: Horton for Sherman from 154, 28 July 1945.
57. RG 226/Entry 134A, Box 9, Folder 26. Lisbon #7687: Patina from Grant and Elton, 19 July 1945; OSS Washington #8817. JETSAM. Grant and Elton from Patina, 23 July 1945.
58. From Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, and Argentina, the Western Allies sought and obtained the restoration of gold and other assets looted by the Germans. These countries were, however, generally cooperative and the necessary agreements were more easily obtained.
59. Eizenstat Report, pp. xi-xii. To approximate 1997 gold values, multiply these figures by 9.74. But given the devastation of Europe and the wild variations in the standard of living from country to country and from day to day, there is no simple way to quantitatively measure the purchasing power of this amount of gold or its impact on the world economy as a whole.
60. In what apparently was a continuation of collection programs established in wartime, the ASA collected and read all Swiss diplomatic telegrams sent in from the summer of 1945 to the summer of 1946. The Swiss used a variant of the same ENIGMA cipher machine used by the European Axis in World War II. Their diplomatic traffic thus could be read by the means used to read German ENIGMA ciphers. This frequently took time, however, and it is not clear that these messages were read in time to be useful to the Allied negotiators.
61. Eizenstat Report, pp. 68-69.
62. RG 226/Entry 134A, Box 9, Folder 26. SSU Washington #WASH 2083 (Bern) BRUCC from Magruder (14 March 1946); #WASH 2159: (Bern) BRUCC for Joyce from Magruder (19 March 1946).
63. RG 226/Entry 108A, Box 1, Folder 9. Walter S. Surrey, Esq.; Division of Economic Security Controls, Department of State from Chairman, Reporting Board SSU; 22 March 1946.
64. On 26 April, he cabled Bern, "The American methods of carrying on negotiations are strange and hardly comprehensible to us. You should tell the Allies that the Delegation has received final instructions without mentioning a figure or hinting at one in any way." Bern (Politique) from Washington (Swiss legation) #310 (26 April 1946) Army Security Agency Diplomatic Translations #H-23017 (29 March 1946), #H-231119 (25 April 1946), #H-231208 (26 April 1946), #H-231271 (25 April 1946), #H-232235 (12 April 1946), #H-234376 (15 April 1946).
65. Army Security Agency Diplomatic Translation #H-232244 (4 May 1946).
66. SSU Washington #WASH 2434: (Bern) BRUCC from Magruder, 27 March 1946.

67. RG 226/Entry 134A, Box 9, Folder 6. SSU Washington #WASH 2829: (Bern) BRUCC from War Department Strategic Services Unit, 10 April 1946.
68. RG 226/Entry 134A, Box 9, Folder 26. SSU Bern #438: War Department Strategic Services Unit from (Bern) BRUCC, 11 APRIL 1946.
69. On 25 March, SSU Washington cabled Bern, "State considers Bern 337...valuable and timely. Congratulations. Cable any further developments" (RG 226/Entry 134A/Box 9/Folder 26. SSU Washington #WASH 2352: (Bern) BRUCC from Magruder, 26 March 1946). "Bern 337," which apparently was sent between 14 and 21 March must have been the basis for the intelligence report that was provided to Walter Surrey at the State Department (RG 226/Entry 108A, Box 1, Folder 6. Walter S. Surrey, Esq.; Division of Economic Security controls, Department of State from Chairman, Reporting Board SSU; 22 March 1946). The original cable, however, has not yet been found in the Archives. We do not know whether further information was obtained from this source, but SSU Washington cabled Bern on 10 April, "Memo from Walter Surrey of State rates your original material re Stucki of utmost value," suggesting that some additional (as opposed to the "original") intelligence material was obtained later on (RG 226/Entry 134A, Box 9, Folder 26. SSU Washington #WASH 2829: (Bern) BRUCC from Quinn, 10 April 1946.
70. Army Security Agency Diplomatic Translation #H-234376 (15 April 1946).
71. Army Security Agency Diplomatic Translation #H232831 (25 April 1946).
72. Stucki went on to opine that perhaps some diplomatic correspondence "which went by ordinary airmail in spite of warnings, was opened by censorship...." Bern (Politique) from Washington (Swiss legation) #305 Army Security Agency diplomatic Translation #H232831 (25 April 1946).
73. RG 226/Entry 134A/Box 9/Folder 26. SSU Washington #WASH 3427: (Bern) BRUCC from War Department Strategic Services Unit, 30 April 1946.
74. Arthur L. Smith, Jr. *Hitler's Gold: The Story of the Nazi War Loot* (Oxford: Berg, 1996), p. 82.
75. Eizenstat Report, pp. 81-83.
76. The results were published in the Eizenstat Report. See above, fn. 2.

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